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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
June 11, 1981, Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 80-1749
SD Miss

FERC & EDWARDS, Sec'y
of Energy

v.
MISSISSIPPI, et al.
1.

SUMMARY.

~

Timely

Federal/Civil

The DC held unconstitutional a variety of

provisions in the
(PURPA), 92 Stat. 3117, that required state utility authorities
to consider certain energy-conservation measures and to adopt
certain others.

The DC based its decision on the Commerce

Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Suprem;r1clause, and the
guarantee of a republican form of government.
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FACTS & HOLDING BELOW.

PURPA was one of a quintet of

------

statutes adopted in November 1978 to counter national enerqy

----

problems.l

This particular statute addresses problems of

electrical generation and their impact on nationwide consumption
~------------------------~

of oil and natural gas.
Titles I and III.

Titles I and III, administered primarily

by the Sec'y of Energy, require state agencies that regulate
utilities to consider the adoption of specific rate designs and
standards.
of

These titles have three common goals:

conservation~

facilities and
15

u.s.c.

§

(1) promotion

(2) optimization of the efficient use of

resources~ and (3) equitable rates for consumers. ~

3201~

16

u.s.c.

3201.

§

More specifically, § 111, 16

u.s.c.

§

2621, requires state

IL

-

authorities to consider including in rate schedules various
certain provisions that would pass through to each consumer the
true cost of service to that

consumer~

~'

-

adjusting rates by

season and by time of day and lowered rates for consumers
consenting to interruption of service during peak demand periods.
Consideration must have commenced by November 8, 1980, and be
completed by November 8, 1981.

In addition, § 113, 16

u.s.c.

§

2623, requires consideration of regulations that would mandate
various other conservation

techniques~

~'

unit-by-unit

metering in new buildings, restricting automatic pass-through of
cost increases, and prohibiting pass-through of advertising costs

lThe other statutes were the National Gas Policy Act of
1978 (NGPA), 92 Stat. 3350~ the National Energy Conservation
Policy Act, 92 Stat. 3206~ the Energy Tax Act of 1978, 92 Stat.
3174~ and the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 92
Stat. 3289.

-

to consumers.

3 -

Title III, through§ 303, 15 U.S.C. § 3203,

mandates consideration of the § 113 regulations for natural gas
utilities, and § 114 in Title I, 16

u.s.c.

§

2624, of whether

rates should be reduced for essential uses by residential
consumers.

A dec is ion on § 113 regulations and related measures

was due by November 8, 1980.
The statute imposed no direct penalties for failure to meet
these deadlines.

--

PURPA does, however, mandate procedures for

consideration of these regulations.
hearing, with notice.

There must be a public

If the regulatory authority does not adopt

the PURPA regulations, it must issue a written statement of its

I

reasons.

"Any person" may bring an action to compel the hearing

and decision.

The Secretary, affected utilities, and consumers

may intervene in Title I standards: only the Secretary has a
right to intervene in natural-gas cases under Title III.

These

intervenors may seek judicial review in state courts of the
agency decision on Title I matters: the Secretary may participate
as an amicus curiae in Title III judicial review.

Title I and

III also incorporate reporting requirements regarding Title I.
Title II, § 210.

This provision is designed to encourage

"cogeneration" (i.e., joint production of electricity and thermal
energy, such as heat or steam) and "small power production
facilities"

(i.e., facilities generating no more than 80

meagwatts through the use of biomass, waste, or renewable
resources such as wind, water, or solar power).

PERC is required

to promulgate, after consultation with state regulatory agencies,
rules to encourage these two activities, including rules
requiring purchase of electricity from these sources.
§

824a-3.

16

u.s.c.

This section also requires state agencies to implement

- 4 the rules, and authorizes FERC to enforce such requirements
against state agencies in federal courts.

FERC has adopted

implementing rules.
PURPA also authorizes the Secretary to make grants to state
agencies to defray the costs of compliance.
Proceedings Below.

In April 1979, Appellees State of

Mississippi and Miss Public Service Commission filed this action
in the USDC for SD Miss against the appellants (FERC and the
Sec'y of Energy)

challenging the constitutionality of Titles I

and III and§ 210.

-

The third appellee, the Miss Power

&~ight

Co., was allowed to intervene on behalf of the State and the
------------------~--~~----------~-------------

Public Service Commission.

-

------

....

On cross-motions for summarv judgment, Judge ~ eld these

provisions unconstitutional.

In an opinion filed February 19,

1981, he stated that these provisions exceed Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause:

the Framers could not have envisioned

federal regulation of the rates of utitilities such as
telephones, electricity, and natural gas.
authority over purely intrastate consumers.

They also usurp state
In a judgment order

filed February 27, Judge Cox stated that Titles I and III and§
210
"are unconstitutional and void in that they constitute a
direct intrusion on integral and traditional functions of
the State of Missippi and violate the Constitution of the
United States, especially the Tenth Amendment, the Supremacy
Clause [Art. VI, § 2], anda republican form of government as
guaranteed by Article IV, Section 4 . . . • " App to Juris
Statement at 9a.2

2For a discussion of the arguments regarding the Supremacy
Clause and the guarantee of a republic form of government, see
infra, at 6.

- 5 -

3.

CONTENTIONS.

The SG believes the contested provisions

of PURPA are clearly within the Commerce Clause and do not
intrude into state sovereignty.

The Federal Govt may regulate

intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce, and
regulation of the supply of electricity and natural gas to
consumers falls within this authority.

Intrusiveness into state

affairs is a closer question, but this statute does not exceed
the limits imposed by the Tenth Amendment.

This is not a case in

which Congress has displaced state decisionmaking in an area
traditionally governed by the States, National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426

u.s.

833 (1976), for federal and state governments

have been exercising concurrent jurisdiction over public utitlies
for over 60 years.

Thus, this is not a function traditionally

intrusted to the States, such as police and fire protection,
public health, and sanittion.
of Frv v. United States, 421

In addition, Usery's distinction

u.s.

542 (1975), indicates that

federal regulation of state matters is permitted when necessary
to counter a serious nationwide problem that can only be
addressed through a single national program and, in such cases,
when the interference with ultimate state decisionmaking.

The

energy crisis, like inflation, is a serious concern that can be
attacked only through a unified national program.

Title I and

III let the States make the ultimate decisions, and the
regulation stops short of wholly preempting state authority in
this area.

These issues are substantial enough to merit the

Court's attention.
The appellees have filed two motions to affirm, one jointly
from the State and the State Commission and the other from the

- 6 Miss Power & Light Co.3
insubstantial.

All three believe the SG's argumentsare

PURPA interferes greatly with matters under the

sovereign power of the States.

It also structures the internal

operation of state utility regulation through its procedural
provisions.

PURPA does not address a serious national problem,

for the Dept of Energy has acknowledged PURPA may save only
160,000 barrels of oil a day, a figure the Sec'y has
independently indicated will have only a slight effect on
imports.

This is not a limited regulation of a short duration,

as Usery characterized the wage freeze in

Fry~

rather, it is a

long term matter.
Miss Power & Light Co. add that PURPA really noes not
regulate
commerce.

commerce~

it regulates state governments' regulation of

Thus, it exceeds the Commerce Clause.

establishing federal law as state law,
law under the Supremacy Clause.

In addition, by

it confuses the ranking of

Finally, by imposing rules and

regulation on States that they did not adopt through their
elected representatives, PURPA fails to ensure the State a
republican form of government.
4.

DISCUSSION.

Obviously, the issue is substantial.

statute clearly is authorized by the Commerce Clause.

The

In

general, it probably does not violate the Tenth Amendment,
although I am troubled by the provisions that establish state
agency--and court--procedures.

The DC's reliance on the

3There also are three amicus briefs, two urging affirmance
(Louisiana State Public Service Commission and Southeastern Legal
Foundation) and one urging reversal (Windfarms, Ltd., a company
involved in generating electricy through wind and governed by §
210).

- 7 -

Supremacy Clause and the guarantee of a republican form of
government, if based on Miss Power

&

Light's theory, is wholly

mer it less.
Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596, and 80-231, the Surface Mining Cases,
address the application of Usery in other areas of state
authority.

One possible solution here is to hold for those cases

and then vacate and remand.

Nevertheless, the statutory scheme

here is substantially different, and

I

doubt a remand woul.d do

anything but delay this Court's consideration of the case.

I

therefore recommend that probable jurisdiction be noted.
There are two motions to affirm.
06/03/81
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: John Wiley
No. 80-1749:

January 10, 1982
FERC v. Mississippi

Questions Presented
1.

Whether Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause pow-

er when it passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978 (PURPA) .
2.

Whether

PURPA transgresses

federalism

limits on

national power, as articulated by National League of Cities.

I.

Background

PURPA is set forth in the Jurisdictional Statement at
pages

12a-67a.

I

will

sketch

the

key

provisions

of

this

lengthy statute.

-

By way of overview, PURPA basically is an energy con-

2.

___

servation
measure. 1
......_
consumption

by

stimu~ting

pricing policies.
tives

for

First, it seeks to cut back on electricity
_reform

of

traditional

electrical

Such pricing policies often created incen-

increased

electrical consumption

at

the

same

time

that they failed to reflect the economic cost of peak consumption. 2

An accompanying and,

to some extent,

inconsistent ob-

jective of PURPA's economic reform is distributional:

---

that low income groups do not suffer
....._

"excessively"

assuring
from this

attempted reformation of utility rate structures.
Second,
tional

fossil

--

PURPA seeks to supplement and improve tradifuel

usage

by

encouraging

"~ogeneration"-

----.,.

combining energy use facilities in ways that permit waste energy to be utilized-7 and smaller scale producers that employ new

~ff

IJ

1 At the outset, I should confess that I was the
author of a
California Energy Commission report that advoc~ed energy policy
options similar to some of those eventually adopted by PURPA.
The
California Energy Commission, for which I worked, first considered
these matter in 1975-76, and since has taken steps to implement many
of these policies at the state level. The PURPA was passed in 1978
and was IDQdelled in some measure after the experience of various
states (including California) with these programs.
2 High energy consumption at peak demand periods is undesirable
because it causes the inefficient use of power generation facilities.
For instance, suppose 24 people own electric clothes dryers
that each require one watt-hour to dry clothes.
It would require a
24 watt generator to supply enough electricity if all of these
individuals dried their clothes at the same time.
The generator
then would sit idle for the remaining 23 hours in the day--an inefficient use of a capital-intensive investment.
A one watt generator, however, would be sufficient to supply all of these 24 different people if each one dried clothes during a different hour. Then
the generator would operate continuously with no idle time--an efficient use of the capital investment.

3.

and alternative technologies

(such as solar, wind, small scale

hydro power, biomass, etc.).

PURPA attempts to facilitate de-

hese technologies by two means.
require

electric

utili ties

to

-

tie

such

The first is to

facilities

into their

power grids, so that small producers can sell excess energy and
buy

back-up

energy

during

their

own

times

of

peak

demand.

(Utilities, at least in California, historically have not been
anxious to make such accomodations.)
to

exempt

such

small

facilities

PURPA's second means is

from

the

burdens

of

public

utilities regulation.
These
tices.
"------

reforms are directed at changing utility prac-

Today, of course,

such practices usually are the subThe PURPA therefore addresses exist-

ject of state regulation.

ing state utility regulation,

in three general ways:

requiring state utility regulators
to consider
( 2)

federal

by requiring

("hortatory standards")

~

(and unregulated utili ties)

to implement substantive FERC rules about utility power sales
and

purchases

producers

from

cogenerators
.

("implementation

cogenerators

and

small

and

small

standards")~

alternative

and

alternative

.

(3)

by

energy producers

energy

exempting
from

all

utility regulation--federal as well as state ("preemption stan. . '· ·
dards").

A.
This

type

of

____

Hortatory__..,...__
standards
regulation

constitutes

the

bulk

~~

~.~

by ~

(and unregulated utilities)

reform proposals

state regulators

(1)

~

of

~5

4.

PURPA's text.
tains

On a general plane, this portion of PURPA con-

no mandatory

substantive

producing substantive changes

federal policies.

It aims at

in utility practices instead by

stating substantive federal policies and by applying mandatory
federal procedural policies to state utility regulation.

This

part of PURPA thus tries to "talk" state regulators into policy
changes by means of federal procedural requirements.

I am not

familiar with another federal statute that takes this unusual
approach.
Examining the hortatory portions of the statute at a
more detailed level, Title I proposes a number of federal standards that state regulatory commissions and unregulated electrical

utilities

three batches:

§§

are

to

consider.

These

2621, 2623, and 2624.

standards

come

in

But all three groups

of standards relate primarily to structuring the terms, conditions, and practices of electricity sales. 3

-

________________,,_____

3 section 2621 p:__o;eo~stan?ards in six subject areas:
(1)
class
costs of service (In
e past, utilities have recovered different
contributions towards total costs from different classes of users.
California traditionally had lowered the burden for residential and
large industrial and raised the burden for small to medium commercial consumers.); (2) declining block (or quantity discount) rates;
(3) time-of-day rates (a form of peak load pricing); (4) seasonal
rates (a different form of peak load pricing); and (5) interruptible
rates (same); and load management techniques (same).
Section 2623 proposes standards in five different subject
areas:
(1)
master metering (aimed at eliminating average cost
pricing for apartment dwellers, where one pays only the per capita
energy cost for the building even though individually one may use
more than the average amount of energy); (2) automatic adjustment
clauses (aimed at forcing utili ties to reexamine their rate structures and practices every time they increase their rate levels); (3)
information to consumers (designed to inform consumers about often
Footnote continued on next page.

5.

State regulatory commissions and unregulated utilities
are requi r ed to "consider"--but not necessarily to adopt--these
standards.

§2622.

tor~ p~oc:?ur:.:
(§262l(b))

er"

~

(§2631)

nation

~

noti~ '

hearing' and writ ten

dec~~c

and judicial review in state court of any determiany

participant

in

the

original

Utili ties are made liable for

attorney's
§2632.

:;e,.;s :-

Vi~ _.

broad participation rights by "any electric consum-

by

§2633 (c).

"Consideration" entails a number of manda-

fees

of

consumers

whose

proceeding.

reasonable costs and

positions

are

adopted.

State authorities and unregulated utilities must report

annually to DOE regarding their considerations.
The state regulators

§2626.

(and unregulated utilities)

are

to determine, regarding the standards in §2621, "whether or not
it is appropriate to implement such standard to carry out the
purposes of this chapter"
qualified, however:
State
from

regulatory
making

any

(emphasis added).

This directive is

"Nothing in this subsection prohibits any

authority

or

determination

nonregulated
that

it

is

electric

utility

not appropriate

to

complex electrical pricing systems so that they are aware of how to
alter their consumption to save money and increase utility efficiency)~
(4) procedures for electrical termination (a consumer "due process" concern rather than a utility efficiency or energy conservation measure)~ and (5) prohibition on consumer reimbursement of
utility promotional and political advertising (obviously a provision
that
predates
your- Central
Hudson
and
Consolidated
Edison
opinions!) .
Section 2624 proposes a standard for "lifeline" rates--an
equity rather than efficiency measure aimed at reducing the cost of
small amounts of consumption that are thought to represent the energy needed for "essentials."

..

•,

}.

...
.,,

'

6.

implement any

such

standard,

pursuant to its authority under

otherwise applicable State law"

(emphasis added).

Regarding the standards in §2623, state regulators and
utili ties

are

to

determine

whether

adoption

of

the

proposed

federal standards "is appropriate to carry out the purposes of
this chapter, is otherwise appropriate, and is consistent with
otherwise applicable state law • .
added) .

And

regarding

the

•

§2623 (a) (1)

(emphasis

lifeline rates proposed

in §2624,

state regulators and utili ties are
[lifeline]

II

to decide

"whether such a

rate should be implemented by such utility"

(empha-

sis added).
Title
respecting

III

of

the

statute

adopts

a

similar

two natural gas utility standards:

approach

procedures for

terminating natural gas service; and a prohibition on recovery
of

utility

advertising

costs

from

consumers

(another

Central Hudson and Consolidated Edison provision) .

§§

pre-

3201 -

11.

B.

----

Mandatory rules

The second type of PURPA regulation does require state
regulators and unregulated utili ties
federal rules.

---------J

Sections 210 (a)

&

(f)

~

to

implement substantive

require FERC to promul-

gate rules after consultation with state authorities and after
notice

and

hearing.

electric utili ties

These

rules
){

.~ Ji. .

··'

- -

,,

to

require

--J(

•

to hook cogenerators and small alternat1ve

____________________________
_,
e~ergy
facilit
::
s
~L~to
thei ;-grids
....
-

essentially are

-#

at fair rates.

-------------

This portion

v

7.

of PURPA also provides for judicial review of state regulators'
and

unregulated

utili ties'

actions,

§210 (g) (1),

and

for

en-

forcement by "any person" of "any requirement" adopted by regulators

or

utili ties

pursuant

to

§ 210 (f) .

§210 (g) ( 2) .

FERC

also is empowered to enforce the requirement that state regulators and utilities implement the FERC rules.

c.

Preemptive provisions

Section 210 (e)
rules

under

§210 (h) (2).

directs that the FERC is to prescribe

which cogenerators and small power producers are

exempted from federal and/or state utility regulation.

Again,

FERC is only to adopt these rules after "consultation with representatives of State regulatory authorities" and others.

II. Discussion
Resps

State of Mississippi

and Miss.

Public Service

Comm' n state that there are two issues:

(1) whether Congress

exceeded its Commerce Clause power: and

(2) whether PURPA in-

fringes

on

National

League

of

Cities

states'

rights.

Resp

Miss. Power & Light Co. raises additional issues based on the
Republican Form of Government Clause: the Supremacy Clause: and
the Takings Clause of

the Fifth Amendment.

address any of the latter issues.

The SG does not

I think this is sound, be-

cause none are serious arguments in my opinion.
Form

of

Government

nonjusticiable:

it

Clause

long

has

is extremely peculiar

been

The Republican
regarded

to attack a

as

federal

8.

statute on the basis of the Supremacy Clause: and any conceivable takings problems would have to be resolved on a cases by
case basis--not in a facial attack of this type.
Virginia

Surface Mining.

Therefore

I

will

See Hodel v.

not

discuss

this

---

last group of issues unless you so request.

-

A.

Whether Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power
T his is not a substantial issue.

found,

inter

alia,

rnerce requires

that proper

Congress explicitly

regulation of

interstate corn-

increased electrical and natural gas conserva-

tion and equitable retail rates for electrical consumers.
Jur. Strnt. 13a.

See

The Virginia Surface Mining opinion from last

Term devoted considerable time explaining that the test here is
whether
the

there

regulated

rnerce.

is a

rational basis for Congress'

activity

substantially

affects

finding

that

interstate

corn-

See 101 s.ct. 2359-64.
Congress did have such a rational basis.

As previous-

ly stated, PURPA essentially is an energy conservation measure.
It takes a brave advocate to argue with a straight face that
energy

conservation--of

any

type--does

not

affect

interstate

commerce, in these post-Arab embargo days of foreign oil dependency.
The

PURPA

does

contain

ancillary

"equity"

measures

that are rationalized as attempts to soften the impact of higher

and

sures

restructured energy prices for
pr irnar ily are

the

"lifeline"

consumers.

electrical

These mea-

rate proposals

.
"

-

9

0

and the "due process" provisions for termination of residential
utility

service.

These provisions are

the overall PURPA regulatory package.

rationally related

to

These provisions also

can be independently justified by their own impact on interstate

commerce:

marginal

retaining

families

hardest.

upon whom

the

national

purchasing

power

increasing energy rates fall

of
the

One may differ with the soundness of the policies,

but it is difficult to say that there is not a rational basis
for

concluding

that the measures substantially affect

inter-

state commerce.
Resps argue that PURPA seeks to regulate State regulatory

processes

convince me.
the

rather

than

"commerce."

This

point does

Congress plainly was concerned with combatting

national

energy crisis via reform of electrical and gas

utility practices and rate design.

PURPA attempts to introduce

these reforms directly upon nonregulated utities.
matters are
that

not

the

subject of state regulation,

regulation

as

a

means

of

affecting

Where these

PURPA addresses

those

same

utility

practices.
I

might agree with

resps'

argument

if the situation

were one in which Congress sought simply to displace state activities

without

any

ultimate

interstate

commerce

goal.

In

this case, however, I think resps would like the Court to focus
on the regulatory means and to ignore the interstate commerce
ends of PURPA.

This argument should fail, however, because the

Commerce Clause power inquiry traditionally has been very con-

..
,.

cerned with the intended ends of congressional action.

i1-v

B.

Whether PURPA transgresses National League of
This is the serious issue in this case.

well as

the Long

this month,

Island R.R.

This case, as

that also is being argued

provides the Court with the opportunity to shape

the protean doctrine
and

case

Cities ~

that so far

that National League of Cities launched

has been elaborated only in Virginia Surface

Mining.
Virginia

Surface

Mining

stated

League of Cities test has four elements:

that

the

(1) whether a federal

statute regulates "States as States;"

(2)

regulation

"attributes

addresses

soverreignty;"
state

ability

(3)
"to

indisputable

whether

the

structure

traditional functions;" and

federal

whether the federal

law

whether,

of

directly

integral operations
(4)

National

in

state
impairs

areas

of

if a federal law of-

fends all three of the foregoing principles of state independence, the nature of the federal interest is such as to justify
state

submission.

together

(The

first

three

requirements were

listed

in text, while the fourth was added in a footnote.)

101 s.ct. at 2366 & n.29.
The Virginia Surface Mining case was decided on the
first ground:

that the strip mining regulations concerned pri-

vate activity rather
s.ct. at 2369.
on

state

than "States as States."

See, e.g., 101

The federal program there intruded considerably

sovereignty by requiring

federal

administrative

ap-

11.

proval of state legislative activity.

Id. at 2357.

This fed-

eral/state interaction was entirely optional, however, because
the federal program directed that a state could do nothing--in
which case the federal agency would undertake complete implementation of the federal scheme.
PURPA offers
tion.

states a

Id. at 2357-58.
similar but less explicit op-

PURPA directs that states undertake procedures and im-

plement substantive policies only if they have ratemaking authority

over

utili ties.

"State

regulated

See PURPA,

electric

§210 (f) (1);

§3202 (c).

obligations

to

rpi vate

§260 2 (18)

utility");

(definition of

§2621 (a) ;

§2623 (a);

States therefore could shift all PURPA
utili ties

rate regulation entirely.

by withdrawing

from

utility

This option resembles Virginia Sur-

face Mining in that it permits the states to avoid any federal
obligations if they are willing to cede this regulatory realm
to the federal government.

This option differs, however, in a

crucial regard.
Because

-

-

PURPA

does

not

-

provide

for

federal

utility

rate regulation, the federal program offers states no assurance
t

the federa

ent will perform the entire regulatory

function
at issue if the states withdraw.
The Surface Mining
____.....,-_
Act, by contrast, did provide for federal surface mining regulation.

A state could withdraw from or decide not to comply

with the Surface Mining Act to avoid the federal intrusion with
the knowledge that the federal government was undertaking responsibility for the entire regulatory activity.

In this case,

,,
•

. "···•·

a

state can avoid federal

intrusion only by withdrawing

all utility rate regulation,

from

knowing that that regulatory re-

sponsibility has been abandoned completely.
This

fact

illustrates

that

the

avoidance of federal intrusion is high:

cost

of

the

state

abandonment of a regu-

latory activity judged by most states to be important enough to
conduct.

The option of avoiding the federal intrusion thus

considerably less realistic, and itself more intrusive, than
Virginia Surface Mining.
The Court could analogize PURPA to the Surface Mining
Act in this manner so as to find National League of Cities inapplicable.

But my feeling

is that PURPA must be regarded as
~-----~--------------regulating "States as States" if a pragmatic meaning is to be

--

attached to that phrase.

If you agree, then PURPA thus sat is-

fies the first prong of National League of Cities.

This factor

then distinguishes this case from Virginia Surface Mining.
The
eignty)

second

and third

(indisputable

attributes

of

state

sover-

(displacement of state ability to structure

integral operations in areas of traditional functions) elements
of the National League of Cities test are difficult for me to
differentiate.

For purposes of this memo,

I will assume that

the second test does not have additional content that is material in this case.
As an initial matter, it is important to note an ambigui ty

in the third element

structure

integral

(displacement of state ability to

operations

in

areas

of

traditional

func-

j

13.

tions) •

This third step might in fact represent a single in-

quiry, or

it could be two distinct sub-tests.

is important.

It depends on whether "integral operations" and

"traditional functions"
tion,

or

The difference

whether

the

represent rephrasings of the same notwo

phrases

are

additive

requirements,

both of which must be satisfied before the Tenth Amendment protects a given state action from federal invasion.
The difference can be illustrated with a hypothetical.
Suppose

California decides

to

undertake

completely untraditional for a state.

that Congress

at

one point had

passes

a

that

is

(Don't laugh too soon-

proposed

minimum wage

activity

For instance, suppose it

embarks on a space exploration program.
-Jerry Brown

an

law

this!)
similar

Suppose also
to

that

in

National League of Cities, except that the law applies only to
federal and state government space exploration programs.
the

Tenth Amendment

prohibit the application of

this

would
law to

California?
Yes, if the third test is a single inquiry.

National

League of Cities makes clear that wage determination is an integral

state

activity.

With only slight semantic difference

one can also say that it is traditional for states to determine
their own wage policy.
But if the third test is a double inquiry, the Tenth
Amendment would not constrain the application of this federal
law.

As

before,

National League

wage determination is integral.

of

Cities

establishes

that

But this federal usurpation of

''•

".

•;

14.

an integral state operation would not displace the state in an
area of traditional functions, because traditionally states do
not explore space.
My

sense

is

that

the

third

inquiry

should

a

two-

1

pronged

test.

I am led to this conclusion by the language of

National League of Cities.

See 426

u.s.

at 851:

[The 1974 amendments to the wage act will]
significantly alter or displace the States'
abilities to structure employee-employer relationships in such areas as fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, public health,
parks and recreation.
These activities are
typical of those performed by state and local
governments in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and fur- (
nishing public services.
Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are created to provide, services such as these which
the States have traditionally afforded their
citizens (emphasis added).
I also think this is wiser of the two possible interpretations.

To hold otherwise would permit states to insulate

themselves from federal regulation in fields that traditionally
have been national matters, simply by establishing programs in
those fields.

A contrary decision also could cut the National

League of Cities doctrine off from its concern with preserving
historic state roles.

The doctrine instead would focus on the

general need for protecting state autonomy in any area in which
a

state might chose

to become

involved.

This

idea seems to

accord more with the concept of states in the Articles of Confederation than with the notion of states in the present Constitution.
If

you

accept

the

idea of

a

two part

test

for

the

15.

third step of the National League of Cities inquiry, the next
problem

is

problem.

to

apply

each

of

these

two parts

to

the present

Starting first with the "traditional functions" part,

the main argument in favor of holding electrical utility regulation to be a "traditional function"
spread nature of such activity.

for states is the wide-

~

Virtually every state does it.

I discern two arguments to the contrary.

First, al-

though virtually every state does engage in such activity, this
is a relatively recent development in the constitutional scheme
of things.
began

As the SG points out at 30 n.35, Mississippi only

such

regulation

in 1956.

I

know

from

the papers that

Texas--one of the last states to avoid the practice--only began

-

such regulation in the late 1970's.
~t

More importantly, energy regulation has been a
state and federal
century.

responsibility for

9~
~ /

~~
/).:/;i:::tt

share~

the better part of

this

Congress passed the Federal Water Power Act in 1920.

~

4-

~

Partly

in

response

to

this

Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam

&

Court

decision

Electric Co.,

in

273

Pulic Utility

u.s.

83

(1927),

Congress augmented this regulation with the Federal Power Act
in 1935.

(As you

recall,

the history of

recounted in part by the briefing in

f:v'

~
ct-~

this regulation is

New England Power Co. v.

New Hampshire, which was argued in December.)

Federal energy

regulation has steadily increased since that time.
My inclination is to think that electrical and natural
gas utility regulation is not a "traditional function" of state
government.

If you agree,

then this ends the case.

Virginia

(~~
Av~~

16.

Surface Mining emphasized that "a claim that congressional commerce

power

legislation

is

invalid

under

the

reasoning

of

National League of Cities must satisfy each of three requirements."

101 S .ct.

2366

(emphasis in original) •

Consequently

reversal would be appropriate.
If you do regard utility regulation as a traditional
state function,

--

displaces
~

then the next step is to decide whether PURPA

"intergral operations"

in this function.

The three

different categories of PURPA regulation, see pages 3-7 supra,
must be analyzed separately in this inquiry.

A.

Preemptive provisions

Taking these categories out of order, the least iQ!rusive

type

of

federal

regulation

(described on page 7,

supra).

is

the

preemptive

provision

This type of regulation simply

tells state regulators to leave cogenerators and small energy
producers alone.
cessively

into

This type of provision does not intrude exthe

integral mechanics of

States are bypassed altogether.
their

own affairs or

transformed

the federal government.
tion,

utility regulation.

They are not told how to run
into administrative arms of

Of the three types of PURPA regula-

this provision is the most analogous to typical and ac-

cepted exercises of federal preemptive power.

B.
More

__.)
--.../

Hortatory provisions

intrusive

are

the

)/

""

hortatory

provisions.

See

',

'·

17.

pages 3-6 supra.

Although these sections contain no mandatory

substantive requirements, they do dictate to states how states
are to run certain state procedures.

I do not perceive of any-

thing "integral," however, about a state's ability to refuse to
consider policies that the federal government considers to be
important and of national

import.

Therefore the notice-and-

hearing and written decision requirements seem innocuous.
associated

timing provisions also seem unobjectionable;

~

The
they

appear reasonable and unlikely to place great strains on state
regulators.

And

the

broad

somewaht more senstive,

standing

provisions,

although

still does not seem to displace any

"integral" state operation.

--

The ultimate decision on the mer-

its remains in the hands of the state.

'

viding

The sections pro-

can bring an action to enforce the

PURPA requirement to hold hearings and make determinations are
but offshoots of the basic state obligation under PURPA to consider the federal proposals.

So I do not think these portions

amount to unconstitutional invasions by the federal government.
Section 2633 (c)

(1) also authorizes "any person" to seek "re-

view of any determination .
utility
• intervened

. with respect to any electric

in the appropriate State court if such person
. in the original proceeding or if State law

permits such review."

The standard for this judicial review is

not stated, and so I presume that a state court would apply its

'

.

~

- ..t.-.r
~

~~
~

The judicial revJ; w provisions initially concerned me,
but my concern has subsided upon reflection.

~

18.

own standard of agency review--probably along
substantial evidence review.

the lines of a

Because the key sections of this

portion of PURPA essentially leave these determinations to the
discretion of
supra,

this

the

state

provision

regulatory

for

judicial

more of an

intrusion than does

quirement.

Again,

the

authority,

see

review does

pages

not

5-6

add much

initial consideration re-

ultimate decision authority rests with the

state.

C.
The

Implementation provisions

implementation

provision

is

the

most

intrusive

federal requirement because it combines the procedural require---------..,

J

L

ments of the hortatory section with substantive federal rules
that

state

regulators must adopt.

These

substantive

federal

rules are to be determined by the FERC after consultation with
~
state authorities. The ,Arules are
---:.

to require electric utilities to offer to-(1) sell electric power to qualifying
cogeneration facilities and qualifying small
power production facilities and
(2)
purchase electric energy from
such facilties.

* * * *

Such rules may not author i ~ •
for purposes other th~sale.

.

any sale

§210(a)
State regulators are required to "implement such rule[s]
for

each

electric

utility

ratemaking authority."

for

which

[the

regulator]

has

§210(f) (1).

"Implementation" is defined by regulation.

State im-

''

plementation

"may consist of

the issuance of regulations,

an

undertaking to resolve disputes between qualifying facilities
and electric utilities .

, or any other action reasonably

designed to implement [the FERC rules]."

18 C.P.R. 292.40l(a).

These provisions, with their associated

judicial re-

view and enforcement specifications, are the portion of PURPA
most

vulnerable

They

establish

to

National

League

of

Cities
t-\.

) 1..

that

standards of utility
responsible for
State

a

federal

bureaucracy

-------------operation that state
~

--

administering,

sovereignty

is

is

invalidation.
to decide

upon

regulators are then

under pain of judicial review.

infringed

because

state

regulators

are

essentially reduced to administrative arms of a federal agency.
On the other hand, the federal provision does operate
only in a narrow area:

wholesale transactions between utili-

ties and small developers of new energy technologies. 4

And the

loose regulation defining "implementation," recited at the top
of

this

page,

does permit

state

regulators

some

latitude

deciding how to implement even these mandatory rules.
stinct

in

My in-

(and I think instinct does have a place with a doctrine

as young as that of National League of Cities) is that this is
not a sufficient infringement upon state sovereingty to require
the invalidation of an act of Congress.

~

lA.--

.to~

4-

~~~~~

tu)..?~ ~

~a.?<.i~~J

4Apparently the FERC rules are to apply only to utility purchases
of excess power from cogenerators and small producers.
Utility
sales of back-up power to cogenerators would be for "purposes other
than retail."
-

20.

If you disagree,

then the fourth prong to be consid-

ered is whether "the nature of the federal interest • . •
such

that

Mining,
this

it

justifies

101 S .Ct.

case

to

KEY.

at
v.

2366

submission."

n. 29.

KEY.

i~

Virginia

The SG attempts

United States,

price controls case).

KEY.

State

u.s.

421

542

[is]

Surface

to compare
(1975)

/ easily distinguishable,

(the

in that

involved o~ temporary federal intrusions on state sover-

eignty.

PURPA does

require only a one-time consideration of

federal standards, but the implementation, preemption, and reporting requirements are on-going.
This fourth
for

rescuing

the

test could, however,

PURPA

implementation

p ~ vide

provision

a rationale
if

you

feel

that provision does displace Mississippi's ability to structure
an integral operation in a

traditional function but that the

federal provision nonetheless is acceptable.
ment of

This fourth ele-

the National League of Cities test has only been de-

fined in a single footnote, and the concept certainly could be
adapted to fit this situation.
You may

ultimately decide

that

this

portion of

statute does transgress National League of Cities.

the

If so, in

my opinion the implementation provision is sufficiently severable so that such a finding would require invalidation qply of

--------------------------(which includes the preemptive

-- -

§210

16).

provision analyzed on page

See Jur Stmt 48a-56a (text of §210).

.........
Summary

III.
~~ e

({;) PURPA has
tive:

hortatory:

three

regulate

types

an~ndatory
"States

as

of

{[)

state

regulations:

preemp-

implementation standards.

States"

as

a

practical

All

matter.

-~

Therefore all three pass the first prong of the National League
of Cities test, as articulated by Virginia Surface Mining.
The second and third prongs of the National League of
Cities

test

should,

in my view,

be

understood

as

inquiring,

first, whether a given activity is a "traditional function" of
state government, and second, whether the federal intrusion is
so great as

I think a

to displace an "intergral operation."

convincing argument can be made that electrical and natural gas

-

regulation is not a traditional state function--because Mississippi only undertook this activity in 1956 and because of the
long

history

of

federal

involvement

in

this

If

field.

you

agree that utility regulation is not a "traditional function,"
you should vote to reverse on this basis.

~

A contrary decision on this point requires a section
by section assessment of PURPA to consider whether the federal
interference extends to "integral operations."

While I

think

there clearly is not an invasion of integral functions . by the
preemptive

-

and

hortatory

portions of

PURPA,

the

question

,l

closer

regarding

the

is

~~

mandatory

implementation

standards.

My

judgment is that the entire PURPA should survive this scrutiny
and

that

the

case

should

be

reversed.

A contrary

holding

-

should sever the invalidated implementation standards from the
remainder of the PURPA.
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. Justice Powell
From:
John Wiley
No. 80-1749:

The SG has

filed

January 15, 1981

~q~~J
~

FERC v. Mississippi

a

reply brief.

change my basic analysis of this case.

His reply does not

He does, however, make

two points that warrant comment.
First, the SG argues that the substantive irnplernentation standards of §210, which I thought were the most intrusive
portions

of

the

PURPA,

are

"essentially

adjudicative

nature."
The states are not compelled to enact legislation, promulgate regu la t i ons, or expend state
funds. At most, Section 210 simply establishes federal substantive rules of decision and
r ~u 1 res the state cornrn1ssions to apply thos e
rules in particular settings J n which the cornmissions already exercise jurisdiction.
SG reply brief at 4.

in

2.

The SG completes this point by citing Testa v. Katt, 330
386 (1947)

u.s.

(state courts obligated to enforce federal law).

This is a powerful argument.

As noted at pages 18-19

of my bench memo, "implementation" is defined by regulation to
mean

"the

issuance of

regulations,

an undertaking

to resolve

disputes between qualifying facilities and electric utilities •
. . , or any other action reasonably designed to implement [the
FERC rules]."
fined,
/

18 C.F.R.

292.40l(a)

(emphasis added).

So de-

the duty of "implementation" that PURPA places on state

r{gulators

does

come

to

resemble

the

traditional

state adjudicative bodies to enforce federal law.

duty

upon

To my mind,

this is a key point that argues strongly in favor of permitting
this type of federal/state interaction.

Second, the SG argues that the PURPA was passed under
Congress' war power as well as its Commerce Clause power.
reply brief at 9-11.

SG

The PURPA....,. does state that

The Congress finds that the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare, the preservation of the national securi!Y, and the proper exercise of the of congressional authority under the Constitution to
regulate inter state commerce require [various
actions] (emphasis added).
Jur Stmt at 13a.
National League of Cities declined to decide whether
its proscription on federal power extended to federal legislation enacted pursuant to grants of power other than the Commerce Clause.

426

u.s.

at 852 n.l7.

That decision also ob-

u/a.r-p~

3.

served

that

"[n] othing

we

say

in

this opinion addresses

scope of Congress' authority under its war power."

the

Id. at 855

n.l8.
Despite these disclaimers,

I have a hard time under- \

standing why the National League of Cities test should be inapplicable outside the realm of the Commerce Clause.
to

file

in our National League of Cities file

Your memos

show that you

believe federalism limits to be a fundamental tenet of the consti tutional

order,

irrespective

of

whether

those

limits

are

drawn from the Tenth Amendment or from the form of the Constitutional as a whole.

As restated by Virginia Surface Mining,

the fourth element of the National League of Cities test takes
into account the objection to applying federal limits to nonCommerce

Clause

legislation:

that

such

federal

legislation

might be too pressing to be subject to federalism limits.

___

My present thinking is that the source of congressio-

__..._ for a particular statute might be material in how the
nal power

statute is analyzed under
For
to

the National League of Cities test.

instance, war power legislation may have a stronger claim
legitimacy

under

source of Congress'

the

fourth

prong

of

the

test.

But

the

power does not seem material to whether a

particular statute must accord with National League of Cities.
As I understand it, your view is that federalism limits are of
a broad importance that transcends such limitations.
The SG does not introduce any new substantive consid-

--

erations in his war power discussion.

The PURPA was designed

?

4.

to cope with the energy crisis.
spective of whether
power purposes.

That crisis is serious, irre-

it is analyzed for Commerce Clause or war

I conclude this part of the SG's discussion

adds nothing to the analysis in my bench memo.

80-1749

..
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: John Wiley
No. 80-1749: FERC v. Mississippi

January 21, 1982

This memo responds to your request that I consider in
more depth the constitutionality of the PURPA's broad standing
provisions ·.

A.

Description of PURPA's standing provisions

There are actually four
in PURPA.
tory

The four

types of standing provisions

types of provisions grant: (£k tate regula-

intervention rights P rights

to

[JUdicial~

enforce A those

intervention rights; rights to judicial review of state regulatory decisions;
requirements.

and
I

rights

summarize

to

judicial enforcement of

these

four

PURPA

types of provisions

in

turn.

,.

~.·

,

.

...

2.

1.
Section

Regulatory intervention rights
2631

(page

36a of

the Jur

Stmt)

grants

the

. h t to 1./
. .
.
r1g
1ntervene\) an d part1c1pate
1n
state regu 1 atory procee d -

ings to "the Secretary, any affected utility, or any electric
consumer of an affected electrical utility . .
III

(natural gas)

The Title

counterpart to this provision is §3205 (page

62a of the Jur Stmt).
only the Secretary)
for

"

This section permits the Secretary (but

to intervene as a matter of right "solely

the purpose of advocating policies or methods which carry

out the purposes set forth in section 3201 [equitable and efficient use of natural gas]
vent ion

right

"

This more limited inter-

in natural gas proceedings presumably reflects

the larger political muscle of the natural gas interests.

Sig-

nificantly, PURPA conveys no right of intervention and participation for the "mandatory implementation" provisions of §210.

2.

Judicial enforcement of regulatory intervention rights
Second, §2633(b)

standing

in

the

(page 40a-4la of the Jur Stmt) grants

federal courts to enforce §2631

intervention

and participation rights to the Secretary, as well a to

"~

electric utility or electric consumer having a right to intervene under section 2631 (a)

"

The Secretary is treated

somewhat differently than the utilities and the consumers.

The

Secretary may bring an action in federal court to "enforce his
right

to

intervene

and

participate

under

section

263l(a) ,"

while consumers and utilities may only bring an action in fed-

3.

eral court if their intervention rights are denied by any state
court.

This difference

utilities--but

not

presumably means

that consumers and

the Secretary--first must

try

to enforce

their intervention rights in state court.
The Title

III counterpart

to

this

forcement right is given by §3207(a) (2)
Stmt).

intervention en-

(page 65a of the Jur

This section grants the Secretary a right to bring an

action in federal court "to enforce his right to intervene under section 3205 . . . • "

Once again, no counterpart to these

provisions exists for the "mandatory implmentation" provisions
of §210.

3.

Judicial review of state regulatory decisions
The right to obtain judicial review of "any determina-

tion made under [the sections authorizing state regulatory consideration] with respect to any electic utility" is granted by
§2633(c)

(pages 4la-42a of the Jur Stmt).

Such judicial review

may be brought in state court if the electric utility is other
than a federal agency.

In this case, the right of review is

conferred to "[a]ny person .

if such person (or the Secre-

tary) intervened or otherwise participated in the original proceedings

or

if

State

law

§2633 (c) (1) (first sentence)

otherwise

permits

such

review."

(page 4la of the Jur Stmt).

If the utility is a federal agency, on the other hand,
the

judicial review

is

to be had

in federal court, and the

right is conferred "[a]ny person (including the Secretary)

,\.

~

~,..:··,.:-;:

4.

if

such

per son

(or

the Secretary)

intervened or otherwise

participated in the original proceedings or if otherwise applicable law permits such review."
Jur Stmt).

§2633(c) (2)

(page 4la of the

In every instance, "the Secretary may also partici-

pate as an amicus curiae in any review in any court of an action arising under the sections requiring state regulatory consideration.

§2633 (c) (3)

(page 42a of the Jur Stmt).

The Title III counterpart to this judicial review provision

is

Stmt).

set

forth

Strikingly,

judicial review.

by §3207 (b) (2)

(page 65a-66a of the Jur

this provision does not grant a

right of

It instead provides that the Secretary is not

authorized "to appeal or otherwise seek judicial review of the
decisions of a State regulatory authority • • . or to become a
party to any action to obtain such review or appeal.

The Sec-

retary may participate as an amicus curiae in any judicial review

of

an

chapter."
ulatory

action

arising

under

the

provisions

of

this

Under Title III, then, judicial review of state reg-

decisions

apparently

is

only

available

as

otherwise

provided by state law.
A §210 counterpart
does exist--for a change.

to

the

judicial review provision

Section 210 (g) (1)

(page 53a of the

Jur Stmt) states that judicial review (respecting state regulatory

proceedings

provisions)
§2633.
cial

is

to

for
be

purposes
available

of
in

implementing
the

Therefore the judicial review is

review

under

Title

I

of

the

mandatory

same manner

cont ~ous

the PURPA.

as

under

with judi-

See page

3 supra.

5.

This

provision

is

difficult

to

understand,

however,

because

§2633 grants judicial review rights only to those who participated

in the proceedings or

to those who already have review

rights under otherwise applicable law.
given amicus curiae rights.)

But §210 does not grant partici-

pation rights in the first instance.
fore

apparently §210 (g) (1)

(The Secretary also is

does

See page 2 supra.

There-

not grant review rights that

are any more expansive than those already extant under

state

law.

4.

Judicial enforcement of PURPA

Finally,

a

right

to

enforce

by

state

court

action

PURPA's Title I consideration provisions--with respect to utilities

other

than

federal

§2633 (c) (1) (second sentence)

agencies--is

(page 4la of the Jur Stmt).

right is granted to "[a]ny person

by

provided

This

(including the Secretary),"

without any requirement that the person be a utility consumer
or

have participated

in any regulatory proceedings.

(Because

"enforcement" presumably would mean forcing a regulatory commission to hold hearing and to consider standards, as Title I
directs, in most instances there probably would be no proceedings in which litigants could yet have participated.)
if

the

tence)

utility

is

a

permits

"[a]ny

federal
person

agency,

~gain,

§2633(c) (2) (second

(including

the

Secretary)"

sento

bring an action to enforce the Title I consideration provisions
in federal court~

.>

,.

~.

6.

There are counterparts to this enforcement provision
in both Title III and in §210.

For Title III,

"[a]ny person

may bring an action to enforce the requirements of this chapter
[to

consider

court."
"[a] ny

natural

§3207 (b) (1)
person

gas

policies]

in

the

appropriate

(page 65a of the Jur Stmt).

(including

the

Secretary)

may

State

And for §210,

bring

an

action

against any electric utility, qualifying small power producer,
or

qualifying

cogenerator

to

enforce

lished by a State regulatory authority

any

estab-

[requiring utilities to

implement utility interconnections].
53a of the Jur Stmt).

requirement

"

§210 (g) (2)

(page

Such §210 enforcement actions are to be

brought in the same manner as provided under §2633.

These §210

enforcement actions, however, differ from the enforcement provisions in Titles I and III;

§210 directs enforcement against

private parties--ordering them to comply with the state regulatory commission's orders--while enforcement under Titles I and
III

is

aimed

at

the

regulatory

bodies

themselves,

requiring

them to comply with PURPA's consideration requirements.

B.

Discussion

I first discuss the type of standing provision granting state regulatory intervention rights.

This type of stand-

ing provision differs from the traditional grant of standing to
adjudicate.
Mississippi

This distinction derives

from the

Public Service Comm' n does more

fact

that the

than adjudicate.

In fact, the key activity here--policy decisions about electri-

w~t ~e~

5~lo(~)(zJ

cal and natural gas pricing for the state--more closely resembles

a

rulemaking

proceeding.

legislative in character.

This

activity

is

quasi-

This grant of standing consequently

begins to resemble instructions to a state legislature to consider a given legislative proposal.
As a result,

this standing provision conveys to "any

electric consumer" a federal right to a place on the state legislati ve

agenda.

Because

state decision about which laws to

enact is, virtually beyond all dispute, an "essential attribute
of state sovereignty," such a grant of "legislative standing"
trenches

on

federalism

values.

States

as

sovereigns

surely

have a right to decide which political voices they will ultimately heed.

It thus must be a component of this right for the

state to decide who will be given an audience in the state legislative process.

The federal government runs into a dangerous

area when it begins to dictate to state legislators (and quasilegislators)
pay

to whom and in what manner such legislators must

attention,

for

the

reason

that

federalism

demands

that

states not be reduced to simple administrative arms of the federal government.
On the other hand,

this right of autonomy respecting

political input to the state legislative process cannot be absolute.

Cf.

Reynolds

reapportionment

of

v.

Sims,

Alabama

377 U.S.

Legislature).

533
It

(1964)

(federal

strikes

me

as

overly rigid to insist that Congress cannot tell states even to
consider given legislative policies that the national govern-

?

8.

ment

believes

leave

to

be

important.

The consequence would

the federal government with

be

to

the stark choice of either

carrying out a policy itself--preempting the state role entirely (which most seem to concede that Congress could have done in
this case)--or else doing nothing.

The intermediate course of

federal/state

with

dialog--if

conducted

regard

for

sovereign

comity--does seem to me to offer a hopeful possibility of cooperative
those

federalism.

The prospect has

offered either

federal

some advantages

preemption or

federal

beyond

inaction,

and is a technique of governance that should not be foreclosed
by the decision in this case.
If absolute proscription of federal interference with
the state legislative process is inappropriate, however, then
dividing

"acceptable"

and

"unacceptable"

federal

interference

in state legislative processes is a line drawing problem:
much

federal

intervention

is

too

much?

The

first

how

type

of

standing provision--"legislative standing"--raises two distinct
sort

of

problems:

who

is permitted

to participate

in

state

legislative decisions, and how are they to participate.
On the first point, PURPA's language is quite clear-"any electric consumer of an affected utility" is given participation

rights.

But

governing Mississippi
respondents'
Comm' n

briefs

standing

laws.

the
law

extent of
is

explains
My own

quite

the

actual conflict with

unclear.

current
research

Miss.
(with

Neither

of

Public

Service

the

the

aid of the

library staff) shows that the Mississippi PSC is to give notice

': r

',

of proposed rate change "to such other persons as the commissian, in its discretion, may determine."

MCA §77-3-37

(1973).

Moreover, "[a] ny interested person shall have the right to pe- ~
titian the commission for
rule or regulation."

issuance, amendment, or repeal of a

Id. at §77-3-45.

These sources suggest

that the Miss PSC--like most state public utility comm' ns--is
(This does not

quite liberal in granting participation rights.
surprise me.

While in law school, I helped conduct a survey of

state power plant siting statutes as part of a contract for the

u.s.

Energy

Research

&

Development

Admin.

The

study

found

relaxed--in many cases virtually nonexistent--standing rules to
be characteristic of state utility comm'ns in the power plant
siting area.)
In

this

light,

my

standing conflicts may be

instinct
better

is

that

~

~ 4_
~

~.Lo

Tenth Amendment , •

resolved on a

basis rather than in a facial attack.

~

----

~~~

case by case

It may well be the poli-

cy of the Miss PSC to allow virtually any interested concumer
group to join a given proceeding.

(The rights that attend in-

tervention is a different matter that I will consider in a moment.)

At minimum,

I have found nothing to show that Missis-

sippi's policy is the contrary, and the parties have identified
no sharp and

inevitable conflicts.

If

the state and federal

policies in fact do not conflict in noticable degree, this suggests that the case for invalidating an act of Congress in the
absense of a concrete dispute is weak.
The Court, of course, should not engage in a wholesale

'

..

'

.LU.

legitimation

of

PURPA 1 s

broadened

standing

laws.

Rather,

I

think the appropriate technique would be to follow your pr actice

in Virginia

Surface Mining:

note

the problem

(there a

taking issue) and reserve it for adjudication in specific cases
in which constitutional limitations bind in factually specific
cases.
The alternative to this deferral technique is to invalidate

all or

a

portion of

this

standing provision in this case.
it simply could say that

an . in~egral

agenda is
PURPA 1 s

as

PURPA regulatory

The Court is free to do this;

setting of the state legislative

operation of a sovereign state, and

oJ~.
/
r

that~

The Court clearly would not be bound by Testa v.

that case simply directed

federal laws.
courts.

of

broad conferral of this power as a federal matter is

unacceptable.
Katt,

th~

type

that state courts enforce

Obviously legislatures can be distinguished from

The conclusion that the PURPA 1 s standing provisions 1

infringement of state control of its own processes is excessive
would be a novel holding, but that will be true no matter how
the Court disposes of this case.

One difficulty with this ap-

preach might be that all of Title I probably would have to excised

from

the PURPA;

I doubt that the standing provision is j

sufficiently distinct from the remainder of this Title to allow
any more detailed severance.
On the second point regarding how individuals are permitted to intervene in state hearings, again there is the problem of

,;

the lack of a concrete dispute about particular prac-

-?:1---0

~

.......
tices.

But I think that the Court should state that PURPA was

passed with

an evident

regard for

Therefore

state autonomy.

future courts interpreting the intervention provision should be
directed to interpret PURPA to leave state regulatory authorities their traditional control over their own proceedings.

For

instance, PURPA certainly should be read to preserve state PSC
power to set and enforce timing deadlines, limitations on oral
presentations,

consolidation of numbers of parties, and other

essential powers of docket management.
sion

that

such an

I think a plain expres-

interpretation should be favored,

together

with a refusal to declare PURPA's intervention grant unconstitutional absent a

showing of conflict with state law,

should

suffice to accomodate federalism values with congresional intent respecting this first type of standing provision.
These
fourth
enforce

grants

same comments
of

largely apply to the second and

standing--the

rights

intervention rights and PURPA' s

to

bring

actions

to

hearing requirements.

These rights to me seem to derive from the orginal PURPA mandate that state regulators allow participation and hold hearings.

If the original PURPA mandate is legitimated, I believe

it follows
gitimated.

that these standing provisions should also be leThey

essentially amount

to a

federal grant of

private right of action to individuals against the states.

a
Of

course, both types of standing provision grant access to federal court under some circumstances.

See pages 2-3 & 5-6 supra.

The Court should observe that Article III limitations will ap-

''

-'-""'•

ply in such situations.

Further comment probably is not possi-

ble or appropriate until a concrete case arises.
On the other hand,

if you are not inclined to defer

judgment on the regulatory standing provisions that I discussed
first,

then

these

subsidiary

standing

grants

should

fall

as

well.
Finally I come to the third PURPA grant of standing,
which essentially allows intervenors the right to appeal state
regulatory decisions.

See pages 3-4 supra.

/...o

Significantly, the ~

key provision, § 2633 (c) (1}, states that "[s] uch review or action in a State court shall be pursuant to any applicable State
procedures."
Again I am uncertain about the extent of actual conflict between PURPA and Miss. law.
" [ i] n addition
equity

~

to other

party

remedies

aggrieved

by

Miss. statutes provide that
now available

any

final

at

law or

in

finding,

order,

or

judgment of the commission shall have the right, regardless of
the amount involved, of appeal to the chancery court .
Any person whose rights may be directly affected by said appeal
may appear

and become a party, or the court on proper notice

order any person to be joined as a party."

MCA §77-3-65

(em-

phasis added} •
This is a realtively broad grant of a right of review.
My feeling once more is that, while federal/state conflict certainly is not impossible, neither is it obvious on this facial
record.

Again

I

lean

~

toward utilizing your Virginia Surface

lJ.

Mining technique of identifying the issue, declining to resolve
it on facial attack, and leaving resolution of the problem to a
more concrete case.

Once more, also, this provision logically

should be invalidated if your belief is that the breadth of the
federal intrusion is unacceptable as a facial matter.

C. Conclusion
The

features

of

the

PURPA

that

you

find

most

troubling--its broad grants of standing--are complex and potentially very intrusive.
flict

between

federal

In this case, however, the actual conand

state

law

is

not

sharp.

In fact,

while conflict is not impossible, it is not inevitable and may
even be quite unlikely--given the broad state rights of participation that have used by state regulatory commissions in recent

years.

Collision

between

state

and

federal

law can be

further minimized by construing PURPA to accomodate traditional
state regulatory agency controls over proceedings.

I conclude ~

that the Court should await a concrete clash between state and
federal policy before

it

invalidates one of these vulnerable

sections of the PURPA.

.,,r

•'

'

jsw

01/22/82

Memorandum to Justice Powell
Re:

1.

FERC intervention rights and amicus briefing

My fast research on whether "intervenors" become "parties" has

focussed on Davis' Administrative Law Treatise.

My initial conclu-

sion

that an intervenor

is

that existing

does become a party.

law has

usually assumed

This area of law, however, has undergone sub-

stantial change with "public interest intervention"

in the 1970's.

Because the question is solely one of legislative intent, the Court
would be free to interpret the PURPA to preserve considerable Mississippi control over the conduct of its hearings conducted pursuant
to PURPA.

2.

I append the relevant pages of Davis' 1980 treatise.

We have amicus briefs from six states.

affirmance.
urge

Maryland, Maine, and the Calif. Public Utilities Comm'n

reversal.

urge partial

Texas and Louisiana urge

The Calif.

Energy Comm' n and

the State of Oregon

reversal--taking no position beyond stating that the

"preemption" portions of PURPA
small producers

from~

(the sections that entirely exempt

regulation) should be consitutional.

We also have briefs urging reversal from the United States
Conference of Mayors and the County of Onondaga, New York .

.
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02/16/82

Memorandum to Justice Powell

(

~ ~

~4 ~
~ ue~+<u~
1-o ~~~

Re:

HAB' s FERC v. Mississippi draft

·r-1-"aL~

Justice
Sections

I-II

Blackmun circulates his draft

are

factual

and procedural.

in

____

this case.

Section __,
III holds

that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to enact
the PURPA.

This is a reasonably argued section that reaches a

result with which I agree and with which I expect you have no
problem.

So far, so good.

Section IV is the llguts"'of the opinion.

-

It holds that

the PURPA in its entirety passes scrutiny under National League
of Cities.

In section IV A, HAB gets around the difficult §210

"mandatory implementation" requirement in the predictable manner:

by relying solely on the FERC regulation that softens the

State's duty.

This regulation permits teh States to discharge

the "implementation" function by requiring only that they "resolve disputes

•

"

authority for this point.

Draft, at 16.

Testa v. Katt is the

As you recall, this is the approach

I considered in my 1/15/82 supplemental bench memo in reaction
to the SG's reply brief.
lution

of

the

challenge

I still believe it is a correct resoto

this

particular

provision.

The

holding does not foreclose future state attacks on the manda-

...~~·~~· ~·:~
f

~/16

.3

..

~

2.
tory implementation provision if in the future FERC adopts more
intrusive regulatory policies.
Of key significance, §210 does not intrusively confer
private rights of action against state regulatory bodies in the
manner of the the other PURPA sections.
tal bench memo at 2, 3, 4-5 & 6.

See 1/21/82 supplemen-

I therefore advise that you

consider joining this section of HAB's draft.

Section IV B of the draft addresses PURPA's direction

--

that States consider its proposed federal standards.

At core,

this section states that Congress is permitted to try and "persuade" state legislative bodies by requiring them to consider
federal

issues.

The only limiting

principle

in this section

seems to be that "[t]here is nothing in PURPA 'directly compelling' the States to enact a legislative program."

Draft at 20.

HAB's answer to PURPA's broad grant of rights of acto compel regulatory consideration through the courts is
I. L.

\\

that PURPA's grant of "standing" rights is no broader than that

7(
(.

fJ~

presently accorded by Mississippi law.

~-

that, HAB again finds Testa v. Katt controlling.

~/
~~

I

continue

Draft at 22-23.

to have mixed feelings

regarding

Beyond

the le-

gitimacy of federal efforts to "persuade" States to enact federally suggested policies.

As I mentioned in our conversations

on this subject, I do think this method of federal/state interaction has considerable potential for

abuse;

it would make a

mockery of "federalism" if Congress could fill State legisla-

't

/

3.
tive agendas with mandatory federal issues so that no time was
left for activity of the States's own choosing.

On the other

hand, it also would be unwise to condemn the "persuasion" technique completely.

This would force Congress to the choice of

entirely preempting a field whereever it seeks federal involvement.

Surely it is preferable to leave Congress free to pre-

t~

serve as much state decision-making authority as possible.
With such conflicting reactions, my response would be
to balance.
suasion"

My conclusion in this case is that the PURPA "per-

burdens

are

acceptable

--

because

Mississippi

(who

must bear the burden of demonstrating consitutional invalidity

__

of an act of Congress) has not shown the PURPA "consideration"
......_
burdens
to involve even a

State regulatory agenda.

significant amount of space on the
That

is, we have not seen a demon-

stration that PURPA in fact imposes much of a time-and-expense
compliance burden.

This relatively slight injury to state sov-

ereignty does not outweigh the federalism interest in preserving this type of "cooperative federalism" program.

I therefore

would join HAB's judgment on this point, writing separately to
stress both that limits exist in this field and that Mississippi failed to make any factual showing regarding PURPA's actual
compliance intrusion.
I

know you

are

quite

concerned

about

PURPA' s

broad

grant of a right of action to enforce via the courts its "consideration" prescription.
could dissent

from

I see two

"-

alternatives.~
irs , you

-----

the validation of PURPA' s

broa

grant of

.

~

'·

'•·

4.
access to courts to bring actions against state regulatory authorities.

The dissenting principle presumably would be that

the federal government should not be able to expand a State's
rules of access to courts when the target of the lawsuit is the
State itself.
Amendment.
vant

A rough analogy could be drawn to the Eleventh

The analogy would be very rough because the rele-

judicial

action

here

place in state court.

predominately

is

directed

to

take

The Eleventh Amendment, of course, pre-

vents only unconsented actions against States in federal court.
Still, part of the notion behind the Eleventh Amendment is that
States
under

are

free

to close

principles of

their

severe ign

own courts
immunity.

to their citizens

Under

PURPA,

States

enjoy no such freedom.
The second alternative is to concur in the judgment on
this

issue

and write separately.

Your concurrence could say

this problem of broad access to courts is serious but not arnenable to facial attack.
ly

proposed:

"standing"

law

there

has

differs

The reasoning is that I have previousbeen
in

any

no

showing

significant

broad PURPA grants of rights of action.
I

recommend

the

second

that

Mississippi's

respect

from

the

See draft at 22-23.

alternative.

My

instinct

is

that National League of Cities should be employed to invalidate
congressional handiwork only when a State can point to a real
difference between federal and state policy .

..~,..·~·

'.

7

--

5.
Finally, in section IV C HAB upholds PURPA's procedural requirements.

I

think these provisions do not differ sig-

nificantly from the "consideration"
part and parcel.

issue -- indeed,

they are

I therefore would uphold them on the balanc-

ing logic set forth on page 3 of this memo.

In sum, I recommend that you join the judgment and all
but sections IV B &
the

c.

Your separate statement should stress

potential difficulties

that lie ahead

in this field,

but

that the federal requirements in this case have not been shown
to be so intrusive and different from existing Mississippi policy as to justify a finding of unconstitutionality.

Alterna-

tively, you may wish to dissent from sections IV B & C on the
grounds I have suggested, or others that I have missed.

I of

course stand ready to help with whatever course you decide.
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80-1749 - FERC v. Mississippi

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS Of

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O ' C O NNOR

February 16, 1982

No. 80-1749

Federal Energy Regulatory Comrn.
v. Mississippi

Dear Harry,
I will circulate a dissent in due course.
Sinc ere ly,

Justice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference
Justice Powell:
By way of

s ~pplementing

the memo I just gave you in this case, I now

would advise awaiting SOC's effort.

I spoke to her clerk at lunch and their

Chambers may be quite in tune with ours on this case. ~
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CHAMBERS Of

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 16, 1982

No. 80-1749

Federal Energy Regulatory Comm.
v. Mississippi

Dear Harry,
I will circulate a dissent in due course.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference
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near Harry:
I will await Sandra's dissent
Sincerely,

Justice Rlackmun
lfp/ss

ccs

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF
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Re:
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80-1749 - FERC v. Mississippi

Dear Harry,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Blackrnun
Copies to the Conference
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RE:

February 17, 1982

No. 80-1749 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
v. Mississippi, et al.

Dear Harry:
I agree.
Sincerely,

I
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Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference
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February 17, 1982
Re:
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Mississippi

Federal Energy Regulatory Comm. v.

Dear Harry:
I will await Sandra's dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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Memorandum to Justice
Re:

Powell ~·~~

SOC dissent in FERC v. Mississippi ~ ~~ ~
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J

SOC has writ¥ en a dissent in which she canJ take rea r' p~~
~~~-'t~k~Hu-~~

think

it

is persuasive

and

eloquent.

Although

it

sw-eeps -morfl '

~~~~.~IY(~~~
bro ~y ....
what I / under stood to be y.i> ur initial inclin§: tions in -

than

this case, you may well wish to join her effort.
If you harbor doubts about the breadth of her position, I
would make the following points.

The dissent can be charged with

being long on rhetoric and short on analysis of the statute involved
In particular,

in this case.

state legislative agendas.

SOC objects

to

federal ordering of

Federal involvement in state legislative

agenda-setting is very intrusive, but I doubt that there should be
an absolute ban on such federal
legislatures at
time

federal

to redistricting.

rather

than

a

intervention.

For instance, state

direction now must devote a
It

congressional

is

true

that

requirement.

this
But

good deal of

is a constitutional
I'm not

sure

that

states find the intrusion less objectionable because it comes from a
9-person Court instead of the national representative body.
My view still is that the Court should weigh the extent of
federal
this

intrusion against the value of preserving state choice

type of

"federal persuasion"

2/16/82 memo on HAB' s

opinion.

legislation.

See page

in

3 of my

The statute in this case has not

~'

'·' ..

~· ~i

...,.

/

been

shown

to

involve

legislative effort.

a

significant

Indeed,

at all in the PURPA' s

2.

/

expenditure of

state

if the States really have no interest

proposed policies, my understanding is that

------

they could satisfy PURPA's demands with very little effort.
cally,

Basi-

the state commissions have to holding hearings and issue a

written report.
report.

quasi-

There is no minimum length for the hearings or the

(There are generous intervenor and judicial review provi-

sions, as you know.
on page

I will deal with these provisions separately,

of this memo.)

Given these facts, my view is that Mis-

sissippi has not shown the federal intrusion into the setting of its
be

quasi-legislative

of

constitutional

therefore would not follow SOC's broad objection to

magnitude.
~federal

I

in-

ference in this regard.
My suggestion instead would be to write separately in order
to

r~-~!i~ if;

PURPA.

the

I would

~

that

sketch out

you

find

most

troubling

the balancing approach

about

that I

the

suggest

here, and state the conclusion that generally the PURPA has not been
I(

\'

shown on its

face

to involve an impermissible federal

invasion of

state quasi-legislative prerogatives -- simply because the Court has
not shown that the burden on

Mississippi is in fact significant.

In other words, if Mississippi thinks the federal standards are nonsense, we have not been shown that the PURPA requires States to take
them with more serious than the State believes appropriate.
I also would, however, qualify this general approval of the
PURPA.

I would note that the PURPA's intervention and judicial re-

view provisions may force open the doors to state courts and agen-

.

-J'

3.

cies to a greater extent than the states themselves choose to do.
In this regard, I would say that the federal government fairly may
------~--------------

be held to take existing state institutions and procedures as it
finds

them.
_____...._

Correspondingly,

the federal government ought to be

prevented from making states more vulnerable to overcrowded agency
hearings and to state judicial action than the states choose to make
themselves.
ll

l \

The principle would be that state
right to determine their own rules of

institutions
------access and procedure

access and procedure is directed against the State itself.

have the
~

when that
The ba-

sis for this principle would be found in the federal principles of
independent state governments.

As I mentioned previously, the best

----.....

analogy I can think of would be to the 11th Amendment.

This analogy

is not exact, because that Amendment bars the exercise of only federal judicial power against the States.

But the 11th Amendment does

leave the States free to decide their own vulnerability to any judicial power by means of adjustment of the sovereign immunity rules in
$tate court.

Under PURPA, however, the federal government arrogates

the power to set rules on participation and judicial review of state
agency decisionmaking.
This intervention and

judicial review aspect is the only

portion of the PURPA in which I think the federal government necessarily requires a State to devote a significant degree of time and
energy to deliberation according to federal mandate.

But, as I have

said before, I think Justice Blackmun correctly points out that Mis--------~-------~~-------

sissippi has not shown that the PURPA expands Mississippi judicial

4.

and

adminstrative

access

itself already has on
this regard,

then,

provisions

its own.

any

Absent a

farther

than Mississippi

concrete controversy in

I would simply spell out the potential hazards

that exist in this field but would conclude that the PURPA has not
yet been shown to have run afoul of them.

*

*

*

*

*

In sum, You may find SOC's dissnet persuasive enough to win
your vote.

It is an admirable piece of work.

My own view, however,

is that it sweeps too broadly and fails to focus on the provisions
about which you have expressed

the most concern.

I would advise

that you write separately.

4,t'
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April 12, 1982

80-1749 Federal Energy

Comm. v. Mississippi

Sandra:
The clerk working with me on this case (John
Wiley) began his memorandum as follows: ""lustice O'Connor
has written a dissent in which she can take real pride. It
is persuasive <ind eloquent." ·I agree with .:John's
assessment, ann think your ophdon will be cited often and in view of your legislative experience - will have influence
over the yenrs.
I am inclined, nevertheless, to write separately.
As you may recall from Conference, my principal concern was
with the extent to which the statute mandates state
procedure, including standing, judicial review, etc. I may
not conclude that the entire statute is facially invalid.
want to take a closer look at the case.

Sincerely,

.:Justise O'Connor
lfp/ss

, • .,1 •
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>"..•
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April 12, 1982

i

80-1749 FF.RC v. Mississippi

Dear Harry:
Although I aq'C'ee with much of what Sandra has
written so well as to the intrusiveness of this statute, I
am not entirely at rest and may write separately.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

'

,I

.

'

··)

• .;r.

~

..
'

~

~.~--·-----------~----------

.;;.''l-!flT.flU¥ l!fUUU .tJl U !¥ ~ 1 1-U'U ~J-1-I:U.I-' ~

~IUf frittgtmt.

lH. cq.

21Jgt)!, ~

CHAMBERS OF
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April 13 , 1982

Re :

80-1749 - FERC v . Mississippi

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE!
Sandra ' s opinion concurring in part and dissenting
as to § IVB and IVC, persuades me the Court goes too
far . I therefore join her dissent .

>

•'

."

..

•

/

(
TH E C. J .

(
W. J . B.

T. M.

B. R. W.

H. A. B.
I

'

. /)oe~
L{ /r3 /~-v

.

~
-v/r;

~ H!l(j ~ Hfl/3

L. F. P.

J . P. S.

S. D. O'C.

I')... cj I 'j'-v-

t-vl-flr+rt

jp-v -v/t' /gv v/trlfY .,;,s- /f....'2.-J

~

~
-v(tr,{f-v

~L....~-71-

~~~ :J

,

jp

l-

JJ~

-c ·

W. H. R.

~~

~

'f{l-v/fv

'f/,~J;~;

~

~

-v/17/?-v

~ )-},qf3

vz4~

-v/t~t.}Civ-

-v/u, / 5'">-I

l/4~

~~()C..

~~

"I r>/r-v

fZ'--?(

~

..........-~

~

~£),~ ,,)-~
J,-;,q /f-,.., s-(,1 If""'

Y/£'/E-,..,..,.;~
~~. -z..-1£-v

2--rP~

~,;

'3-.JA+I
5""'/u /P~
'f~~

~/rtt lf"l--

s-(vf/~-v(

/

80-1749

FERC v. Mi sis sip pi

-·--

-

- -

-

-

· -

o: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Just i ce i'lhite
Justice ::
1.11
Justiro•, ("\ 11
J u.- ·- i
1 ·.ot
Jt
,' l
J t:.

J

0

vU

,u.

From: Ju.Jtice Blackrn'm

~~ulJ.td: FEB 1 5 1982
Recirct' la ted:

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1749

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET
AL., APPELLANTS v. MISSISSIPPI, ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
[February -

, 1982]

JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, appellees successfully challenged the constitutionality of Titles I and III, and of § 210 of Title II, of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
We conclude that
95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (PURPA or Act.)
appellees' challenge lacks merit and we reverse the judgment
below.
I
On November 9, 1978, President Carter signed PURPA
into law. 1 The Act was part of a package of legislation/ approved the same day, designed to combat the nationwide energy -crisis.
At the time, it was said that the generation of electricity
consumed more than 25% of all energy resources used in the
United States. S. Rep. No. 95-442, p. 7 (1977). Approxi1
The Senate vote was taken on Oct. 9, 1978. The Mississippi Senators
voted against the bill. See 124 Cong. Rec. S17818. The House vote was
taken on Oct. 15, 1978. The five-member Mississippi delegation voted
three "ayes" and two "nays." See 124 Cong. Rec. H38503.
2
In addition to PURP A, the package included the Energy Tax Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174; the National Energy Conservation
Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206; the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289; and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621 , 92 Stat. 3351.
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mately one-third of the electricity in this country was generated through use of oil and natural gas, and electricity generation was one of the fastest growing segments of the
Nation's economy. S. Rep. No. 95-361, p. 32 (1977). In
part because of their reliance on oil and gas, electricity utilities were plagued with increasing costs and decreasing efficiency in the use of their generating capacities; each of these
factors had an adverse effect on rates to consumers and on
the economy as a whole. S. Rep. No. 95-442, at 9. Cvngress accordingly determined that conservation by electricity
utilities of oil and natural gas was essential to the success of
any effort to lessen the country's dependence on foreign oil,
to avoid a repetition of the shortage of natural gas that had
been experienced in 1977, and to control consumer costs.

A
Titles I and III
PURPA's Titles I and III, which relate to regulatory policies for electricity and gas utilities, respectively, are administered (with minor exceptions) by the Secretary of Energy.
These provisions are designed to encourage the adoption of
certain retail regulatory practices. The Titles share three
goals: (1) to encourage "conservation of energy supplied by
. . . utilities;" (2) to encourage "the optimization of the efficiency of use of facilities and resources" by utilities; and (3) to
encourage "equitable rates ... to consumers." §§ 101 and
301, 92 Stat. 3120 and 3149, 16 U. S. C. § 2611 (1976 ed.,
Supp. III), 15 U.S. C. §3201 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 3 To
achieve these goals, Titles I and III direct state utility regulatory commissions and nonregulated utilities to "consider"
the adoption and implementation of specific "rate design" and
regulatory standards.
For simplicity of citation, and to avoid repetition, unless otherwise
noted herein, any reference to 16 U. S. C. relates to Supplement III of the
1976 edition of the Code, and any reference to 15 U. S. C. relates to Supplement IV of that edition.
3

'

..
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Section 111(d) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 2621(d), requires
each state regulatory authority and nonregulated utility to
consider the use of six different approaches to structuring
rates: (1) promulgation, for each class of electricity consumers, of rates that, "to the maximum extent practicable,"
would "reflect the costs of ... service to such class"; (2)
elimination of declining block rates; 4 (3) adoption of time-ofday rates; 5 (4) promulgation of seasonal rates; 6 (5) adoption
of interruptible rates; 7 and (6}.use of load management techniques. 8 The Act directed each state authority and
nonregulated utility to consider these factors not later than
two years after PURPA's enactment, that is, by November
8, 1980, and provided that the authority or utility by November 8, 1981, was to have made a decision whether to adopt
the standards. § 2622(b). The statute does not provide
penalties for failure to meet these deadlines; the state author4
"Declining block rates" are a traditional and still common approach
used by utilities in their charges for electricity. The highest unit rate is
charged for basic electrical consumption, with a declining per-unit price for
each block of additional consumption. SeeS. Rep. No. 95-442, pp. 26-27
(1977).
~ "Time-of-day rates" are designed to reduce "peak load," the term used
to describe the greatest demand for a utility's electricity. Demand varies
by hour and season, usually reaching a daily maximum in the afternoon and
a seasonal maximum in mid-summer or mid-winter. A utility must have
enough generating capacity to meet that demand; steps that reduce peak
demand also reduce the required amount of generating capacity and the
use of "peaking'' generating equipment, which frequently is gas- or oilfueled. Under time-of-day rates, utilities charge more for electricity consumed during peak load hours. SeeS. Rep. No. 95-442, at 29.
6
"Seasonal rates" operate to reduce peak load by imposing higher rates
during the seasons when demand is greatest.
7
"Interruptible rates" tend to reduce peak load by charging less for
service which the utility can interrupt, or stop, during peak demand
periods.
8
"Load management techniques" are methods used to reduce the demand for electricity at peak times. For example, a utility might employ
remote-control devices that temporarily turn off applicances during periods
when the demand is particularly great.

'•
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ity or nonregulated utility is merely directed to consider the
standards at the first rate proceeding initiated by the authority after November 9, 1980. § 2622(c).
Section 113 of PURP A, 16 U. S. C. § 2623, requires each
state regulatory authority and nonregulated utility to consider the adoption of a second set of standards relating to the
terms and conditions of electricity service: (1) prohibition of
master-metering in new buildings; 9 (2) restrictions on the
use of automatic adjustment clauses; 10 (3) disclosure to consumers of information regarding rate schedules; (4) promulgation of procedural requirements relating to termination of
service; and (5) prohibition of the recovery of advertising
costs from consumers. Similarly, §303, 15 U. S.C. §3203,
requires consideration of the last two standards-procedures
for termination of service and the nonrecovery of advertising
costs-for natural gas utilities. A decision as to the standards contained in§§ 113 and 303 was to have been made by
November 1980, although, again, no penalty was provided by
the statute for failure to meet the deadline.
Finally, § 114 of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 2624, directs each
state authority and nonregulated utility to consider promulgation of "lifeline rates"-that is, lower rates for service that
meets the essential needs of residential consumers-if such
rates have not been adopted by November 1980.
Titles I and III also prescribe certain procedures to be followed by the state regulatory authority and the nonregulated
"Master-metering" is the use of one meter for several living units.
Studies have shown that tenants of master-metered buildings use 35%
more electricity, on the average, than tenants of buildings where each
apartment has its own meter. See S. Rep. No. 95--442, at 31.
10
An "automatic adjustment clause" provides that as a utility's fuel costs
rise it may increase its rates without public hearing or review by the state
regulatory authority. A clause of this kind provides the utility with no
incentive to reduce its costs or to shift away from oil- or gas-fueled generating facilities, and therefore tends to discourage the efficient use of energy resources.
9
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utility when considering the proposed standards. Each
standard is to be examined at a public hearing after notice,
and a written statement of reasons must be made available to
the public if the standards are not adopted. 16 U. S. C.
§§ 2621(b) and (c)(2), and §§ 2623(a) and (c); 15 U. S.C
§§ 3203(a) and (c). "Any person" may bring an action in
state court to enforce the obligation to hold a hearing and
make determinations on the PURPA standards. 16 U. S. C.
§ 2633(c)(1); 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(1).
The Secretary of Energy, any affected utility, and any consumer served by an affected utility is given the right to intervene and participate in any rate-related proceeding considering the Title I standards. 16 U. S. C. § 2631(a). Under
Title III, the Secretary alone has the right to intervene. 15
U. S. C. §3205. Any person (including the Secretary) who
intervenes or otherwise participates in the proceeding may
obtain review in state court of any administrative determination concerning the Title I standards, 16 U. S. C.
§ 2633(c)(1), and the Secretary has the right to participate as
an amicus in any Title III judicial review proceeding initiated by another. 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2). The right to intervene is enforceable against the state regulatory authority
by an action in federal court. 16 U. S. C. § 2633(b); 15
U. S. C. § 3207(a)(2).
Titles I and III also set forth certain reporting requirements. Within one year of PURP A's enactment, and annually thereafter for 10 years, each state regulatory authority
and nonregulated utility is to report to the Secretary "respecting its consideration of the standards established." 16
U. S. C. §2626(a); 15 U. S. C. §3209(a). The Secretary, in
turn, is to submit a summary and analysis of these reports to
Congress. 16 U. S. C. § 2626(b); 15 U. S. C. § 3209(b).
Electricity utilities also are required to collect information
concerning their service costs. 16 U. S. C. § 2643. This information is to be filed periodically with appellant Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and with appropri-

80-1749-0PINION
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ate state regulatory agencies, and is to be made available to
the public. Title III requires the Secretary, in consultation
with FERC, state regulatory authorities, gas utilities, and
gas consumers, to submit a report to Congress on gas utility
rate design. 15 U. S. C. § 3206.
Despite the extent and detail of the federal proposals, however, no state authority or nonregulated utility is required to
adopt or implement the specified rate design or regulatory
standards. Thus, 16 U. S. C. §§ 2621(a) and 2623(a) and 15
U. S. C. § 3203(a) all provide: "Nothing in this subsection
prohibits any State regulatory authority or nonregulated . . .
utility from making any determination that it is not appropriate to [implement or adopt] any such standard, pursuant to
its authority under otherwise applicable State law." Similarly, 16 U. S. C. § 2627(b) and 15 U. S.C § 3208 make it clear
that any state regulatory authority or nonregulated utility
may adopt regulations or rates that are "different from any
standard established by this [subchapter or chapter]."
B
Section 210
Section 210 ofPURPA's Title II, 92 Stat. 3144, 16 U. S. C.
§ 824a-3, seeks to encourage the development of cogeneration and small power production facilities. 11 Congress believed that increased use of these sources of energy would reduce the demand for traditional fossil fuels. But it also felt
that two problems impeded the development of nontraditional generating facilities: (1) traditional electricity utilities were reluctant to purchase power from, and to sell power
11
A "cogeneration facility" is one that produces both electric energy and
steam or some other form of useful energy, such as heat. 16 U. S. C.
§ 796(18)(A). A "small power production facility" is one that has a production capacity of no more than 80 megawatts and uses biomass, waste, or
renewable resources (such as wind, water, or solar energy) to produce electric power. § 796(17)(A).
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to, the nontraditional facilities, 12 and (2) the regulation of
these alternative energy sources by state and federal utility
authorities imposed financial burdens upon the nontraditional
facilities and thus discouraged their development. 13
In order to overcome the first of these perceived problems,
§ 210(a) directs FERC, in consultation with state regulatory
authorities, to promulgate "such rules as it determines necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power production,"
including rules requiring utilities to offer to sell electricity to,
and purchase electricity from, qualifying cogeneration and
small power production facilities. Section 210(f), 16 U. S. C.
§ 824a-3(f), requires each state regulatory authority and
nonregulated utility to implement FERC's rules. And
§ 210(h), 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3(h), authorizes FERC to enforce
this requirement in federal court against any state authority
or nonregulated utility; if FERC fails to act after request,
any qualifying utility may bring suit.
To solve th.e second problem perceived by Congress,
§ 210(e), 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3(e), directs FERC to prescribe
rules exempting the favored cogeneration and small power
facilities from certain state and federal laws governing electricity utilities.
Pursuant to this statutory authorization, FERC has
adopted regulations relating to purchases and sales of electricity to and from cogeneration and small power facilities.
See 18 CFR pt. 292 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 12214-12237 (1980).
These afford state regulatory authorities and nonregulated
12
See 123 Cong. Rec. 25848 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Percy); id., at 32403
(remarks of Sen. Durkin); id., at 32437 (remarks of Sen. Haskell); id., at
32419 (remarks of Sen. Hart); National Energy Act: Hearings on H.R.
6831 et al. before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 3, pp. 552-553 (1977).
"See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 9&-1750, p. 98 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 9&-496,
pt. 4, p. 157 (1977); 123 Cong. Rec. 32399 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Cranston); id., at 32660 (remarks of Sen. Percy).
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utilities latitude in determining the manner in which the
regulations are to be implemented. Thus, a state commission may comply with the statutory requirements by issuing
regulations, by resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis, or
by taking any other action reasonably designed to give effect
to FERC's rules. 14
II
In April 1979, the State of Mississippi and the Mississippi
Public Service Commission, appellees here, filed this action
in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi against FERC and the Secretary of Energy,
seeking a declaratory judgment that PURPA's Titles I and
III and § 201 are unconstitutional. App. 3. 15 Appellees
maintained that PURP A was beyond the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and that it constituted an invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the
Tenth Amendment. 16
·
Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court, in an unreported opinion, held that in enacting
PURP A Congress had exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause. App. to Juris. Statement 1a. The court observed that the Mississippi Public Service Commission by
"Congress recognized that a State's compliance with the requirements
ofPURPA would involve the expenditure of funds. Accordingly, it authorized the Secretary of Energy to make grants to state regulatory authorities to assist them in carrying out the provisions of Titles I and III, including the reporting requirements, and the provisions of § 210. See 42
U. S. C. § 6807 (1976 ed., Supp. III).
For each of the fiscal years 1979 and 1980, Congress authorized for
appropriation up to $40 million to help state regulatory authorities defray
the costs of complying with PURPA. Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 142(1), 92
Stat. 3134, 42 U. S. C. § 6808(1) (1976 ed., Supp. III).
15
Mississippi Power & Light Company was permitted to intervene in the
action as a plaintiff and is also an appellee here.
16
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U. S. Const. , Arndt. 10.
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state statute possessed the "power and authority to regulate
and control intrastate activities and policies of all utilities operating within the sovereign state of Mississippi." I d., at
2a. Relying on Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238
(1936), the court stated: "There is literally nothing in the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution which authorizes or
justifies the federal government in taking over the regulation
and control of public utilities. These public utilities were actually unknown at the writing of the Constitution." App. to
Juris. Statement 4a. Indeed, in the court's view, the legislation "does not even attempt to regulate commerce among the
several states but it is a clear usurpation of power and authority which the United States simply does not have under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution." !d., at 7a.
Relying on National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S.
833 (1976), the court also concluded that PURPA trenches on
state sovereignty. 17 It therefore pronounced the statutory
provisions void because "they constitute a direct intrusion on
integral and traditional functions of the State of Mississippi."
App. to Juris. Statement 8a-9a. For reasons it did not explain, the court also relied on the guarantee of a republican
form of government, U. S. Const., Art. IV, §4, and on the
Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2. App. to Juris. Statement
2a, n. 1, and 9a.
FERC and the Secretary of Energy appealed directly to
this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn.,-- U.S.--,--, n.
15 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - (1981).
III
The Commerce Clause
We readily conclude that the District Court's analysis and
the appellees' arguments are without merit so far as they
"The sovereign state of Mississippi is not a robot , or lackey which may
be shuttled back and forth to suit the whim and caprice of the federal government." App. to Juris. Statement 2a.
17

-~
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concern the Commerce Clause. To say that nothing in the
Commerce Clause justifies federal regulation of even the intrastate operations of public utilities misapprehends the
proper role of the courts in assessing the validity of federal
legislation promulgated under one of Congress' plenary powers. The applicable standard was reiterated just last Term
in Hodel v. Indiana,-- U. S. - - (1981):
"It is established beyond peradventure that 'legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic
life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality .... ' Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U. S. 1, 15 (1978). . . . A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is
clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional
finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between
the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends."
ld., at-- (slip op. 7)." 18
Despite these expansive observations by this Court, appellees assert that PURPA is facially unconstitutional because it
In the companion case decided the same day, this Court observed:
"Judicial review in this area is influenced above all by the fact that the
Commerce Clause is a grant of plenary authority to Congress . . . . This
power is 'complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.'
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). Moreover, this Court has made
clear that the commerce power extends not only to 'the use of channels of
interstate or foreign commerce' and to 'protection of the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce .. . or persons or things in commerce,' but also to
'activities affecting commerce.' Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 150
(1971). As we explained in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547
(1975) , '[e]ven activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign
nations.' " Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn., - - U. S.
,(1981) (slip op. 9-10).
'
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does not regulate "commerce"; instead, it is said, the Act directs the nonconsenting State to regulate in accordance with
federal procedures. This, appellees continue, is beyond
Congress' power: "In exercising the authority conferred by
this clause of the Constitution, Congress is powerless to regulate anything which is not commerce, as it is powerless to do
anything about commerce which is not regulation." Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S., at 297. The "governance of
commerce" by the State is to be distinguished from commerce itself, for regulation of the former is said to be outside
the plenary power of Congress. 19
It is further argued that the proper test is not whether the
regulated activity merely "affects" interstate commerce but,
instead, whether it has "a substantial effect" on such commerce, citing JUSTICE REHNQUIST's opinion concurring in
the judgment in the Hodel cases,-- U. S., at-- (slip op.
IH>).
PURP A, appellees maintain, does not meet this
standard.
The difficulty with these arguments is that they disregard
entirely the specific congressional finding, in § 2 of the Act,
16 U. S. C. § 2601, that the regulated activities have an immediate effect on interstate commerce. Congress there determined that "the protection of the public health, safety, and
welfare, the preservation of national security, and the proper
exercise of congressional authority under the Constitution to
regulate interstate commerce require," among other things,
a program for increased conservation of electric energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by
electricity utilities, and equitable retail rates for electricity
consumers, as well as a program to improve the wholesale
For this proposition, appellees reply on Brown v. EPA , 521 F . 2d 827,
839 (CA9 1975), vacated and remanded , 431 U. S. 99 (1977), and District of
Colum bia v. Train, 172 U. S. App. D.C. 311, 332, 521 F . 2d 971, 992
(1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99
(1977).
19
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distribution of electric energy, and a program for the conservation of natural gas while ensuring that rates to gas consumers are equitable. 16 U. S. C. § 2601. The findings,
thus, are clear and specific.
The Court heretofore has indicated that federal regulation
of intrastate power transmission may be proper because of
the interstate nature of the generation and supply of electric
power. FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U. S. 453
(1972). Our inquiry, then, is whether the congressional findings have a rational basis. Hodel v. Virginia Suiface Min.
& Reel. Assn.,-- U. S., at-- (slip op. 10); Hodel v. Indiana, - - U. S., at - - (slip op. 7).
The legislative history provides a simple answer: there is
ample support for Congress' conclusions. The hearings were
extensive. Committees in both Houses of Congress noted
the magnitude of the Nation's energy problems and the need
to alleviate those problems by promoting energy conservation and more efficient use of energy resources. See S. Rep.
No. 95-442, at 7-10; H.R. Rep. No. 95--543, vol. I, pp. 5--10
(1977); H.R. Rep. No. 95--496, pt. 4, pp. 3-7, 125--130 (1977). 20
Congress was aware that domestic oil production had lagged
behind demand and that the Nation had become increasingly
dependent on foreign oil. I d., at 3. The House Committee
observed: "Reliance upon imported oil to meet the bulk of
U. S. oil demands could seriously jeopardize the stability of
the Nation's economy and could undermine the independence
ofthe United States." Ibid. See H.R. Rep. No. 95--543, at
5-6. Indeed, the Nation had recently experienced severe
shortages in its supplies of natural gas. I d., at 7. The
20
See also 124 Cong. Rec. S17528 (Oct. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Jackson); id., at S17530 (remarks of Sen. Bumpers); 124 Cong. Rec. S17804
(Oct. 9, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Robert C. Byrd); 124 Cong. Rec. H13103
(Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ashley); id., at H13121-H13122 (remarks
of Rep. Dingell); 123 Cong. Rec. 25894 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Ashley);
id., at 25916-25917 (remarks of Rep. Ottinger); id., at 27063-27064 (remarks of Rep. Wolff).
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House and Senate committees both noted that the electricity
industry consumed more than 25% of the total energy resources used in this country while supplying only 12% of the
user demand for energy. S. Rep. No. 95-442, at 7-8; H.R.
Rep. No. 95-496, pt. 4, at 125. In recent years, the electricity utility industry had been beset by numerous problems,
id., at 129, which resulted in higher bills for the consuming
public, a result exacerbated by the rate structures employed
by most utilities. S. Rep. No. 95-442, at 26. Congress naturally concluded that the energy problem was nationwide in
scope, 21 and that these developments demonstrated the need
to establish federal standards regarding retail sales of electricity, as well as federal attempts to encourage conservation
and more efficient use of scarce energy resources. See S.
Rep. No. 95-442, at 24-32; H.R. Rep. No. 95-496, pt. 4, at
131-133, 136-138, 170-171.
Congress also determined that the development of
cogeneration and small power production facilities would conserve energy. The evidence before Congress showed the potential contribution of these sources of energy: it was estimated that if proper incentives were provided, industrial
cogeneration alone could account for 7o/o--10% of the Nation's
electrical generating capacity by 1987. S. Rep. No. 95-442,
at 21, 23.
We agree with appellants that it is difficult to conceive of a
more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and every commercial or manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on
its own resources in this respect. See FPC v. Florida
Power & Light Co., supra. Indeed, the utilities involved in
this very case, Mississippi Power & Light Company and Mississippi Power Company, sell their retail customers power
that is generated in part beyond Mississippi's borders, and
21
See, e. g. , 123 Cong. Rec. 32437-32438 (1977) (remarks of Sen.
Brooke); i d., at 32444 (remarks of Sen. Percy).
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offer reciprocal services to utilities in other States. App.
93-94. The intrastate activities of these utilities, although
regulated by the Mississippi Public Service Commission,
bring them within the reach of Congress' power over interstate commerce. See FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
404 U. S., at 458; New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire,-- U. S.-- (1982). 22
Even if appellees were correct in suggesting that PURP A
will not significantly improve the Nation's energy situation,
the congressional findings compel the conclusion that "'the
means chosen by [Congress are] reasonably adapted to the
end permitted by the Constitution'" Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn., --U.S., at-- (slip op. 9),
quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U. S. 241, 262 (1964). It is not for us to say whether the
means chosen by Congress represent the wisest choice. It is
sufficient that Congress was not irrational in concluding that
limited federal regulation of retail sales of electicity and natural gas, and of relationships between cogenerators and electric utilities, was essential to protect interstate commerce.
That is enough to place the challenged portions of PURP A
within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 23 Because PURPA's provisions concern private nonregulated utilities as well as state commissions, the statute necessarily is
valid at least insofar as it regulates private parties. See
22
PURP A could be upheld even if some of its provisions were not directly
related to the purpose of fostering interstate commerce: "A complex regulatory program ... can survive a Commerce Clause challenge without a
showing that every single facet of the program is independently and directly related to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program and that
the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole satisfies this test."
Hodel v. Indiana,- U.S. - , - , n. 17. (1981).
23
This is not to say the Congress can regulate in an area that is only tangentially related to interstate commerce. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U. S. 183, 196-197, n. 27 (1968). That obviously is not the case here.
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Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn.,-- U. S., at
(slip op. 19-20).
IV
The Tenth Amendment
Unlike the Commerce Clause question, the Tenth Amendment issue presented here is somewhat novel. This case obviously is related to National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U. S. 833 (1976), insofar as both concern principles of state
sovereignty. But there is a significant difference as well.
National League of Cities, like Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542 (1975), presented a problem the Court often confronts: the extent to which state sovereignty shields the
States from generally applicable federal regulations. In
PURPA, in contrast, the Federal Government attempts to
use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals. To
an extent, this presents an issue of first impression.
PURP A, for all its complexity, contains essentially three
requirements: (1) § 210 has the States enforce standards promulgated by FERC; (2) Titles I and III direct the States to
consider specified rate-making standards; and (3) those Titles
impose certain procedures on state commissions. We consider these three requirements in turn:
A. Section 210. On its face, this appears to be the most
intrusive of PURPA's provisions. The question of its constitutionality, however, is the easiest to resolve. Insofar as
§ 210 authorizes FERC to exempt qualified power facilities
from "State laws and regulations," it does nothing more than
pre-empt conflicting state enactments in the traditional way.
Clearly, Congress can pre-empt the States completely in the
regulation of retail sales by electricity and gas utilities and in
the regulation of transactions between such utilities and
congenerators. Cf. Southern Pacific Co . v. Arizona, 325
U. S. 761, 769 (1945). The propriety of this type of regulation-so long as it is a valid exercise of the commerce
power-was made clear in National League of Cities, and

. t',
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was reaffirmed in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel.
Assn.: the Federal Government may displace state regulation
even though this serves to "curtail or prohibit the States' prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the
States may consider important." - - U. S. - - , at - (slip op. 23).
Section 210's requirement that "each State regulatory authority shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing,
implement such rule (or revised rule) for each electric utility
for which it has ratemaking authority," 16 U. S. C.
§ 824a-3(f)(1) (emphasis added), is more troublesome. The
statute's substantive provisions require electricity utilities to
purchase electricity from, and to sell it to, qualifying
cogenerator and small power production facilities.
§ 824a-3(a). Yet FERC has declared that state commissions
may implement this by, among other things, "an undertaking
to resolve disputes between qualifying facilities and electric
utilities arising under [PURPA]." 18 CFR § 292.401(a)
(1980). In essence, then, the statute and the implementing
regulations simply require the Mississippi authorities to adjudicate disputes arising under the statute. Dispute resolution of this kind is the very type of activity customarily engaged in by the Mississippi Public Service Commission.
See, e. g., Miss. Code Ann. §§ 77-1-31, 77-3-5, 77-3-13(3),
77-3-21, 77-3-405 (1973).
Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), is instructive and controlling on this point. There, the Emergency Price Control
Act, 56 Stat. 34, as amended, created a treble damages remedy, and gave jurisdiction over claims under the Act to state
as well as federal courts. The courts of Rhode Island refused to entertain such claims, although they heard analogous
state causes of action. This Court upheld the federal program. It observed that state courts have a unique role in
enforcing the body of federal law, and that the Rhode Island
courts had "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under es-
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tablished local law to adjudicate this action." 330 U. S., at
394. Thus the state courts were directed to heed the constitutional command that "the policy of the federal Act is the
prevailing policy in every state," id., at 393, "'and should be
respected accordingly in the courts of the State.'" I d., at
392, quoting Mondau v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223
u. s. 1, 57 (1912).
So it is here. The Mississippi Commission has jurisdiction
to entertain claims analogous to those granted by PURP A,
and it can satisfy § 210's requirements simply by opening its
doors to claimants. That the Commission has administrative
as well as judicial duties is of no significance. 24 Any other
conclusion would allow the States to disregard both the preeminent position held by federal law throughout the Nation,
cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 340-341 (1816),
and the congressional determination that the federal rights
granted by PURPA can appropriately be enforced through
state adjudicatory machinery. Such an approach, Testa emphasized, "flies in the face of the fact that the States of the
Union constitute a nation," and "disregards the purpose and
effect of Article VI of the Constitution." 330 U. S., at 389.
B. Mandatory Consideration of Standards. We acknowledge that "the authority to make . . . fundamental . . . decisions" is perhaps the quintessential attribute of sovereignty.
See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 851.
Indeed, having the power to make decisions and to set policy
is what gives the State its sovereign nature. See Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 360 (1977) (State Supreme Court speaks as sovereign because it is the "ultimate
body wielding the State's power over the practice of law").
It would follow that the ability of a state legislative (or, as
24
In another context, the Court has noted that "the role of the modern
federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge .. . is 'functionally
comparable' to that of a judge." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 513
(1978).

'
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here, administrative) body-which makes decisions and sets
policy for the State as a whole-to consider and promulgate
regulations of its choosing must be central to a State's role in
the federal system. Indeed, the nineteenth century view,
expressed in a well known slavery case, was that Congress
"has no power to impose upon a State officer, as such, any
duty whatever, and compel him to perform it." Kentucky v.
Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107 (1861).
Recent cases, however, demonstrate that this rigid and
isolated statement from Kentucky v. Dennison-which suggests that the States and the Federal Government in all circumstances must be viewed as co-equal sovereigns-is not
representative of the law today. While this Court never has
sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations, cf. EPA v. Brown,
431 U. S. 99 (1977), there are instances where the Court has
upheld federal statutory structures that · in effect directed
state decision-makers to take or to refrain from taking certain actions. In Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975),
for example, state executives were held restricted, with respect to state employees, to the wage and salary limitations
established by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.
Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658 (1979),
acknowledged a federal court's power to enforce a treaty by
compelling a state agency to "prepare" certain rules "even if
state law withholds from [it] the power to do so." !d., at
695. 25 And certainly Testa v. Katt, supra, by declaring that
"the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every
state," 330 U. S., at 393, reveals that the Federal Government has some power to enlist a branch of state government-there the judiciary-to further federal ends. In
25
The Court did express doubt as to whether a state agency "may be ordered actually to promulgate regulations having effect as a matter of state
law." 443 U.S., at 695. As we have noted , however, PURPA does not
require promulgation of particular regulations.
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doing so, Testa clearly cut back on both the quoted language
and the analysis of the Dennison case of the preceding
century. 26
Whatever all this may forebode for the future, or for the
scope of federal authority in the event of a crisis of national
proportions, it plainly is not necessary for the Court in this
case to make a definitive choice between competing views of
federal power to compel state regulatory activity. Titles I
and III of PURPA require only consideration of federal standards. And if a State has no utilities commission, or simply
2<1 In Dennison, the Court concluded that the state courts entertained
federal actions solely as a discretionary "matter of comity, which the several sovereignties extended to one another for their mutual benefit. It
was not regarded by either party as an obligation imposed by the Constitution." 24 How., at 109. That analysis cannot survive Testa, which
squarely held "that state courts do not bear the same relation to the United
States that they do to foreign countries." 330 U. S., at 389. And Testa,
of course, placed the obligation of state officials to enforce federal law
squarely in the Supremacy Clause.
Our recent cases also demonstrate that the Federal Government, at least
in certain circumstances, can structure the State's exercise of its sovereign
powers. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), for
example, the Court made clear that the State's regulation of its relationship with its employees is an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty."
!d., at 845. Yet, by holding "unimpaired" California v. Taylor, 353 U. S.
553 (1957), which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18, National League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal control. This analysis was restated in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn., supra, which indicated that federal
regulations are subject to Tenth Amendment attack only if they "regulat[e]
the 'States as States,"' "address matters that are indisputably 'attributes
of state sovereignty, ' " and impair the States' "ability 'to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional functions.'" - - U. S., at-- (slip op.
21), quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 854, 845,
852. And even when these requirements are met, "[t]here are situations
in which the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it
justifies State submission.'' Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel.
Assn.,-- U. S., at-- (slip op. 21 n.29).
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stops regulating in the field, it need not even entertain the
federal proposals. In a sense, then, this case is only one step
beyond Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn.,
supra. There, the Federal Government could have preempted all surface mining regulations; instead, it allowed the
States to enter the field if they promulgated regulations consistent with federal standards. In the Court's view, this
raised no Tenth Amendment problem: "We fail to see why
the Surface Mining Act should become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to allow the States a regulatory role." - - U. S., a t - - (slip op. 24.) "[T]here
can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a regulatory program." ld., at-- (slip
op. 22).
Similarly here, Congress could have pre-empted the field;
PURP A should not be invalid simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress adopted a less intrusive
scheme and allowed the States to continue regulating in the
area on the condition that they consider'the suggested federal standards. -n There is nothing in PURPA "directly compelling'' the States to enact a legislative program. And because the two challenged Titles simply condition continued
state involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration
of federal proposals, they do not threaten the States' "sepa27
1t seems evident that Congress intended to defer to state prerogatives-and expertise-in declining to pre-empt the utilities field entirely.
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 95-442, pp. 9, 13-14 (1977); 124 Cong. Rec. S17528
(Oct. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Jackson); id., at S17530 (remarks of Sen.
Bumpers); id., at S17801 (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum); id., at S17806 (remarks of Sen. Durkin); 123 Cong. Rec. 32430 (1977) (remarks of Sen. John- ·
ston); id., at 32395 (remarks of Sen. Bartlett). The congressional intention would not save the statute, of course, if the method of regulation were
constitutionally impermissible. But it would be a peculiar type of federalism that encourages Congress to pre-empt a field entirely, when its preference is to allow the States a continued role in the field.
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rate and independent existence," Lane County v. Oregon, 7
Wall. 71, 76 (1869); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 580
(1911), and do not impair the ability of the States "to function
effectively in a federal system." Fry v. United States, 421
U. S., at 547, n. 7; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U. S., at 852. To the contrary, they offer the States a vehicle for remaining active in an area of overriding concern.
We recognize, of course, that the choice put to the Statesthat of either abandoning regulation of the field altogether or
considering the federal standards-may be a difficult one.
And that is particularly true when Congress, as is the case
here, has failed to provide an alternative regulatory mechanism to police the area in the event of state default. Yet in
other contexts the Court has recognized that valid federal enactments may have an effect on state policy-and may, indeed, be designed to induce state action in areas that otherwise would be beyond Congress' regulatory authority. Thus
in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U. S. 127 (1947),
the Court upheld Congress' power to attach conditions to
grants-in-aid r.eceived by the States, although the condition
under attack involved an activity that "the United States is
not concerned with, and has no power to regulate." I d., at
143. The Tenth Amendment, the Court declared, "has been
consistently construed 'as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a
granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to
the permitted end,"' ibid, quoting United States v. Darby,
312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941)-the end there being the disbursement of federal funds. Thus it cannot be constitutionally determinative that the federal regulation is likely to move the
States to act in a given way, or even to "coerc[e] the States"
into assuming a regulatory role by affecting their "freedom to
make decisions in areas of 'integral governmental functions.'"
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn.,-- U. S., at
(slip op. 22, 23).
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Equally as important, it has always been the law that state
legislative and judicial decisionmakers must give preclusive
effect to federal enactments concerning governmental activity, no matter what the strength of the competing local interests. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat., at 340--341.
This requirement follows from the nature of governmental
regulation of private activity. "[l]ndividual businesses necessarily [are] subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and the State in which they reside," National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 845; when
regulations promulgated by the sovereigns conflict, federal
law necessarily controls. This is true though Congress exercises its authority "in a manner that displaces the States' exercise of their police powers," Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Min. & Reel. Assn.,-- U. S., at-- (slip op. 25), or in
such a way as to "curtail or prohibit the States' prerogatives
to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States
may consider important," id., at-- (slip op. 23)-or, to put
it still more plainly, in a manner that is "extraordinarily intrusive." Id., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring) (slip op. 1).
Thus it may be unlikely that the States will or easily can
abandon regulation of public utilities to avoid PURP A's requirements. But this does not change the constitutional
analysis: as in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn.,
"[t]he most that can be said is that the ... Act establishes a
program of cooperative federalism that allows the States,
within limits established by federal minimum standards, to
enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular needs." I d., at - - (slip
op. 22).
To be sure, PURPA gives virtually any affected person the
right to compel consideration of the statutory standards
through judicial action. We fail to see, however, that this
places any particularly onerous burden on the State. Mississippi by statute already grants "{ a]ny interested person ...

.'

80--1749-0PINION
FERC v. MISSISSIPPI

23

the right to petition the [Public Service] [C]ommission for issuance, amendment or repeal of a rule or regulation," Miss.
Code Ann. § 77-3-45 (1973) (emphasis added), and provides
that "any party aggrieved by any final finding, order or judgment of the commission shall have the right, regardless of the
amount involved, of appeal in chancery court." Miss. Code
Ann. § 77-~7(1) (1981 Cum. Supp.) (emphasi~ added). Indeed, "[a]ny person whose rights may be directly affected by
said appeal may appear and become a party.... " Ibid.
And "[a]ppeals in accordance with law may be had to the supreme court of the State of Mississippi from any final judgment of the chancery court." Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-71
(1973).
It is hardly clear on the statute's face, then, that PURP A's
standing and appeal provisions grant any rights beyond those
presently accorded by Mississippi law, and appellees point to
no specific provision of the Act expanding on the State's existing, liberal approach to public participation in ratemaking.
In this light, we again find the principle of Testa v. Katt,
supra, controlling: the State is asked only to make its administrative tribunals available for the vindication of federal as
well as state-created rights. PURP A, of course, establishes
as federal policy the requirement that state commissions consider various ratemaking standards, and it gives individuals a
right to enforce that policy; once it is established that the requirement is constitutionally supportable, "the obligation of
states to enforce these federal laws is not lessened by reason
of the form in which they are cast or the remedy which they
provide." Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S., at 391. See Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 57 (1912).
In short, Titles I and III do not involve the compelled exercise of Mississippi's sovereign powers. And, equally important, they do not set a mandatory agenda to be considered in
all events by state legislative or administrative
decisionmakers. As we read them, Titles I and III simply
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establish requirements for continued state activity in an otherwise pre-emptible field. Whatever the constitutional
problems associated with more intrusive federal programs,
the "mandatory consideration" provisions of Titles I and III
must be validated under the principle of Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Min. & Reel. Assn. 28
C. The Procedural Requirements. Titles I and III also
require state commissions to follow certain notice and comment procedures when acting on the proposed federal standards. In a way, these appear more intrusive than the "consideration" provisions; while the latter are essentially
hortatory, the procedural provisions obviously are prescriptive. Appellants and amici Maryland, et al., argue that the
procedural requirements simply establish minimum due process standards, something Mississippi appears already to provide, 29 and therefore may be upheld as an exercise of ConAs we note above, PURPA imposes certain reporting requirements on
state commissions. But because these attach only if the State chooses to
continue its regulatory efforts in the field, we find them supportable for the
reasons addressed in connection with the other provisions of Titles I and
Ill. Appellees nevertheless suggest that PURPA's requirements must
fall because compliance will impose financial burdens on the States. We
are unconvinced: in a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional activity, "the determinative factor ... [is] the nature of the federal action, not
the ultimate economic impact on the States." Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Min. & Reel. Assn.,-- U.S., at - - , n. 33. In any event, Congress
has taken steps to reduce or eliminate the economic burden of compliance.
See n. 14, supra.
29
Mississippi law provides for reasonable notice in the fixing of rates and
conditions of service of utilities. Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-33(2) (1973). It
also requires the Public Service Commission to keep a "full and complete
record" of all proceedings, § 77+63, and to "make and file its findings and
order, and its opinion, if any," § 77--3--59. Indeed, the state statute requires that ~'[a]ll findings of the commission and the determination of every
matter by it shall be in writing and placed upon its minutes." § 77-1-41.
These "shall be deemed a public record, and shall at all seasonable times be
subject to the inspection of the public." Ibid. Thus, the requirements
that appellees characterize as an extraordinary burden on the State appear
28
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gress' Fourteenth Amendment powers. We need not go
that far, however, for we uphold the procedural requirements under the same analysis employed above in connection
with the "consideration" provisions. If Congress can require
a state administrative body to consider proposed regulations
as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible
field-and we hold today that it can-there is nothing unconstitutional about Congress' requiring certain procedural min.ima as that body goes about undertaking its tasks. The procedural requirements obviously do not compel the exercise of
the State's sovereign powers, and do not purport to set standards to be followed in all areas of the state commission's
endeavors.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed.

It is so ordered.

to accord few , if any, procedural rights not already established by Mississippi law.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 80-1749

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION ET
AL., APPELLANTS, v. MISSISSIPPI ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
[April - , 1982]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part in the judgment
and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the Commerce Clause supported Congress' enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(PURP A). I disagree, however, with much of the majority's
Tenth Amendment analysis. Titles I and III of PURP A ~
script state utility commissions into the national bureaucratic
army This result is contrary to the principles of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), antithetical
to the values of federalism, and inconsistent with our constitutional history. Accordingly, I dissent from subsections
IVB and C of the majority's opinion.'
)

I

1
I concur in the majority's decision to uphold Title II, § 210 of PURPA 1!-:n!!i?C-<:tt::.~~~
against appellees' facial attack. As the majority explains, part of that section permits the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to ex- ~ ~....£/
empt cogeneration and small power production facilities from otherwise ap- ~...r~--;plicable state and federal laws. 16 U.S. C. §824a-3 (e) (1976 ed., Supp.
--~~
IV). This exemption authority does not violate the Tenth Amendment,
for it merely preempts state control of private conduct, rather than regulating the "States as States." See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293 (1981).
Section 210's requirement that the States "implement" rules promulgated by the Secretary of Energy, 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 (f) (1976 ed., Supp.
IV), is more disturbing. Appellants, however, have interpreted this statu-

"t
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I

Titles I and III of PURPA require state regulatory agencies to decide 'Yheth~dop_f·ad_gzen federaLstandar:_ds
governing gas afi:'<f§ectric utilities. 2 The statute describes,
in some e ail, the procedures state authorities must follow
when evaluating these stanaard~ but does not compel the
tory obligation to include "an undertaking to resolve disputes between
qualifying facilities and electric utilities arising under [§ 210], or any other
action reasonably designed to implement [that section]." 18 CFR
§ 292.401 (a) (1981). It appears, therefore, that state regulatory authorities may satisfy § 210's implementation requirement simply by adjudicating
private disputes arising under that section. As the majority points out,
ante, at 16-17, the Mississippi Public Service Commission has jurisdiction
over similar state disputes, and it is settled that a State may not exercise
its judicial power in a manner that discriminates between analogous federal
and state causes of action. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947).
Under these circumstances, but without foreclosing the possibility that
particular applications of § 210's implementation provision might uncover
hidden constitutional defects, I would not sustain appellees' facial attack on
the provision.
Section 210 also authorizes FERC, electric utilities, cogenerators, and
small power producers to "enforce" the above implementation provision
against state utility commissions. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 (h) (2) (1976 ed.,
Supp. IV). As applied, it is conceivable that this enforcement provision
would raise troubling federalism issues. Once again, however, I decline to
accept appellees' facial challenge to the provision, preferring to consider
the constitutionality of this provision in the setting of a concrete
controversy.
2
The statute imposes the same requirements upon nonregulated utilities. In this respect, it regulates purely private conduct and does not violate the Tenth Amendment. Throughout this dissent, I consider only the
constitutionality of Titles I and III as applied to state regulatory authorities. I would allow the District Court, on remand, to decide whether the
constitutionally defective aspects of Titles I and III are severable from the
unobjectionable portions.
3
See majority op., ante, at 4-6. The majority overlooks several of
PURPA's procedural mandates. For example, with respect to six of the
standards, tfie stat-;agency must publish a written determination, including findings, even if it decides to adopt the federal standard. 16 U. S. C.
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States to adopt thP suggested federal standards. 15
U. S.C. §3203 (a) (1~76 ed., Supp. IV); 16 U.S. C. §§2621
(a), 2623 (a), 2627 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The latter, deceptively generous, feature of PURP A persuades the Court
that the statute doeE not intrude impermissibly into state
sovereign functions. The Court's conclusion, however, rests \
upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the role that state l
governments play in our federalist system.
tat"e le~slative and administrative bodies are not field offices of the ti al areaucracy. Nor are they think tanks
o wh1ch Congress m&y assign problems for extended study.
Instead, each State is sovereign within its own domain, governing its citizens anJ providing for their general welfare.
While the Constitution and federal statutes limit the scope of
state authority, they do not harness that power for national
purposes. The Constitution contemplates "an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States," a system in which
both the state and national governments retain a "separate
and independent existence." Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700,
725 (1869); Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869).
Adhering to these principles, the Court has recognized that
the Tenth Amendment restrains congressional action that
woul~tate's ability to function as a State."
United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455
§ 2621 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). In addition, PURPA guarantees certain
information, § 2631 (b); requires the State to provide

~ht~discover

transcnp s, at the cost of reproduction, to parties to ratemaking proceedings or other "regulatory proceeding[s] relating to [electric utility] rates or
rate design," § 2632 (c); and, under some circumstances, mandates compensation for reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and other
costs to consumers who contribute substantially to the adoption of a Title I
standard, § 2632 (a), (b). These requirements, as well as the ones described by the majority, may impose special burdens on state administrative agencies. I do not weigh the constitutionalit of these individual
procedural requirements, owever, because wou d invalidate the entire
regimen Titles I and III impose on state regulatory authorities.

j

&(

~f~
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U. S. - - , - - (1982); National League of Cities --k1lsery,
426 U. S. 833, 842-852 (1976); Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542, 547, n. 7 (1975). See also City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 423-424 (1978)

(CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment). For
example, in National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, the
Court held that Congress could not prescribe the minimum
wages and maximum hours of state employees engaged in
"traditional governmental functions," id., at 852, because the
power to set those wages and hours is an "attribute of state
sovereignty" that is "essential to [a] separate and independent existence." ld., at 845 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon,
supra, at 76).
Just last Term this Court identified three separate inquiries underlying the result in National League of Cities. A
congressional enactment violates the Tenth Amendment, we
observed, if it regulates the "'States as States,"' addresses
"matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty,"' and "directly impair[s] [the States'] ability to 'structure integral o;>erations in areas of traditional governmental
functions."' v1Iodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U. S. 264, 287-288 (1981) (quoting National League of Cities, supra, at 854, 845, 852). See also
United Transportation Union, supra, at - - . 4
Application of these principles to the present case reveals
the Tenth Amendment defects in Titles I and III. Plainly
those titles regulate the "States as States." While the statute's ultimate aim may be the regulation of private utility
companies, PURPA addresses its commands solely to the
• In both Hodel and United Transportation Union we further noted
that, even when these three requirements are met, "the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission."
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, n. 29; United Transportation Union, 455 U. S.,
a t - , n. 9. Neither of those cases involved such an exception to National League of Cities, and the Court has not yet explored the circumstances that might justify such an exception.
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States. Instead of requesting private utility companies to
adopt lifeline rates, declining block rates, or the other
PURPA standards, Congress directed state agencies to appraise the appropriateness of those standards.
It is djffi- (
cult to argue that a statute structuring the regulatory agenda
~- 9
or a state a ency is ~a
regu
atwn
of
the
"State."
...______
-..---.,.,..- -.....
~·
find it equally clear that Tit es I an III address
"attributes of state sovereignty." Even the majority recog~1/v~
nizes that "the power to make decisions and to set policy is
what gives the State its sovereign nature." Ante, at 17.
~' ~
The power to make decisions and set policy, however, embraces more than the ultimate authority to enact laws; it also 9--~
includes the power to decide which proposals are most wor- { ~/'
thy of consideration, the order in which they should be taken
up, and the precise form in which they should be debated. ~h
PURPA intrudes upon all of these functions. It chooses
twelve proposals, forcing their consideration even if the state
agency deems other ideas more worthy of immediate attention. In addition, PURPA hinders the agency's ability to
schedule consideration of the federal standards. 5 Finally,
PURP A specifies, with exacting detail, the content of the
( standards that will absorb the agency's time. 6

-

-.__....

4)

~

s As the majority recognizes, ante, at 5, PURPA permits "[a]ny person" to bring an action in state court to enforce the agency's obligation to
consider the federal standards. 15 U. S. C. § 3207 (b) (1) (1976 ed., Supp.
IV); 16 U. S. C. § 2633 (c) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The Secretary of Energy, moreover, may intervene in any ongoing ratemaking proceeding to
require consideration of PURPA's standards. 15 U. S. C. § 3205 (a) (1976
ed., Supp. IV); 16 U. S. C. §§ 2631 (a), 2622 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Title
I grants affected utilities and consumers the same right of intervention.
16 U. S. C. § 2631 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Because of these rights of intervention and enforcement, state agencies lack even the power to schedule their consideration of PURPA's standards.
6
For example, the proposed standards governing advertising provide
that "No electric [or gas] utility may recover from any person other than
the shareholders (or other owners) of such utility any direct or indirect expenditure by such utility for promotional or political advertising as [fur-
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If Congress routinely required the state legislatures to debate bills drafted by congressional committees, it could
hardly be questioned that the practice would affect an
attribute of state sovereignty. PURPA, which sets the
agendas of agencies exercising delegated legislative power in
a specific field, has a similarly intrusive effect.
ther] defined in . . . this title." 16 U. S. C. § 2623 (b) (5) (1976 ed., Supp.
IV); 15 U. S. C. § 3203 (b) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). PURPA then defines
the terms advertising, political advertising, and promotional advertising:
"(1) For purposes of this section and section 2623 (b) (5) of this title(A) The term 'advertising' means the commercial use, by an electric utility, of any media, including newspaper, printed matter, radio, and television, in order to transmit a message to a substantial number of members of
the public or to such utility's electric consumers.
(B) The term 'political advertising' means any advertising for the purpose of influencing public opinion with respect to legislative, administrative , or electoral matters, or with respect to any controversial issue of
public importance.
(C) The term 'promotional advertising' means any advertising for the
purpose of encouraging any person to select or use the service or additional
service of an electric utility or the selection or installation of any appliance
or equipment designed to use such utility's service.
"(2) For purposes of this subsection and section 2623 (b) (5) of this title, the
terms 'political advertising' and 'promotional advertising' do not include(A) advertising which informs electric consumers how they can conserve
energy or can reduce peak demand for electric energy,
(B) advertising required by law or regulation, including advertising required under part 1 of title II of the National Energy Conservation Policy
Act ... ,
(C) advertising regarding service interruptions, safety measures, or
emergency conditions,
(D) advertising concerning employment opportunities with such utility,
(E) advertising which promotes the use of energy efficient appliances,
equipment or services, or
(F) any explanation or justification of existing or proposed rate schedules, or notifications of hearings thereon." 16 U. S. C. § 2625 (h) (1976
ed., Supp. IV).
See also 15 U. S. C. § 3204 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (containing similar provisions for gas utilities).

v

.•
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Finally, PURPA directly impairs the States' ability to
"structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." Utility regulation is a traditional function of state government, 7 and the regulatory commission is
the most integral part of that function. By taxing the limited resources of these commissions, and decreasing their
ability to address local regulatory ills, PURPA directly impairs the power of state utility commissions to discharge
their traditional functions efficiently and effectively. 8
The majority sidesteps this analysis, suggesting that the
States may escape PURPA simply by ceasing regulation of
public utilities. Even the majority recognizes that this
choice "may be a difficult one," ante, at 21, and that "it may
be unlikely that the States will or easily can abandon regulation of public utilities to avoid PURPA's requirements."
Ante, at 22. In fact, the majority's "choice" is an absurdity,
for if its analysis is sound, the Constitution no~longer liriiits
federal regulation of state affairs. Under the majority's
7

The Court has not explored fully the extent of "traditional" state functions. Utility regulation, however, should fall within any definition of that
term. See generally W. Jones, Cases and Materials on Regulated Industries 25-44 (2d ed. 1976) (tracing history of state regulation of utilities).
8
PURP A thus offends each of the criteria named in Hodel. I do not
believe, moreover, that this is a case in which "the nature of the federal
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." Seen.
4, supra. Whatever the ultimate content of that standard, it must refer,
not only to the weight of the asserted federal interest, but to the necessity
of vindicating that interest in a manner that intrudes upon state sovereignty. In this case, the Government argues that PURPA furthers vital
national interests in energy conservation. Although the congressional
goal is a noble one, appellants have not shown that Congress needed to
commandeer state utility commissions to achieve its aim. Consistent with
the Tenth Amendment, Congress could have assigned PURPA's tasks to
national officials. Alternatively, it could have requested state commissions to comply with Titles I and III and directed the Secretary to shoulder
the burden of any State choosing not to comply.
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analysis, for example, National League of Cities, would have
been wrongly decided, because the States could have avoided
the Fair Labor Standards Act by "choosing'' to fire all employees subject to that Act and to close those branches of
state government. Similarly, Congress could dictate the
agendas and meeting places of state legislatures, because unwilling States would remain free to abolish their legislative
bodies. 9 I do not agree that this dismemberment of state
government is the correct solution to a Tenth Amendment
challenge.
The choice put to the States by the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq. (1976
ed., Supp. Ill), the federal statute upheld in Hodel and discussed by the Court, ante, at H~20, is quite different from
the decision PURPA mandates. The Surface Mining Act invites the States to submit proposed surface mining regulations to the Secretary of the Interior. 30 U. S. C. § 1253
(1976 ed., Supp. III). If the Secretary approves a state regulatory program, then the State enforces that program. If a
State chooses not to submit a program, the Secretary develops and implements a program for that State. § 1254.
Even States in the latter category, however, may supplement the Secretary's program with consistent state laws. 10
9
But cf. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 565 (1911) ("The power to
locate its own seat of government and to determine when and how it shall
be changed from one place to another . . . are essentially and peculiarly
state powers. That one of the ... States could now be shorn of such powers by an act of Congress would not be for a moment entertained").
10
Subsection 1254 (g) of Title 30 only preempts state laws "insofar as
they interfere with the achievement of the purposes and the requirements
of this chapter and the Federal program. " Similarly, § 1255 (a) provides
that no state law or regulation "shall be superseded by any provision of this
chapter or any regulation issued pursuant thereto, except insofar as such
State law or regulation is inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter."
Subsection 1255 (b) explains that neither state laws that are more stringent
than the federal standards nor state laws governing operations "for which
no provision is contained in this chapter" are "inconsistent" with the con-
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The Surface Mining Act does not force States to choose between performing tasks set by Congress and abandoning all
mining or land use regulation. That statute is "a program of
cooperative federalism," 452 U. S., at 289, because it allows
the States to choose either to work with Congress in pursuit
of federal surface mining goals or to devote their legislative
resources to other mining and land use problems. By contrast, there is nothing "cooperative," about a federal
program
1
that com/els state agencies either to function as bureaucratic
puppets of the federal government or to abandon regulation
of an entire field traditionally reserved to state authority. 11
Yet this is the "choice" the Court today forces upon the
States.
The Court further defends its novel decision to permit federal conscription of state legislative power by citing three
cases that "in effect directed state decision-makers to take or
to refrain from taking certain actions." Ante, at 18. Testa
v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), is the most suggestive of these
In Testa, the Court held that state trial courts
decisions. 12
gressional Act.
11
As one scholar has written, "[a] federal system implies a partnership,
all members of which are effective players on the team and all of whom
retain the capacity for independent action. It does not imply a system of
collaboration in which one of the collaborators is annihilated by the other."
L. White, The States and the Nation 3 (1953) (hereinafter White).
12
The other two decisions, Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975),
and Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing VesFry
sel Association, 443 U. S. 658 (1979), are readily distinguishable.
upheld a temporary wage freeze as applied to state and local governmental
employees. As we subsequently observed, this emergency restraint "displaced no state choices as to how governmental operations should be structured, nor did it force the States to remake such choices themselves. Instead, it merely required that the wage scales and employment
relationships which the States themselves had chosen be maintained during
[a] period of ... emergency." National League of Cities v. Usery, supra,
at 853. In Washington State Fishing Vessel Association, state agencies
were defendants to a suit charging violations of federal treaties, and we
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may not refuse to hear a federal claim if "th[e] same type of
claim arising under [state] law would be enforced by that
State's courts." I d., at 394. A facile reading of Testa might
suggest that state legislatures must also entertain congressionally sponsored business, as long as the federal duties are
similar to existing state obligations. Application of Testa to
legislative power, however, would expand vastly the scope of
that decision. Because trial courts of general jurisdiction do
not choose the cases that they hear, the requirement that
they evenhandedly adjudicate state and federal claims falling
within their jurisdiction does not infringe any sovereign authority to set an agenda. As explained above, however, the
power to choose subjects for legislation is a fundamental
attribute of legislative power, and interference with this
power unavoidably undermines state sovereignty. Accordingly, the existence of a congressional authority to "enlist
... the [state] judiciary ... to further federal ends," ante, at
18, does not imply an equivalent power to impress state legislative bodies into federal service.
The Court, finally, reasons that, because Congress could
have preempted the entire field of intrastate utility regulation, the Constitution should not forbid PURPA's "less intrusive scheme." Ante, at 20 and n. 27. The majority's evaluation of intrusiveness, however, is simply irrelevant to the
constitutional inquiry. The Constitution permits Congress
to govern only through certain channels. This Court's task
is to enforce those limits, not to decide wh~ther alternative
upheld the lower court's power to enforce its judgment by ordering the defendants to comply with federal law. The power of a court to enjoin adjudicated violations of federal law, however, is far different from the power
of Congress to demand state legislative action in the absence of any showing that the State has violated existing federal duties. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 51~16
(1954) (hereinafter Hart); Salmon, The Federalist Principle: The Interaction of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment in the Clean Air
Act, 2 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 290, 334-337 (1976) (hereinafter Salmon).

'·
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courses would better serve state and federal interests. 13 I do
not believe, moreover, that Titles I and III of PURPA are
less intrusive than preemption. 14 When Congress preempts
a field, it precludes only state legislation that conflicts with
the national approach. The States usually retain the power
to complement congressional legislation, either by regulating
details unsupervised by Congress or by imposing requirements that go beyond the national threshold. 15 Most importantly, after Congress preempts a field, the States may simply devote their resources elsewhere. This country does not
lack for problems demanding legislative attention. PURPA,
however, drains the invept.jye epet~ of...state..governmental
bodies by reqmrmg them to wei h its detailed standards, enter WI1tt~n findings, an efend their determinations in state
court:- -wJiile engaged in these congressionally mandated
--tasks, state utility commissions are less able to pursue local
proposals for conserving gas and electric power. The States
13
Justice Harlan once commented that times of "international unrest and
domestic uncertainty" are "bound to produce temptations and pressures to
depart from or temporize with traditional constitutional precepts or even
to short-cut the processes of change which the Constitution establishes."
Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A.J. 943, 943 (1963) (hereinafter Harlan). Justice Harlan
then cautioned that it "[i]s . . . the special responsibility of lawyers,
whether on or off the bench, to see to it that such things do not happen."
Ibid.
14
In 1975, then Attorney General Edward H. Levi responded to a similar argument that the "greater'r power of preempb6h includes the "lesser"
power of demanding affirmative action from state governments. Attorney
General Levi remarked that "it is an insidious point to say that there is
more federalism by compelling a State instrumentality to work for the Federal Government." Hearings on S. 354 before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 503 (1975). In a similar vein, he warned
against "lov[ing] the States to their demise." Id., at 507.
5
' In rare instances, Congress so occupies a field that any state regulation is inconsistent with national goals. The Court, however, is reluctant
to infer such expansive preemption "in the absence of persuasive reasons."
Florida Lime & A vocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963) .

.

,
. ~·
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might well prefer that Congress simply impose the standards
described in PURPA; this, at least, would leave them free to
exercise their power in other areas.
Federal preemption is less intrusive than PURPA's approach for a second reason. Local citizens hold their utility
commissions accountable for the choices they make. Citizens, moreover, understand that legislative authority usually
p\A.C.. 1o ~
includes the power to decide which ideas to debate, as well as
which policies to adopt. Congressional compulsion of statn .J{ N.~ ~~1 ,. J,J._t-r
agencies, unlike preemption, blurs the lines of political \o
~ cJ.,t.oorcaccountability and leaves citizens feeling that their repre- ~....d" ~tAl
sentatives are no longer responsive to local needs. 16
-\1>
7
The foregoing remarks suggest that, far from approving a
~
"
minimally intrusive form of federal regulation, the majority's
decision undermines the most valuable aspects of our federalism. Courts and commentators frequently have recognized
that the fift States serve as laboratories for the development of new socia , economic, and po 1 1ca 1 eas. 17 State in-

()P"''.

16
See generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy,
86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1239-1247 (1977) (hereinafter Stewart); Comment, Redefining the National League of Cities State Sovereignty Doctrine, 129 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1460, 1477-1478 (1981).
Daniel Elazar, testifying before the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in March 1980, commented upon this problem of garbled political responsibility. He suggested that national officials tend to
force state governments to administer unpopular programs, thus transferring political liability for those programs to the States. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Federal Role in the Federal System: The Dynamics of Growth, Hearings on the Federal Role 32 (October
1980). As an example, he cited the President's attempt in 1979 to force
state governors to establish and enforce unpopular gas rationing mechanisms. I d., at 85 (formal statement of Professor Elazar).
17
See, e. g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U. S. 560, 579 (1981); Reeves, Inc .
v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429, 441 (1980); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 597 and
n. 20 (1977); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Hart, supra, n. 12, at 540, 542; Macmahon, The
Problems of Federalism: A Survey, in Federalism, Mature and Emergent

...
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~oming

novation is no judicial myth. When
became a
State in 1890, it was the only State permitting women to
vote. 18 That novel idea did not bear national fruit for another thirty years. 19 vW'fsconsin pioneered unemployment insurance, 20 while~ssachusetts initiated minimum wage laws
for women and minors. 21
After decades of academic debate, state experimentation finally provided an opportunity
to observe no-fault automobile insurance in operation. 22
Even in the field of environmental protection, an area subject
to heavy federal regulation, the States have supplemented
national standards with innovative and far-reaching statutes. 23 Utility regulation itself is a field marked by valuable
state invention. 24 PURPA, which commands state agencies
3, 11}--11 (A. Macmahon, ed. 1955); N. Rockefeller, The Future of Federalism S-9 (1962) (hereinafter Rockefeller); Stewart, supra, n. 16, at 1210;
White, supra, n. 11, at 46-47.
18
Wyoming's policy followed a practice it had adopted as a territory.
Compare Act of Jan. 21, 1891, ch. 100, § 4, 1891}--1891 Wyo. Sess. Laws
394, with Act of March 14, 1890, ch. 80, § 5, 1890 Sess. Laws Wyo. Territory 157. See generally C. Beard & M. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization 563 (rev. ed. 1937).
19
The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, prohibits abridgement
of the right to vote "on account of sex."
20
See Act of Jan. 28, 1932, ch. 20, 1931-1932 Wis. Laws 57; Act of June
1, 1933, ch. 186, 1933 Wis. Laws 448; Act of June 2, 1933, ch. 194, 1933
Wis. Laws 491; W. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New
Deal, 1932-1940, p. 130 (1963); Rockefeller, supra, n. 17, at 16.
21
See Act of June 4, 1912, ch. 706, 1912 Mass. Acts 780; R. Morris,
Encyclopedia of American History 768 (bicentennial ed. 1976).
22
See C. Morris & C. Morris, Jr., Morris on Torts 244-245 (2d ed. 1980);
Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 Yale L.J. 1019, 1034 (1977).
23
Florida, for example, has enacted particularly strict legislation against
oil spills. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 376.011-.21 (1974 ed. and Supp. 1982). This
Court upheld that legislation in Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc., 411 U. S. 325 (1973).
24
See Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464,
489 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Long before the Federal Government
could be stirred to regulate utilities, courageous states took the initiative

.
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to spend their time evaluating federally proposed standards
and defending their decisions to adopt or reject those standards, will retard this creative experimentation.
In addition to promoting experimentation, federalism enhances the opportunity of all citizens to participate in representative government. Alexis de Tocqueville understood
well that participation in local government is a cornerstone of
American democracy:

"It is incontestably true that the love and habits of republican government in the United States were engendered in the townships and in the provincial assemblies.
[l]t is this same republican spirit, it is these manners and actions of a free people, which are engendered
and nurtured in the different States, to be afterwards
applied to the country at large." 1 A. de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America 149-150 (H. Reeve trans. 1966). 25
Citizens, however, cannot learn the lessons of self-government if their local efforts are devoted to reviewing proposals
formulated by a far-away national legislature. If we want to
preserve the ability of citizens to learn democratic processes
through participation in local government, local citizens must
retain the power to govern, not merely administer, their local
problems.
Finally, our federal system provides a salutary check on
governmental power. As ustice Irar a once explained, our
ancestors "were suspicious f every form of all-powerful cenand almost the whole body of utility practice has resulted from their
experiences").
25
See also Stewart, supra, n. 16, at 1210--1211, n. 62 (quoting Ignazio Silone) ("The first test to be applied in judging an alleged democracy is the
degree of self-governing attained by its local institutions. If ... the province is governed by the representative of the central government, there
can be no true and complete democracy. Only local government can accustom men to responsibility and independence, and enable them to take part
in the wider life of the state").
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tral authority." Harlan, supra n. 13, at 944. To curb this
evil, they both allocated governmental power between state
and national authorities, and divided the national power
among three branches of government. Unless we zealously
protect these distinctions, we risk upsetting the balance of
power that buttresses our basic liberties. While analyzing
this brake on governmental power, Justice Harlan noted that
"[t]he diffusion of power between federaland state authority
. . . takes on added significance as the size of the federal bureaucracy continues to grow." I bid. 26 Today, the Court disregards this warning and permits Congress to kidnap state
utility commissions into the national regulatory family.
Whatever the merits of our national energy legislation, I am
not ready to surrender this state legislative power to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
II
As explained above, the majority's decision to uphold Titles I and III violates the principles of National League of
Cities and threatens the values promoted by our federal system. The majority's result, moreover, is j.s/at odds with our
constitutional history, which demonstrates that the ramers
consciOusly rejected a system in which the national legislature would achieve its ends by controlling state legislative
power.
The principal defect of the Articles of Confederation, eighteenth century writers agreed, was that the new national
government lacked the power to compel individual action.
Instead, the central government had to rely upon the cooperation of state legislatures to achieve national goals. · Thus,
Alexander Hamilton explained that: "The great and radical
vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the
principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERN26
See also Stewart, supra, n. 16, at 1241-1244 (discussing "political safeguards of federalism") ; Rockefeller, supra , n. 17, at 10.

,.j.(
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MENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS
of whom they consist." The Federalist No. 15, p. 93 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961). He pointed out, for example, that the national government had "an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money," but "no authority to raise either by regulations extending to the individual citizens of
America." Ibid.
The Constitution cured this defect by permitting direct
contact between the national government and the individual
citizen, a change repeatedly acknowledged by the delegates
assembled in Philadelphia. George Mason, for example, declared that:
"Under the existing Confederacy, Congress represent[s]
the States not the people of the States: their acts operate
on the States not on the individuals. The case will be
changed in the new plan of Government." 1 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 133 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911) (hereinafter Farrand) (abbreviations
expanded in this and subsequent quotations).
Alexander Hamilton subsequently explained to the people of
New York that the Constitution marked the "difference between a league and a government," because it "extend[ed]
the authority of the union to the persons of the citizens,-the
only proper objects of government." The Federalist No. 15,
p. 95. Similarly, Charles Pinckney told the South Carolina
House of Representatives that "the necessity of having a
government which should at once operate upon the people,
and not upon the states, was conceived to be indispensable by
every delegation present; . . . however they may have differed with respect to the quantum of power, no objection was
made to the system itself." 4 Elliot's Debates 256.
The speeches and writings of the Framers suggest why
they adopted this means of strengthening the national government. Mason, for example, told the Convention that be-
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cause "punishment could not [in the nature of things be executed on] the States collectively," he advocated a national
government that would "directly operate on individuals." 1
Farrand 34. Hamilton predicted that a national government
forced to work through the States could only "degenerate
into a military despotism." The Federalist No. 16, p. 101 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961). This was so because a national government
could enforce its will against the States only by maintaining a
"large army, continually on foot to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government." Ibid. See also id.,
at 102; The Federalist No. 15, pp. 95-96.
Thus, the Framers concluded that government by one sovereign through the agency of a second cannot be satisfactory.
At one extreme, as under the Articles of Confederation, such
a system is simply ineffective. At the other, it requires a
degree of military force incompatible with stable government
and civil liberty. 27 For this reason, the Framers concluded
that "the execution of the laws of the national government
... should not require the intervention of the State Legislatures," The Federalist No. 16, p. 103, and abandoned the
Articles of Confederation in favor of direct national
legislation.
At the same time that the members of the Constitutional
Convention fashioned this principle, they rejected two proposals that would have given the national legislature direct
power to control state governments. The first proposal
would have authorized Congress "to call forth the force of the
27
Henry M. Hart, Jr., agreed that the Framers were well aware "of the
delicacy, and the difficulties of enforcement, of affirmative mandates from
a federal government to the governments of the member states." Hart,
supra, n. 12, at 515. Until the second half of this century, congressional
regulation apparently heeded this wisdom. "Federal law," Hart observed
in 1954, "often says to the states, 'Don't do any of these things,' leaving
outside the scope of its prohibition a wide range of alternative courses of
action. But it is illuminating to observe how rarely it says, 'Do this thing,'
leaving no choice but to go ahead and do it." Ibid.
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Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its
duty under the articles thereof." 1 Farrand 21. The delegates never even voted on this suggestion. Madison moved
to postpone it, stating that "the more he reflected on the use
of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice
and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively and
not individually." ld., at 54. Several other delegates echoed his concerns, 28 and Madison ultimately reported that
"[t]he practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions,
for the States as political bodies [has] been exploded on all
hands."
2 Farrand 9.
The second proposal received more favorable consideration. Governor Randolph suggested that Congress should
have the power "to negative all laws passed by the several
States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union." 1 Farrand 21. On May 31,
1787, the Committee of the Whole approved this proposal
without debate. Id., at 61. A week later, Pinckney moved
to extend the congressional negative to all state laws
"which [Congress] should judge to be improper." ld., at
164. Numerous delegates criticized this attempt to give
Congress unbounded control over state lawmaking. Hugh
Williamson, for example, thought "the State Legislatures
ought to possess independent powers in cases purely local,"
id., at 171, while Elbridge Gerry thought Pinckney's idea
might "enslave the States." I d., at 165. After much debate, the Convention rejected Pinckney's suggestion.
Late in July, the delegates reversed their approval of even
Randolph's more moderate congressional veto. Several delRandolph, for example, opposed a similar proposal for national coercion
on the ground that it was "impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals."
Instead, he advocated "resort ... to a national Legislation over individuals. " 1 Farrand 256 (emphasis deleted). Mason eloquently argued that
"[t]he most jarring elements of nature; fire & water themselves are not
more incompatible that [si c] such a mixture of civil liberty and.,military execution." Id. , at 339.
28
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egates now concluded that the negative would be "terrible to
the States," "unnecessary," and "improper." 2 Farrand 27. 29
Omission of the negative, however, left the new system without an effective means of adjusting conflicting state and national laws. To remedy this defect, the delegates adopted
the Supremacy Clause, providing that the federal Constitution, laws, and treaties are "the supreme Law of the Land"
and that "the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby."
Art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, the Framers substituted judicial review of state laws for congressional control of state
legislatures.
While this history demonstrates the Framers' commitment
to a strong central government, the means that they adopted
to achieve that end are as instructive as the end itself. 30
Under the Articles of Confederation, the national legislature
operated through the States. The Framers could have fortified the central government, while still maintaining the same
system, if they had increased Congress' power to demand
obedience from state legislatures. In time, this scheme
might have relegated the States to mere departments of the
national government, a status the Court appears to endorse
29
Thomas Jefferson disapproved of the congressional veto as soon as he
heard of it. Writing to Madison from Paris, he declared: "The negative
proposed to be given [the national legislators] on all the acts of the several
Legislatures is now for the first time suggested to my mind. Prima facie I
do not like it." C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 168 (1937)
(hereinafter Warren). Notably, Jefferson suggested that "an appeal from
the State Judicatures to a Federal Court, in all cases where the Act of Confederation controuled the question, [would] be as effectual a remedy."
Id., at 168-169.
30
Experience under the Articles of Confederation taught the Framers
that multiple state legislatures, unchecked by any central power,
"threat[en] danger not to the harmony only, but to the tranquillity of the
Union."
Warren, supra, n. 29, at 166 (quoting Madison). My analysis
of the Framers' intent does not detract from the proper role of federal
power in a federalist system, but merely requires the exercise of that
power in a manner that does not destroy state independence.
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today. The Framers, however, eschewed this course.
They permitted Congress to pass laws directly affecting individuals, and rejected proposals that would have given Congress military or legislative power over state governments.
In this way, the Framers established independent state and
national sovereigns. Each government retained the power
to pursue its own ends, subject only to the Constitution and
the restraints of judicial review. 31 The product of the Constitutional Convention, I believe, is fundamentally inconsistent with a system in which either Congress or a state legislature harnesses the legislative powers of the other sovereign. 32
' This Court quickly recognized that Congress' strength derives from its
own enumerated powers, not from the ability to direct state legislatures.
In M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), the historic decision affirming Congress' power to establish a national bank, Chief Justice Marshall declared: "No trace is to be found in the constitution of an intention to
create a dependence of the government of the Union on those of the states,
for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was it expected to rely for the
accomplishment of its ends." I d., at 424 (emphasis added). See also S.
Davis, The Federal Principle 114 (1978) (after examining history of Constitutional Convention, "only the principle of duality articulated in a single
constitutional system of two distinct governments, national and state, each
acting in its own right, each acting directly on individuals, and each qualified master of a limited domain of action, stands out as the clearest fact");
Salmon, supra, n. 12, at 359 (discussing history of Constitutional Convention and concluding that substitution of Supremacy Clause for negative on
state laws "evidenced the clear distinction in [the Framers'] minds between
the supremacy of the nation, which they approved, and the power of the
nation to control the functioning of the states, which they rejected").
32
After the Convention, several thinkers suggested that the national
government might rely upon state officers to perform some of its tasks.
Madison, for example, thought that Congress might rely upon state officials to collect national revenue. The Federalist No. 45, pp. 312-313 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961). None of these suggestions, however, went so far as to
propose congressional control of state legislative power. The suggestions,
moreover, seemed to assume that the States would consent to national use
of their officials. See also W. Anderson, The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners? 8&-87 (1955) (noting that First Congress rejected propos3
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III
During his last Term of service on this Court, Justice Black
eloquently explained that our notions of federalism subordinate neither national nor state interests:
"The concept does not mean blind deference to 'States'
Rights' any more than it means centralization of control
over every important issue in our National Government
and its ,courts. The Framers rejected both these
courses. What the concept does represent is a system
in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 44 (1971).
In this case, I firmly believe that a proper "sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments"
requires invalidation of Titles I and III of PURPA insofar as
they apply to "state regulatory authorities." Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to uphold those
portions of the statute.

als to rely upon state officials to enforce federal law and suggesting that
this decision to leave "the states free to work out, and to concentrate their
attention and resources upon, their own functions" has become part of our
constitutional understanding).

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell .-Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens

'

From:

Justice O'Connor

Circulated: --::-:-------- - -

Recirculated:~~ 11 1982

3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1749

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION ET
AL., APPELLANTS, v. MISSISSIPPI ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
[May - , 1982]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JusTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part in the judgment
and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the Commerce Clause supported Congress' enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(PURPA). I disagree, however, with much of the Court's
Tenth Amendment analysis. Titles I and III of PURP A conscript state utility commissions into the national bureaucratic
army.
This result is contrary to the principles of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), antithetical
to the values of federalism, and inconsistent with our constitutional history. Accordingly, I dissent from subsections
IVB and C of the Court's opinion. 1
'I concur in the Court's decision to uphold Title II, § 210 of PURP A
against appellees' facial attack. As the Court explains, part of that section
permits the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to exempt
cogeneration and small power production facilities from otherwise applicable state and federal laws. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 (e) (1976 ed., Supp.
IV). This exemption authority does not violate the Tenth Amendment,
for it merely preempts state control of private conduct, rather than regulating the "States as States." See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293 (1981).
Section 210's requirement that the States "implement" rules promul-
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I
Titles I and III of PURPA require state regulatory agencies to decide whether to adopt a dozen federal standards
governing gas and electric utilities. 2 The statute describes,
in some detail, the procedures state authorities must follow
when evaluating these standards, 3 but does not compel the
States to adopt the suggested federal standards.
15
gated by the Secretary of Energy, 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 (f) (1976 ed., Supp.
IV), is more disturbing. Appellants, however, have interpreted this statutory obligation to include "an undertaking to resolve disputes between
qualifying facilities and electric utilities arising under [§ 210], or any other
action reasonably designed to implement [that section]." 18 CFR
§ 292.401 (a) (1981). It appears, therefore, that state regulatory authorities may satisfy § 210's implementation requirement simply by adjudicating
private disputes arising under that section. As the Court points out, ante,
at 16-17, the Mississippi Public Service Commission has jurisdiction over
similar state disputes, and it is settled that a State may not exercise its
judicial power in a manner that discriminates between analogous federal
and state causes of action. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947).
Under these circumstances, but without foreclosing the possibility that
particular applications of § 210's implementation provision might uncover
hidden constitutional defects, I would not sustain appellees' facial attack on
the provision.
Section 210 also authorizes FERC, electric utilities, cogenerators, and
small power producers to "enforce" the above implementation provision
against state utility commissions. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3 (h) (2) (1976 ed.,
Supp. IV). As applied, it is conceivable that this enforcement provision
would raise troubling federalism issues. Once again, however, I decline to
accept appellees' facial challenge to the provision, preferring to consider
the constitutionality of this provision in the setting of a concrete
controversy.
2
The statute imposes the same requirements upon nonregulated utilities. In this respect, it regulates purely private conduct and does not violate the Tenth Amendment. Throughout this dissent, I consider only the
constitutionality of Titles I and III as applied to state regulatory authorities. I would allow the District Court, on remand, to decide whether the
constitutionally defective aspects of Titles I and III are severable from the
unobjectionable portions.
3
See ante, at 4-6. The Court overlooks several of PURPA's procedural mandates. For example, with respect to six of the standards, the
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U.S. C. §3203 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV); 16 U. S. C. §§2621
(a), 2623 (a), 2627 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The latter, deceptively generous feature of PURP A persuades the Court
that the statute does not intrude impermissibly into state
sovereign functions. The Court's conclusion, however, rests
upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the role that state
governments play in our federalist system.
State legislative and administrative bodies are not field offices of the national bureaucracy. Nor are they think tanks
to which Congress may assign problems for extended study.
Instead, each State is sovereign within its own domain, governing its citizens and providing for their general welfare.
While the Constitution and federal statutes define the boundaries of that domain, they do not harness state power for national purposes. The Constitution contemplates "an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States," a
system in which both the state and national governments retain a "separate and independent existence." Texas v.
White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869); Lane County v. Oregon, 7
Wall. 71, 76 (1869).
Adhering to these principles, the Court has recognized that
the Tenth Amendment restrains congressional action that
would impair "a State's ability to function as a State."
state agency must publish a written determination, including findings,
even if it decides to adopt the federal standard. 16 U. S. C. § 2621 (b)
(1976 ed., Supp. IV). In addition, PURPA guarantees certain rights to discover information, § 2631 (b); requires the State to provide transcripts, at
the cost of reproduction, to parties to ratemaking proceedings or other
"regulatory proceeding[s] relating to [electric utility] rates or rate design,"
§ 2632 (c); and, under some circumstances, mandates compensation for reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and other costs to consumers
who contribute substantially to the adoption of a Title I standard, § 2632
(a), (b). These requirements, as well as the ones described by the Court,
may impose special burdens on state administrative agencies. I do not
weigh the constitutionality of these individual procedural requirements,
however, because I would invalidate the entire regimen that Titles I and
III impose on state regulatory authorities.

',.
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United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455
U. S. - - , - - (1982); National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U. S. 833, 842-852 (1976); Fry v. United States, 421
U. S. 542, 547, n. 7 (1975). See also City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 423-424 (1978)
(THE CHIEF JUSTICE, concurring in the judgment). For example, in National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, the
Court held that Congress could not prescribe the minimum
wages and maximum hours of state employees engaged in
"traditional governmental functions," id., at 852, because the
power to set those wages and hours is an "attribute of state
sovereignty" that is "essential to [a] separate and independent existence." Id., at 845 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon,
supra, at 76).
Just last Term this Court identified three separate inquiries underlying the result in National League of Cities. A
congressional enactment violates the Tenth Amendment, we
observed, if it regulates the "'States as States,'" addresses
"matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty,'" and "directly impair[s] [the States'] ability to 'structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions."' Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U. S. 264, 287-288 (1981) (quoting National League of Cities, supra, at 854, 845, 852). See also
United Transportation Union, supra, at - - . 4
Application of these principles to the present case reveals
the Tenth Amendment defects in Titles I and III. Plainly
those titles regulate the "States as States." While the statute's ultimate aim may be the regulation of private utility
companies, PURPA addresses its commands solely to the
'In both Hodel and United Transportation Union we further noted
that, even when these three requirements are met, "the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission."
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, n. 29; United Transportation Union, 455 U. S.,
a t - , n. 9. Neither of those cases involved such an exception to National League of Cities, and the Court has not yet explored the circumstances that might justify such an exception.

~.
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States. Instead of requesting private utility companies to
adopt lifeline rates, declining block rates, or the other
PURPA standards, Congress directed state agencies to appraise the appropriateness of those standards.
It is difficult to argue that a statute structuring the regulatory agenda
of a state agency is not a regulation of the "State."
I find it equally clear that Titles I and III address
"attribute[s] of state sovereignty." Even the Court recognizes that "the power to make decisions and to set policy is
what gives the State its sovereign nature." Ante, at 17.
The power to make decisions and set policy, however, embraces more than the ultimate authority to enact laws; it also
includes the power to decide which proposals are most worthy of consideration, the order in which they should be taken
up, and the precise form in which they should be debated.
PURPA intrudes upon all of these functions. It chooses
twelve proposals, forcing their consideration even if the state
agency deems other ideas more worthy of immediate attention. In addition, PURPA hinders the agency's ability to
schedule consideration of the federal standards. 5 Finally,
PURPA specifies, with exacting detail, the content of the
standards that will absorb the agency's time. 6
As the Court recognizes, ante, at 5, PURPA permits "[a)ny person"
to bring an action in state court to enforce the agency's obligation to consider the federal standards. 15 U. S. C. § 3207 (b) (1) (1976 eel., Supp.
IV); 16 U. S. C. § 2633 (c) (1) (1976 eel., Supp. IV). The Secretary of Energy, moreover, may intervene in any ongoing ratemaking proceeding to
require consideration of PURPA's standards. 15 U. S. C. § 3205 (a) (1976
eel., Supp. IV); 16 U. S. C. §§ 2631 (a), 2622 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Title
I grants affected utilities and consumers the same right of intervention.
16 U. S. C. § 2631 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Because of these rights of intervention and enforcement, state agencies lack even the power to schedule their consideration of PURPA's standards.
6
For example, the proposed standards governing advertising provide
that "No electric [or gas] utility may recover from any person other than
the shareholders (or other owners) of such utility any direct or indirect expenditure by such utility for promotional or political advertising as [further] defined in . .. this title." 16 U. S. C. § 2623 (b) (5) (1976 eel., Supp .
5

.
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If Congress routinely required the state legislatures to debate bills drafted by congressional committees, it could
hardly be questioned that the practice would affect an
attribute of state sovereignty. PURPA, which sets the
agendas of agencies exercising delegated legislative power in
a specific field, has a similarly intrusive effect.
Finally, PURPA directly impairs the States' ability to
"structure integral operations in areas of traditional governIV); 15 U. S. C. § 3203 (b) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). PURP A then defines
the terms advertising, political advertising, and promotional advertising:
"(1) For purposes of this section and section 2623 (b) (5) of this title(A) The term 'advertising' means the commercial use, by an electric utility, of any media, including newspaper, printed matter, radio, and television, in order to transmit a message to a substantial number of members of
the public or to such utility's electric consumers.
(B) The term 'political advertising' means any advertising for the purpose of influencing public opinion with respect to legislative, administrative, or electoral matters, or with respect to any controversial issue of
public importance.
(C) The term 'promotional advertising' means any advertising for the
purpose of encouraging any person to select or use the service or additional
service of an electric utility or the selection or installation of any appliance
or equipment designed to use such utility's service.
"(2) For purposes of this subsection and section 2623 (b) (5) of this title, the
terms 'political advertising' and 'promotional advertising' do not include(A) advertising which informs electric consumers how they can conserve
energy or can reduce peak demand for electric energy,
(B) advertising required by law or regulation, including advertising required under part 1 of title II of the National Energy Conservation Policy
Act ... ,
(C) advertising regarding service interruptions, safety measures, or
emergency conditions,
(D) advertising concerning employment opportunities with such utility,
(E) advertising which promotes the use of energy efficient appliances,
equipment or services, or
(F) any explanation or justification of existing or proposed rate schedules, or notifications of hearings thereon." 16 U. S. C. § 2625 (h) (1976
ed., Supp. IV).
See also 15 U. S. C.§ 3204 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (containing similar provisions for gas utilities).
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mental functions." Utility regulation is a traditional function of state government, 7 and the regulatory commission is
the most integral part of that function. By taxing the limited resources of these commissions, and decreasing their
ability to address local regulatory ills, PURPA directly impairs the power of state utility commissions to discharge
their traditional functions efficiently and effectively. 8
The Court sidesteps this analysis, suggesting that the
States may escape PURPA simply by ceasing regulation of
public utilities. Even the Court recognizes that this choice
"may be a difficult one," ante, at 22, and that "it may be unlikely that the States will or easily can abandon regulation of
public utilities to avoid PURPA's requirements." Ante, at
23. In fact, the Court's "choice" is an absurdity, for if its
analysis is sound, the Constitution no longer limits federal
regulation of state governments. Under the Court's analysis, for example, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U. S. 833 (1976), would have been wrongly decided, because
the States could have avoided the Fair Labor Standards Act
by "choosing" to fire all employees subject to that Act and to
7

The Court has not explored fully the extent of "traditional" state functions. Utility regulation, however, should fall within any definition of that
term. See generally W. Jones, Cases and Materials on Regulated Industries 25-44 (2d ed. 1976) (tracing history of state regulation of utilities).
8
PURPA thus offends each of the criteria named in Hodel. I do not
believe, moreover, that this is a case in which "the nature of the federal
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." Seen.
4, supra. Whatever the ultimate content of that standard, it must refer,
not only to the weight of the asserted federal interest, but also to the necessity of vindicating that interest in a manner that intrudes upon state
sovereignty. In this case, the Government argues that PURPA furthers
vital national interests in energy conservation. Although the congressional goal is a noble one, appellants have not shown that Congress needed
to commandeer state utility commissions to achieve its aim. Consistent
with the Tenth Amendment, Congress could have assigned PURPA's tasks
to national officials. Alternatively, it could have requested state commissions to comply with Titles I and III and directed the Secretary to shoulder
the burden of any State choosing not to comply.
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close those branches of state government. 9 Similarly, Congress could dictate the agendas and meeting places of state
legislatures, because unwilling States would remain free to
abolish their legislative bodies. 10 I do not agree that this dismemberment of state government is the correct solution to a
Tenth Amendment challenge.
The choice put to the States by the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq. (1976
ed., Supp. III), the federal statute upheld in Hodel v. Vir9
Contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 26, n. 31, National League
of Cities did not involve only "federal interference with the State's provision of essential services." The 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act brought "almost all public employees employed by the
States and by their various political subdivisions" within the Act's coverage. 426 U. S., at 836. As one of the appellants in that case stressed, the
amendments affected the wages and hours of nonprofessional workers employed in both "governmental" and "proprietary" agencies. Brief for Appellant State of California in National League of Cities v. Usery, O.T.
1974, Nos. 74--878, 74--879, pp. 39-48. The complaint, for example, alleged that the federal Act would affect "state and local administrative and
regulatory agencies which enforce laws and regulations preserving the
public health, safety and welfare, including ... licensing of occupations
and businesses, ... preservation of environmental quality, ... [and] protection of the public against fraud and sharp practice." 1 App. inN ational
League of Cities v. Usery, 0. T. 1974, Nos. 74--878, 74--879, p. 16. The
Court did not intimate that, because Congress could have preempted state
regulation of these fields, it could regulate wages and hours as a condition
of "continued state activity in an otherwise pre-emptible field." Ante, at
25. Instead, the Court shielded the activities that state governments perform "in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law
and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851 (emphasis added).
I am confident that, as the Court itself stresses, ante, at 2fr.26, n. 31,
today's decision is not intended to overrule National League of Cities.
Instead, the novelty of PURPA's scheme, see ante, at 15, merely seems to
have obscured the relevance of National League of Cities to this case.
0
' But cf. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 565 (1911) ("The power to
locate its own seat of government and to determine when and how it shall
be changed from one place to another . . . are essentially and peculiarly
state powers. That one of the ... States could now be shorn of such powers by an act of Congress would not be for a moment entertained").

I
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ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U. S.
264 (1981), and discussed by the Court, ante, at 20--21, 24, n.
30, is quite different from the decision PURPA mandates.
The Surface Mining Act invites the States to submit proposed surface mining regulations to the Secretary of the Interior. 30 U. S. C.§ 1253 (1976 ed., Supp. III). If the Secretary approves a state regulatory program, then the State
enforces that program. If a State chooses not to submit a
program, the Secretary develops and implements a program
for that State. § 1254. Even States in the latter category,
however, may supplement the Secretary's program with consistent state laws. 11 The Surface Mining Act does not force '
States to choose between performing tasks set by Congress
and abandoning all mining or land use regulation. That statute is "a program of cooperative federalism," Hodel, supra,
at 289, because it allows the States to choose either to work
with Congress in pursuit of federal surface mining goals or to
devote their legislative resources to other mining and land
use problems. By contrast, there is nothing "cooperative"
about a federal program that compels state agencies either to
function as bureaucratic puppets of the Federal Government
or to abandon regulation of an entire field traditionally reserved to state authority. 12 Yet this is the "choice" the
11
Subsection 1254 (g) of Title 30 only preempts state laws "insofar as
they interfere with the achievement of the purposes and the requirements
of this chapter and the Federal program." Similarly, § 1255 (a) provides
that no state law or regulation "shall be superseded by any provision of this
chapter or any regulation issued pursuant thereto, except insofar as such
State law or regulation is inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter."
Subsection 1255 (b) explains that neither state laws that are more stringent
than the federal standards nor state laws governing operations "for which
no provision is contained in this chapter" are "inconsistent" with the congressional Act.
12
As one scholar has written, "[a] federal system implies a partnership,
all members of which are effective players on the team and all of whom
retain the capacity for independent action. It does not imply a system of
collaboration in which one of the collaborators is annihilated by the other."
L. White, The States and the Nation 3 (1953).
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Court today forces upon the States.
The Court defends its novel decision to permit federal conscription of state legislative power by citing three cases upholding statutes that "in effect directed state decision-makers
to take or to refrain from taking certain actions." Ante, at
18. Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), is the most suggestive of these decisions. 13 In Testa, the Court held that state
trial courts may not refuse to hear a federal claim if "th[e]
same type of claim arising under [state] law would be enforced by that State's courts." !d., at 394. A facile reading
of Testa might suggest that state legislatures must also entertain congressionally sponsored business, as long as the
federal duties are similar to existing state obligations.
Application of Testa to legislative power, however, vastly expands the scope of that decision. Because trial courts of general jurisdiction do not choose the cases that they hear, the
requirement that they evenhandedly adjudicate state and
The other two decisions, Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975),
and Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U. S. 658 (1979), are readily distinguishable. Fry upheld a temporary wage freeze as applied to state and local governmental
employees. As we subsequently observed, this emergency restraint "displaced no state choices as to how governmental operations should be structured, nor did it force the States to remake such choices themselves. Instead, it merely required that the wage scales and employment
relationships which the States themselves had chosen be maintained during
[a] period of . .. emergency." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U. S. 833, 853 (1976). In Washington State Fishing Vessel Association,
state agencies were defendants to a suit charging violations of federal treaties, and we upheld the lower court's power to enforce its judgment by ordering the defendants to comply with federal law. The power of a court to
enjoin adjudicated violations of federal law, however, is far different from
the power of Congress to demand state legislative action in the absence of
any showing that the State has violated existing federal duties. See Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489,
51fr-516 (1954); Salmon, The Federalist Principle: The Interaction of the
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment in the Clean Air Act, 2
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 290, 334-337 (1976).
18
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federal claims falling within their jurisdiction does not infringe any sovereign authority to set an agenda. 14 As explained above, however, the power to choose subjects for legislation is a fundamental attribute of legislative power, and
interference with this power unavoidably undermines state
sovereignty. Accordingly, the existence of a congressional
authority to "enlist ... the [state] judiciary ... to further
federal ends," ante, at 19, does not imply an equivalent
power to impress state legislative bodies into federal service.
The Court, finally, reasons that because Congress could
have preempted the entire field of intrastate utility regulation, the Constitution should not forbid PURPA's "less intrusive scheme." Ante, at 21 and n. 29. 15 The Court's evalua-

I

The Court suggests, ante, at 19, n. 27, that the requirement that state
courts adjudicate federal claims may, as a practical matter, undermine the
capacity of those courts to decide state controversies. Whatever the force
of that observation, it does not demonstrate Testa's relevance to this case.
State legislative bodies possess at least one attribute of sovereignty, the
power to set an agenda, that trial courts lack. This difference alone persuades me not to embrace the Court's expansion of Testa.
15
The Court's suggestion is somewhat disingenuous because Congress
concluded that federal preemption of the matters governed by Titles I and
III would be inappropriate. The administration's original proposal, as
well as the version of PURP A approved by the House, would have preempted state law by establishing minimum federal ratemaking standards.
See generally H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1750, pp. 63-65 (1978); S. Conf.
Rep. No. 95-1292, pp. 63-65 (1978). The Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, however, rejected this approach because:
"the committee felt that setting minimum federal standards for utility
rates, or mandating the use of certain costing methods for ratesetting,
would be an unnecessary intrusion into an area which has traditionally
been regulated by the States. It was apparent to the committee that
many State utility commissions are currently involved in innovative
ratemaking and are working toward the goal of conservation of energy
through rate reform. At present, the State regulatory agencies rather
than the Federal Government, possess the expertise to conduct the detailed costing and demand studies required to implement rate structure revision. Moreover, the committee recognized that rate structures must re14

J.
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tion of intrusiveness, however, is simply irrelevant to the
constitutional inquiry. The Constitution permits Congress
to govern only through certain channels. If the Tenth
Amendment principles articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U. S. 264
(1981), foreclose PURP A's approach, it is no answer to argue
that Congress could have reached the same destination by a
different route. This Court's task is to enforce constitutional
limits on congressional power, not to decide whether alternative courses would better serve state and federal interests. 16
I do not believe, moreover, that Titles I and III of PURPA
are less intrusive than preemption. 17 When Congress prefleet the individual needs and local peculiarities of each utilities' service
area . . . . Finally the committee felt that the potential uncertainty and
delays accompanying Federal regulation threatened to have an adverse impact on the financial health of the utility industry which outweighed the
projected savings in capital expenditures claimed by supporters of the administration's proposal." S. Rep. No. 95-442, p. 9 (1977).
See also 123 Cong. Rec. 32392-32393 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Johnston);
id., at 32394 (remarks of Sen. Domenici). The Senate version of PURPA,
accordingly, eschewed the preemption route. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
95-1750, pp. 65--66 (1978); S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1292, pp. 65--66 (1978).
While the Conferees produced a compromise bill, they too stopped short of
preemption. Today's decision, therefore, permits Congress to set state
legislative agendas in a field that Congress might have occupied but expressly found unsuited to preemption.
16
Justice Harlan once commented that times of "international unrest and
domestic uncertainty" are "bound to produce temptations and pressures to
depart from or temporize with traditional constitutional precepts or even
to short-cut the processes of change which the Constitution establishes."
Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A.J. 943, 943 (1963). Justice Harlan then cautioned that it
"[i]s ... the special responsibility of lawyers, whether on or off the bench,
to see to it that such things do not happen." Ibid.
17
In 1975, then Attorney General Edward H. Levi responded to a similar argument that the "greater" power of preemption includes the "lesser"
power of demanding affirmative action from state governments. Attorney
General Levi remarked that "it is an insidious point to say that there is

l
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empts a field, it precludes only state legislation that conflicts
with the national approach. The States usually retain the
power to complement congressional legislation, either by
regulating details unsupervised by Congress or by imposing
requirements that go beyond the national threshold. 18 Most
importantly, after Congress preempts a field, the States may
simply devote their resources elsewhere. This country does
not lack for problems demanding legislative attention.
PURPA, however, drains the inventive energy of state governmental bodies by requiring them to weigh its detailed
standards, enter written findings, and defend their determinations in state court. While engaged in these congressionally mandated tasks, state utility commissions are less able
to pursue local proposals for conserving gas and electric
power. The States might well prefer that Congress simply
impose the standards described in PURPA; this, at least,
would leave them free to exercise their power in other areas.
Federal preemption is less intrusive than PURP A's approach for a second reason. Local citizens hold their utility
commissions accountable for the choices they make. Citizens, moreover, understand that legislative authority usually
includes the power to decide which ideas to debate, as well as
which policies to adopt. Congressional compulsion of state
agencies, unlike preemption, blurs the lines of political
accountability and leaves citizens feeling that their representatives are no longer responsive to local needs. 19
more federalism by compelling a State instrumentality to work for the Federal Government." Hearings on S. 354 before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, 94th Con g., 1st Sess., 503 (1975). In a similar vein, he warned
against "lov[ing] the States to their demise." ld., at 507.
'" In rare instances, Congress so occupies a field that any state regulation is inconsistent with national goals. The Court, however, is reluctant
to infer such expansive preemption "in the absence of persuasive reasons."
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul , 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963).
9
' See generally Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy,
86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1239--1247 (1977); Comment, Redefining the National

.,
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The foregoing remarks suggest that, far from approving a
minimally intrusive form of federal regulation, the Court's
decision undermines the most valuable aspects of our federalism. Courts and commentators frequently have recognized
that the fifty States serve as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas. 20 This
state innovation is no judicial myth. When Wyoming became a State in 1890, it was the only State permitting women
to vote. 21 That novel idea did not bear national fruit for another thirty years. 22 Wisconsin pioneered unemployment insurance,23 while Massachusetts initiated minimum wage laws
League of Cities State Sovereignty Doctrine, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1460,
1477-1478 (1981).
.
Daniel Elazar, testifying before the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in March 1980, commented upon this problem of garbled political responsibility. He suggested that national officials tend to
force state governments to administer unpopular programs, thus transferring political liability for those programs to the States. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Federal Role in the Federal System: The Dynamics of Growth, Hearings on the Federal Role, p. 32
(October 1980). As an example, he cited the President's attempt in 1979
to force state governors to establish and enforce unpopular gas rationing
mechanisms. I d., at 85 (formal statement of Professor Elazar).
20
See, e. g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U. S. 560, 579 (1981); Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429, 441 (1980); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 597 and
n. 20 (1977); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Hart, supra, n. 12, at 540, 542; Macmahon, The
Problems of Federalism: A Survey, in Federalism, Mature and Emergent
3, 10--11 (A. Macmahon, ed. 1955); N. Rockefeller, The Future of Federalism 8-9 (1962); Stewart, supra n. 19, at 1210; White, supra n. 12, at 46-47.
21
Wyoming's policy followed a practice it had adopted as a territory.
Compare Act of Jan. 21, 1891, ch. 100, § 4, 1890--1891 Wyo. Sess. Laws
394, with Act of March 14, 1890, ch. 80, § 5, 1890 Sess. Laws Wyo. Territory 157. See generally C. Beard & M. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization 563 (rev. ed. 1937).
22
The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, prohibits abridgement
of the right to vote "on account of sex."
:?;! See Act of Jan. 28, 1932, ch. 20, 1931-1932 Wis. Laws 57; Act of June
1, 1933, ch. 186, 1933 Wis. Laws 448; Act of June 2, 1933, ch. 194, 1933
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for women and minors. 24 After decades of academic debate,
state experimentation finally provided an opportunity to observe no-fault automobile insurance in operation. 25
Even in
the field of environmental protection, an area subject to
heavy federal regulation, the States have supplemented national standards with innovative and far-reaching statutes. 26
Utility regulation itself is a field marked by valuable state invention. 27 PURPA, which commands state agencies to
spend their time evaluating federally proposed standards and
defending their decisions to adopt or reject those standards,
will retard this creative experimentation.
In addition to promoting experimentation, federalism enhances the opportunity of all citizens to participate in representative government. Alexis de Tocqueville understood
well that participation in local government is a cornerstone of
American democracy:
"It is incontestably true that the love and the habits of
republican government in the United States were engendered in the townships and in the provincial assemblies.
[l]t is this same republican spirit, it is these manners and customs of a free people, which are engendered
Wis. Laws 491; W. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New
Deal, 1932- 1940, p. 130 (1963); Rockefeller, supra n. 20, at 16.
24
See Act of June 4, 1912, ch. 706, 1912 Mass. Acts 780; R. Morris,
Encyclopedia of American History 768 (bicentennial ed. 1976).
25
See C. Morris & C. Morris, Jr., Morris on Torts 244-245 (2d ed. 1980);
Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 Yale L.J. 1019, 1034 (1977).
26
Florida, for example, has enacted particularly strict legislation against
oil spills. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 376.011-.21 (1974 ed. and Supp. 1982). This
Court upheld that legislation in A skew v. A merican Waterways Operators,
Inc. , 411 U. S. 325 (1973).
27
See Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464,
489 (1950) (Jackson, J ., dissenting) ("Long before the Federal Government
could be stirred to regulate utilities, courageous states took the initiative
and almost the whole body of utility practice has resulted from their
experiences").
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and nurtured in the different States, to be afterwards
applied to the country at large." 1 A. de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America 181 (H. Reeve trans. 1961). 28
Citizens, however, cannot learn the lessons of self-government if their local efforts are devoted to reviewing proposals
formulated by a far-away national legislature. If we want to
preserve the ability of citizens to learn democratic processes
through participation in local government, citizens must retain the power to govern, not merely administer, their local
problems.
Finally, our federal system provides a salutary check on
governmental power. As Justice Harlan once explained, our
ancestors "were suspicious of every form of all-powerful central authority." Harlan, supra n. 16, at 944. To curb this
evil, they both allocated governmental power between state
and national authorities, and divided the national power
among three branches of government. Unless we zealously
protect these distinctions, we risk upsetting the balance of
power that buttresses our basic liberties. In analyzing this
brake on governmental power, Justice Harlan noted that
"[t]he diffusion of power between federal and state authority
. . . takes on added significance as the size of the federal bureaucracy continues to grow." Ibid. 29 Today, the Court disregards this warning and permits Congress to kidnap state
utility commissions into the national regulatory family.
Whatever the merits of our national energy legislation, I am
28

See also I. Silone, The School for Dictators 119 (W. Weaver trans.
1963) ("A regime of freedom should receive its lifeblood from the self-government of local institutions. When democracy, driven by some of its
baser tendencies, suppresses such autonomies, it is only devouring itself.
If in the factory the master's word is law, if bureaucracy takes over the
trade union, if the central government's representative runs the city and
the province, ... then you can no longer speak of democracy").
29
See also Stewart, supra, n. 19, at 1241-1244 (discussing "political safeguards of federalism"); Rockefeller, supra n. 20, at 10.

80-1749-CONCUR & DISSENT
FERC v. MISSISSIPPI

17

not ready to surrender this state legislative power to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
II
As explained above, the Court's decision to uphold Titles I
and III violates the principles of National League of Cities
and threatens the values promoted by our federal system.
The Court's result, moreover, is at odds with our constitutional history, which demonstrates that the Framers consciously rejected a system in which the national legislature \
would employ state legislative power to achieve national
ends.
The principal defect of the Articles of Confederation, eighteenth century writers agreed, was that the new National
Government lacked the power to compel individual action.
Instead, the central government had to rely upon the cooperation of state legislatures to achieve national goals. Thus,
Alexander Hamilton explained that: "The great and radical
vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the
principle of legislation for states or governments, in their corporate or collective capacities and as contradistinguished
from the individuals of whom they consist." The Federalist
No. 15, p. 93 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis omitted). He
pointed out, for example, that the National Government had
"an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and
money," but "no authority to raise either by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America." Ibid.
The Constitution cured this defect by permitting direct
contact between the National Government and the individual
citizen, a change repeatedly acknowledged by the delegates
assembled in Philadelphia. George Mason, for example, declared that:
"Under the existing Confederacy, Congress represent[s]
the States not the people of the States: their acts operate
on the States not on the individuals. The case will be
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changed in the new plan of Government." 1 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 133 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911) (hereinafter Farrand) (abbreviations
expanded in this and subsequent quotations).
Hamilton subsequently explained to the people of New York
that the Constitution marked the "difference between a
league and a government," because it "extend[ed] the authority of the union to the persons of the citizens,-the only
proper objects of government." The Federalist No. 15, p.
95. Similarly, Charles Pinckney told the South Carolina
House of Representatives that "the necessity of having a
government which should at once operate upon the people,
and not upon the states, was conceived to be indispensable by
every delegation present; ... however they may have differed with respect to the quantum of power, no objection was
made to the system itself." 4 Elliot's Debates 256.
The speeches and writings of the Framers suggest why
they adopted this means of strengthening the National Government. Mason, for example, told the Convention that because "punishment could not [in the nature of things be executed on] the States collectively," he advocated a National
Government that would "directly,operate on individuals." 1
Farrand 34. Hamilton predicted that a National Government forced to work through the States would "degenerate
into a military despotism" because it would have to maintain
a "large army, continually on foot" to enforce its will against
the States. The Federalist No. 16, p. 101 (J. Cooke ed.
1961). See also id., at 102; The Federalist No. 15, pp. 95-96.
Thus, the Framers concluded that government by one sovereign through the agency of a second cannot be satisfactory.
At one extreme, as under the Articles of Confederation, such
a system is simply ineffective. At the other, it requires a
degree of military force incompatible with stable government
and civilliberty. 3° For this reason, the Framers concluded
30

Henry M. Hart, Jr., agreed that the Framers were well aware "of the
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that "the execution of the laws of the national government
... should not require the intervention of the State Legislatures," The Federalist No. 16, p. 103, and abandoned the
Articles of Confederation in favor of direct national
legislation.
At the same time that the members of the Constitutional
Convention fashioned this principle, they rejected two proposals that would have given the national legislature power
to supervise directly state governments. The first proposal
would have authorized Congress "to call forth the force of the
Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its
duty under the articles thereof." 1 Farrand 21. The delegates never even voted on this suggestion. James Madison
moved to postpone it, stating that "the more he reflected on
the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the
justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively and not individually." !d., at 54. Several other delegates echoed his concerns, 31 and Madison ultimately reported
that "[t]he practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies [has] been exploded on
all hands." 2 Farrand 9.
The second proposal received more favorable considerdelicacy, and the difficulties of enforcement, of affirmative mandates from
a federal government to the governments of the member states." Hart,
supra n. 13, at 515. Until the second half of this century, Congress apparently heeded this wisdom. "Federal law," Hart observed in 1954, "often
says to the states, 'Don't do any of these things,' leaving outside the scope
of its prohibition a wide range of alternative courses of action. But it is
illuminating to observe how rarely it says, 'Do this thing,' leaving no choice
but to go ahead and do it." Ibid.
31
Governor Randolph of Virginia, for example, opposed a similar proposal for national coercion on the grounds that it was "impracticable, expensive, [and] cruel to individuals." Instead, he advocated "resort ... to
a national Legislation over individuals." 1 Farrand 256 (emphasis deleted). Mason eloquently argued that "[t]he most jarring elements of nature; fire & water themselves are not more incompatible that [sic] such a
mixture of civil liberty and military execution." I d., at 339.
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ation. Virginia's Governor Randolph suggested that Congress should have the power "to negative all laws passed by
the several States, contravening in the opinion of the N ationa! Legislature the articles of Union." 1 Farrand 21. On
May 31, 1787, the Committee of the Whole approved this proposal without debate. ld., at 61. A week later, Pinckney
moved to extend the congressional negative to all state laws
"which [Congress] should judge to be improper." ld., at
164. Numerous delegates criticized this attempt to give
Congress unbounded control over state lawmaking. Hugh
Williamson, for example, thought "the State Legislatures
ought to possess independent powers in cases purely local,"
id., at 171, while Elbridge Gerry thought Pinckney's idea
might "enslave the States." I d., at 165. After much debate, the Convention rejected Pinckney's suggestion.
Late in July, the delegates reversed their approval of even
Randolph's more moderate congressional veto. Several delegates now concluded that the negative would be "terrible to
the States," "unnecessary," and "improper." 2 Farrand 27. 32
Omission of the negative, however, left the new system without an effective means of adjusting conflicting state and national laws. To remedy this defect, the delegates adopted
the Supremacy Clause, providing that the federal Constitution, laws, and treaties are "the supreme Law of the Land"
and that "the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby."
Art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, the Framers substituted judicial review of state laws for congressional control of state
32
Thomas Jefferson disapproved of the congressional veto as soon as he
heard of it. Writing to Madison from Paris, he declared: "The negative
proposed to be given [the national legislators] on all the acts of the several
Legislatures is now for the first time suggested to my mind. Prima facie I
do not like it." C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 168 (1937).
Notably, Jefferson suggested that "an appeal from the State Judicatures to
a Federal Court, in all cases where the Act of Confederation controuled the
question, [would] be as effectual a remedy." Id., at 168-169.
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legislatures.
While this history demonstrates the Framers' commitment
to a strong central government, the means that they adopted
to achieve that end are as instructive as the end itself. 33
Under the Articles of Confederation, the national legislature
operated through the States. The Framers could have fortified the central government, while still maintaining the same
system, if they had increased Congress' power to demand
obedience from state legislatures. In time, this scheme
might have relegated the States to mere departments of the
National Government, a status the Court appears to endorse
today. The Framers, however, eschewed this course, choosing instead to allow Congress to pass laws directly affecting
individuals, and rejecting proposals that would have given
Congress military or legislative power over state governments. In this way, the Framers established independent
state and national sovereigns. The National Government received the power to enact its own laws and to enforce those
laws over conflicting state legislation. The States retained
the power to govern as sovereigns in fields that Congress
cannot or will not preempt. 34 This product of the Constitu33
Experience under the Articles of Confederation taught the Framers
that multiple state legislatures, unchecked by any central power,
"threat[en] danger not to the harmony only, but to the tranquillity of the
Union." C. Warren, supra n. 32, at 166 (quoting Madison). My analysis
of the Framers' intent does not detract from the proper role of federal
power in a federalist system, but merely requires the exercise of that
power in a manner that does not destroy state independence.
34
This Court quickly recognized that Congress' strength derives from its
own enumerated powers, not from the ability to direct state legislatures.
In M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), the historic decision affirming Congress' power to establish a national bank, Chief Justice Marshall declared: "No trace is to be found in the constitution of an intention to
create a dependence of the government of the Union on those of the states,
for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was it expected to rely for the
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tional Convention, I believe, is fundamentally inconsistent
with a system in which either Congress or a state legislature
harnesses the legislative powers of the other sovereign. 35

III
During his last Term of service on this Court, Justice Black
eloquently explained that our notions of federalism subordinate neither national nor state interests:
"The concept does not mean blind deference to 'States'
Rights' any more than it means centralization of control
over every important issue in our National Government
and its courts. The Framers rejected both these
courses. What the concept does represent is a system
accomplishment of its ends." !d., at 424. (emphasis added). See also S.
Davis, The Federal Principle 114 (1978) (after examining history of Constitutional Convention, "only the principle of duality articulated in a single
constitutional system of two distinct governments, national and state, each
acting in its own right, each acting directly on individuals, and each qualified master of a limited domain of action, stands out as the clearest fact");
Salmon, supra n. 13, at 359 (discussing history of Constitutional Convention and concluding that substitution of Supremacy Clause for negative on
state laws "evidenced the clear distinction in [the Framers'] minds between
the supremacy of the nation, which they approved, and the power of the
nation to control the functioning of the states, which they rejected").
35
After the Convention, several thinkers suggested that the National
Government might rely upon state officers to perform some of its tasks.
Madison, for example, thought that Congress might rely upon state officials to collect national revenue. The Federalist No. 45, pp. 312-313 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961). None of these suggestions, however, went so far as to
propose congressional control of state legislative power. The suggestions,
moreover, seemed to assume that the States would consent to national use
of their officials. See also W. Anderson, The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners? 86-87 (1955) (noting that First Congress rejected proposals to rely upon state officials to enforce federal law and suggesting that
this decision to leave "the states free to work out, and to concentrate their
attention and resources upon, their own functions" has become part of our
constitutional understanding).

80-1749-CONCUR & DISSENT
FERC v. MISSISSIPPI

23

in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 44 (1971).
In this case, I firmly believe that a proper "sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments"
requires invalidation of Titles I and III of PURPA insofar as
they apply to "state regulatory authorities." Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to uphold those
portions of the statute.
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unprecedented

92 Stat.
burdens

3117 et seq.,
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O'Connor ably demonstrates,

the

States.

(PURPA),

im-

As Justice

it intrusively requires them
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to make a place on their administrative agenda for consideration

and

"standards . " \

potential

~ ~e

adoption

~derally
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statute <;::;,:: not simply ask States
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~si-legislative
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matters that Congress believes
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c i.id.on.al P"-Ocess ~operat-e. In my view, the PURPA vio.,
lates

the

Tenth

Amendment

when

it
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to decide

for

~~~~j-~~5~
States how they will run tneir own state government.
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I

The most basic attribute of a government's sover-
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eignty is its right of self-conception.

There is an amaz-

ing variety of ways in which governmental institutions can
be designed and operated.

The diversity of political bod-

ies and traditions in our fifty States evidence this fact.
A keystone of the genius of our
decisions

about

federal

system is that

the structure of state governments have

been reserved to the States.

Heretofore that allocation

of responsibility has not been questioned.

This principle

of decentralization is basic to our constitutional scheme
and

key

to

the success and adaptability of our

system of government. 1

have any meaning,

it must

federal

u.s.

include

833, 842 (1976), is to
the

recognition

that

States have the right to shape the structure of their own
governmental institutions as they see fit.
decisions

30

If "state sovereignty," National

League of Cities v. Usery, 426

Our

25

reflect

the

assumption

that,

so

1 Among the values of local autonomy are "the greater
sensitivity of local officials to the preferences of citizens and the costs of achieving .
. goals in a given
locality; the diffusion of governmental power and the promotion of cultural and social diversity; and the enhancement of individual participation in and identification
with governmental decisionmaking."
Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.
J. 1196, 1231 (1977). See also id., at 1210-1211.

35

3.
•'

long

as

individual

fringed' 2

state

government
States.

is

to

constitutional

choice
be

about

preserved

the

rights

are

architecture

for

not
of

determination

instate

by

the

40

As Justice Blackmun has recognized in a related

context,
"[j]ust as the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as
provided by the Tenth Amendment, the power . to
regulate elections, • . . each State has the
power to prescribe the qualifications of its
officers and the manner in which they shall be
chosen.
Such power inheres in the State
by virtue of its obligation .
. to preserve
the basic conception of a political community . •
And this power and responsibility of the
State applies, not only to the qualifications of
voters, but also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who
participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy perform
functions that go to the heart of representative
government." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 u.s. 634,
647 (1973) (citations and quotations omitted).

45

50

55

60

The fourth section of Article IV of the Constitution provides that the "United States shall guarantee to
each State in this Union a Republican Form of Government."

65

'
Consistent with the principle
of state autonomy, however,

this Court has refused to constrict the States' design of
their own institutions on this basis.

Rather it has ruled

2
This exemption must encompass individual Aas defined by
legislation passed pursuant to §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hodel v. Vir,inia Surface Mining & Reclaimation
Ass'n, 452 u.s. 264, 28 n. 28 (1981).

"7'
f

...
4•

...

the Guarantee Clause nonjusticiable.
phone Co.

v.

Oregon,

223 U.S.

E.g., Pacific Tele-

118, 142-143

(1912) •

"No

70

one, we believe, has ever doubted the proposition, that,
according to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in every State resides in the people of the State,

L.t'
and that they may alter and change their form of at their

1
Luther

own pleasure."

v.

See Fortson v. Morris, 385

Borden,

u.s.

7 How.

1,

231, 234 (1966)

47

(1849).

75

("There is

no provision of the United States Constitution or any of
its

amendments which either

tates

the

method

Governor.").

a

State

Indeed,

though

expressly or
must
our

use
federal

impliedly dieto

select

tradition

it
is

80

premised on the notion that decentralized state democracies

promote

individual

liberty,

so

§

are

St~

to

fashion their own forms of government that they are not
bound even

by a

right to vote. 3

federal

requirement

that

they extend a

See San Antonio School Dist.

v.

Rodri-

3 n [T]he privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the
State may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem
proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made
between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution."
Pope v. Williams, 193 u.s. 621, 632 (1904).
See
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 172-173 (1874).

85

5•

...

u.s. 1, 35 n. 78 (1973); id., at 101 (Marshall,

guez, 411

J., dissenting)

("the right to vote in state elections has

itself never been accorded the stature of an independent
constitutional guarantee") .

Compare River a Rodriguez v.

Popular Democratic Party, No. 81-328 (not yet circulated).
Recognition of

the

States'

exclusive

right

90

to

determine the nature of their own institutions resonates
throughout our federal tradition.

As the products of in-

dependent and coordinate organs of government, state decisions regarding state law have remained immune from federal review.
(18 7 4 ) .
(1938)

95

E.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590

Cf . E i r e v • R . R . v . Tompkins , 3 0 4 U. S . 6 4 , 7 8- 7 9
("the Constitution of the United States . . • rec-

ognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the
States -- independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments")
Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149

(quoting Baltimore

u.s. 368, 401 (1893) (Field,

100

&

J.,

dissenting)).

n

By means the Eleventh Amendment, the nation from
1\

its earliest years has protected the intergrity of independent state government structures by barring the federal

105

6•

.. .

courts from hearing unconsented suits against state treaEdelman v.

Jordan,

u.s.

suries.

E.g.,

415

651,

663-668

(1974).

State sovereign immunity recognizes that budget-

ary vulnerability in a national forum could diminish the

110

States' freedom to allocate their financial resources between

their

institutions

Cf. Hans v. Louisiana, 134

of

government

u.s.

as

1, 21 (1890)

they choose.
("to deprive

the legislature of the power of judging what the honor and
safety of the State may require, even at the expense of a

115

temporary failure to discharge public debts, would be attended with greater evils than such a failure can cause").
To be meaningful, this tribute to the extent to which sovereign state policies are free from federal control must
presuppose that the very framework of the political institutions

through which state policies are

administered must

be

similarly

120

formulated and

independent.

Indeed,

it

would be a confused constitutional scheme that would recognize

a

State's

freedom to decide where to locate

state capitol, Coyle v. Oklahoma,
(1911),

but would

deny the far

221
more

u.s.

559, 565, 579

important right

decide of what that capitol will consist.

its

to

125
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...

The
state

Court

courts

to

Testa v. Katt, 330
\ under

has

held

adjudicate

u.s.

that

Congress

federal

386 (1947).

causes

may

require

of

action.

This illustrates that

some conditions the federal government

130

indeed may

call upon state governmental institutions to decide matters of federal policy for

it.

But when doing so, Con-

gress must respect the state institution's own structure
and method of decision.

Testa recognized this limitation

135

when its limited its holding to circumstances under which
the state court has "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate
under established local law to adjudicate this
action."

330

u~s.,

at

394

(emphasis

[federal]

added) . 4

Testa

therefore supports the principle that Congress must defer
to a State's design of its own institution.

"The general

rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state

4The Testa Court then emphasized its meaning by citing
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 u.s. 117 (1945), where the Court
stated that "it would not be open to us" to insist on adjudication in a state court of a federal claim arising
beyond the jurisdiction of the state court.
Id., 121.
See Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal
Penal and Criminal Statutes:
Developments in Judicial
Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) ("in the Testa opinion there is no language which would upset the traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a
state's sovereign right to determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of its own courts").
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control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law
takes state courts as it finds them."

Hart, The Relations

Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colurn. L. Rev. 489, 508

145

(1954).
II
The
read,

PURPA

breaks

with

this

tradition.

Fairly

it commands the States to conform their terms and

conditions of governmental participation to federal prescription. 5

Irrespective of preexisting State practice,

5The Court says Congress has given States a choice by
which they can avoid this order. Ante, 20-22. If Mississippi dissolves its Public Service Commission and abandons
entirely~ governmental oversight of its monopoly public
utilities, the Court reasons, then Mississippi need alter
no instrument of state government.
I find such reasoning
Orwellian.
By employing this dialect, one may transform
the statement "your money or your life" from an order to a
simple offer of choice.
The impoverished character of the "choice" in
this case may be appreciated by considering a case in
which States were offered a meaningful option by Congress.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., 452 u.s. 264 (1981), Congress established an interim
federal regulatory program in a new area of concern: surface mining and reclamation.
The statute at issue there
offered States the choice of assuming control of the new
regulatory program on a permanent basis -- if their program conformed to federal standards.
"If a State d[id]
not wish to submit a proposed permanent program that cornplies with the Act and implementing regulations, the full
regulatory burden w[ould] be borne by the Federal Government." Id., at 288. By contrast, here the Court acknowledges thatthe PURPA "has failed to provide an alternative
regulatory mechanism to police the area in the event of
state default." Ante, at 22.
In the cases of federal programs passed under the
Spending Clause, Congress also may offer States the genuine choice of accepting new federal financial benefits in
return for cooperative renunciation of aspects of state
sovereignty.
See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil
Service Cornrn'n, 330 u.s. 127, 143 (1947). Commerce Clause
Footnote continued on next page.
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the PURPA purports to establish the rules governing who
may initiate and participate in state regulatory proceedings. 6

It provides

that these participation rights are

enforceable against the State in federal court. 7

If the

155

nature or timing of state regulatory proceedings fail to
satisfy

everyone,

enforce

judicially the PURPA' s requirements -- no matter

what the States'

the

PURPA

authorizes

"any

person"

to

rule is as to what parties normally are

~~ t>rpermitted
action. 8

to petition
And

once

judicially toA sptir
the

State

has

administrative

carried

out

160

its

federally-imposed duties, the PURPA grants any federallymandated participant the right to subject the state agency
to

state

paid

to

judicial
s-t1'dar-d

review. 9
state

6ftee /Jgain

rules

governing

no/\ ~is
access

to

state

cases by their very nature, however, may contain a coercive aspect absent from the conditional disbursement of
federal bounty under the Spending Clause.
6

See 16 u.s.c. §263l(a)
(Supp. IV 1980)

7 see

(Supp.

16 u.s.c. §2633 (b) (1)
H.s.c. §3207 (a) (2) (Supp. IV
See 16 u.s.c. §2633 (c) (1)
§3207(b) (1) (Supp. IV 1980);
(B) (Supp. IV 1980).

IV 1980); 15 u.s.c. §3205

and (2) (Supp. IV 1980); 15
1980).
(Supp. IV 1980); 15 u.s.c.
16 u.s.c. §824a-3h(2) (A) and

9 see 16 u.s.c. §2633(c) (1); 15 u.s.c. §3207(b) (2) (Supp.
IV 1980); and 16 U.S.C. §824a-3 (g) (1) (Supp. IV 1980).
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courts for

~

the purpose of prot:es W ng state adminstrative

action.
The terms and conditions of public participation
in agency decisionmaking are core aspects of the design of

administrative ~S~me

a State's
lieve

that public

pointed

utilities

officials

serving

should
lengthy

be

States may be-

170

regulated by ap-

terms,

and

that

any

state citizen should be able to petition those officials
on any matter of regulatory policy.
for

direct

relatively

election of public utility commissioners

for

short

the

participation
rigorous

terms,

rights of

standing,

quirements.

Other States may opt

but

otherwise

may

restrict

the general public

intervention,

and

175

by means of

reviewability

re-

Still other states may decide that no utility

regulation at all is desirable.

Possible mixes of repre-

180

sentation and direct participation in the establishment of
quasi-legislative administrative bodies are endless.
each

particular

instance,

decision

about

the

In

extent of

direct political participation before the representative
body marks a crucial and distinctive feature of that body.
The PURPA invades

the liberty of the States to

185

11.

determine
bodies. 10

the character

of one

of

their

own

regulatory

I therefore would hold that these provisions of

the PURPA transgress the Tenth Amendment.
In defense of its holding, the Court reasons that

190

Congress can condition the States' utility regulatory activities on any terms it pleases since, under the Commerce
Clause, Congress has the power to preempt,r completely the
States' utility regulatory activities.
der this logic, however, Congress

Ante, 21-22.

validly~

Un-

establish

195

a national park that admits persons on the condition that
they

be white

-- on

the

ground

that

the Necessary and

Proper Clause confers federal power to establish national
parks

that exclude everyone.

faulty.

Plainly this

reasoning

is

It fails to distinguish between the separate lim-

itations on federal power contained by the Necessary and
Proper Clause and by the Fourteenth Amendment.

As Nation-

u.s.,

at 841, and

al League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426

10 The Court argues that Mississippi's practices in fact
are not at odds with the prescriptions of the PURPA.
Ante, 24-25.
This is not iJtl!f"' an adequate defense of the
statute. The PURPA purports to remove States' choice over
matters that I believe the Tenth Amendment commits to
their choice alone.
The intrusion is not cured by the
current -- and perhaps otherwise temporary -- coincidence
of state and federal choice.

200
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as the structure of the Court's own opinion makes plain,
ante,

at

9

and

15,

the

Commerce Clause

and

the

Tenth

205

Amendment also embody distinct limitations on federal power.

That Congress has satisfied the one demostrates noth-

ing about whether Congress has satisfied the other. 11
It is true the provisions at issue rework state
rules of government in ways that might not seem dramatic.
But this

is

the

210

first occasion on which this Court has

been required to pass on such federal action.

"Of course,

no one expects Congress to obliterate the states, at least
in one fell swoop.

If there is any danger, it lies in the

tyranny of small decisions -- in the prospect that Con-

j(~

215

gress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit,
until

someday essentially nothing

shell."

is

left

but

a

gutted

L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978).

In my view, Congress may not coercively reshape the design

11 The

Court also cites washington v. Fishing Vessel
Assn., 443 u.s. 658 (1979), to support its holding. Ante,
18. The case stands for the unremarkable proposition that
a District Court, after adjudicating a contest under federal law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing
rights, may order the losing State to abide by the court's
decision.
Nothing in our Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion
authorized the federal court to amend the structure of a
state political institution.

~

.

13.
;

of state government under a false banner of "cooperative
federalism."
PURPA do force

Because

I

believe

that

just such a recasting,

provisions

of

220

the

I would hold these

provisions invalid under the Tenth Amendment as interpreted by National League of Cities v. Usery.
I respectfully dissent •
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poses

L.

No.

95-617,

unprecedented

92 Stat.
burdens

3117 et seq.,
on

O'Connor ably demonstrates,

it

the

States.

(PURPA),
As

im-

Justice

intrusively requires them

to make a place on their administrative agenda for consideration

and

"standards."

potential

adoption

of

federally

proposed

The statute does not simply ask States to

consider quasi-legislative matters that Congress believes
they would do well to adopt.

It also prescribes adminis-

trative and judicial procedures that States must follow in
deciding

whether

to

adopt

the

proposed

standards.

At

least to this extent, I think the PURPA violates the Tenth
Amendment.
I

Most,

if not all, of the States have administrative

2.

bodies - usually a commission - that regulate the electric
and gas public utility companies.

As these utilities nor-

mally are given monopoly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both substantively and procedurally by State
law.

Until now, with limited exceptions, the federal gov-

ernment wisely has not attempted to preempt this essential
State function, and certainly has not undertaken to prescribe

the

procedures

make their decisions.

·u,.,

by

which

PURPA,

for

State

regulatory

bodies

the first time, breaks

~
this longstanding deference to principles of federalism.

I\
Now,

regardless

of

established

procedures

before

State administrative regulatory agencies, and of State law
with respect to

judicial review, PURPA mandates standing

rights and procedures including judicial review, that must
be followed in considering the proposed substantive standards.
(Note to John):
Here, please spell out in appropriate detail the standing rights, procedures
and requirements for review under the Federal
Act. You have done this in general terms on p 9
of your draft. As the focus of my dissent is on
these provisions, and I would like them to be
specifically identified in the text. My recollection is that the procedures prescribed differ
in some respects according to the Part of the
Act.

3.

The foregoing requirements by PURPA intrude upon - in effeet preempt --core areas of a State's administrative and
judicial procedure.
II
In sustaining these provisions of the Act, the Court
reasons that Congress can condition the utility regulatory
activities of States on any terms it pleases since, under
the

Commerce Clause,

completely

all

such

Congress has
activities.

the

power

Ante,

to

21-22.

preempt
This

is

suggested even though utility regulation has been

exer-

cised by some States since the turn of the century.

Un-

der the "threat" of preemption reasoning, Congress - one
supposes - could reduce the States to federal provinces.
~
ButANational League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426

841,

and

u.s.

at

indeed as the structure of the Court's opinion

today makes plain, Ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause
and

the

Tenth

federal power.

Amendment

embody distinct

limitations on

That Congress has satisfied the one demon-

strates nothing as to whether Congress has satisfied the
other.
11) .

(John:

add here the notes you now have as fn.

4.

It

may

be

true

PURPA that prompt

that

the

procedural

this dissent may

provisions

of

not effect dramatic

changes in the laws and procedures of some States.

But I

know of no other attempt by the federal government to supplant State prescribed procedures for administrative agencies.
er

If Congress may do this, presumably it has the pow-

to preempt State court rules of civil procedure and

judicial review in classes of cases found to affect commerce.

This would

be

the

type

of

hypothesized by Professor Tribe:

gradual

encroachment

"Of course, no one ex-

pects Congress to obliterate the states, at least in one
fell swoop.
ny of

If there is any danger, it lies in the tyran-

small decisions --

in the prospect that Congress

will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until
someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell."
(Put

in

fn.

L.

Tribe,

American Constitutional

Law

302

(1978)).

I

have

limited

this

PURPA identified above.

dissent

to

the

provisions

of

Despite the appeal - and indeed

wisdom - of Justice O'Connor's evocation of the principles

5.

of federalism,
the

I believe precedents of this Court support

constitutionality

of

the

substantive

provisions

of

this Act.
{John:

Here cite Hodel and one or two other cases you

think most relevant).
cedural provisions may

Accordingly, to the extent the probe

separable,

I

would

affirm

part and dissent in part.

{John:
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could be put in a note. The quote from Hart, p.
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CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1749

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET
AL., APPELLANTS v. MISSISSIPPI ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
[May - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Publi.~ Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-617 , 92 Stat. 3117 et seq., (PURPA), imposes unprecedented burdens on the States. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR ably
demonstr~'.tes, it intrusively requires them to make a place on
their adrr.inistrative agenda for consideration and potential
adoption of federally proposed "standards." The statute
does not simply ask States to consider quasi-legislative matters tha ·~ Congress believes they would do well to adopt. It
also pr,~scribes administrative and judicial procedures that
States must follow in deciding whether to adopt the proposed
standards. At least to this extent, I think the PURPA violates +.he Tenth .Amendment.
I
Most, if not all, of the States have administrative bodiesusu· tlly commissions-that regulate electric and gas public
uti);ty companies. As these utilities normally are given mono· 1oly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both subst<,ntively and procedurally by state law. Until now, with
lhnited exceptions, the federal government has not att ~mpted to preempt this important state function, and certainly has not undertaken to prescribe the procedures by
which state regulatory bodies make their decisions. The
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PURPA, for the first time, breaks with this longstanding
deference to principles of federalism.
Now, regardless of established procedures before State administrative regulatory agencies, and of state law with respect to judicial review, the PURPA forces federal procedures on state regulatory institutions.
The PURP A
prescribes rules directing that "the Secretary [of Energy],
any affected electric utility, or any electric consumer of an affected electric utility may intervene and participate as a matter of right" in regulatory proceedings respecting electrical
rates. 1 It directs that "[a]ny person (including the Secretary) may bring an action to enforce" the obligations with respect to electrical rate consideration that the PURPA lays
upon state regulatory commissions. 2 The statute provides
that "[a]ny person (including the Secretary) may obtain [judicial] review of any determination" made by a state regulatory
commission regarding PURPA's electrical rate policies. 3
'16 U. S. C. § 2631(a) (Supp. IV 1980). "[A]ny electric utility or electric consumer" may enforce its intervention and participation rights in federal court. § 2633(b)(2). See also § 2633(b)(l).
The PURPA grants similar intervention and participation rights to the
Secretary with respect to state natural gas utility rate proceedings. See
15 U. S. C. § 3205 (Supp. IV 1980). These rights also are specified to be
enforceable in federal court. See § 3207(a)(2).
2
16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The same enforcement right
is granted in the case of natural gas rate proceedings. 15 U. S. C.
§ 3207(b)(l) (Supp. IV 1980).
Under PURPA's Title II, § 210, States must implement federal rules relating to the interconnection of electrical utilities with qualifying
cogeneration and small power production facilities. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3
(Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or (under
certain conditions) "[a]ny electrical utility, qualifying cogenerator, or qualifying small power producer'' may bring judicial actions against state regulatory commissions to require the implementation of the federal rules.
§ 824a-3(h)(2)(A) and (B).
' 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(l) (Supp. IV 1980). The PURPA also makes
available a right of judicial review in the same manner with respect to the
interconnection of electrical utilities with cogeneration and small power
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The foregoing requirements by PURPA intrude upon-in effect preempt-core areas of a State's administrative and judicial procedure.
II
In sustaining these provisions of the Act, the Court reasons that Congress can condition the utility regulatory activities of States on any terms it pleases since, under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to preempt
completely all such activities. Ante, 21-22. Under the
"threat of preemption" reasoning, Congress--one supposescould reduce the States to federal provinces. But as N ational League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426 U. S., at 841,
and indeed as the structure of the Court's opinion today
makes plain, ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment embody distinct limitations on federal
power. That Congress has satisfied the one demonstrates
nothing as to whether Congress has satisfied the other. 4
production facilities. § 824a-3(g)(1). No similar right is available in the
case of natural gas rate proceedings. See 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2) (Supp.
IV 1980).
As a separate matter, the PURPA specifies the procedural requirements
for the state regulatory agencies consideration and determination of the
PURPA's federally proposed standards. See §3203(c); 16 U.S. C.
§ 2621(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
'The Court cites Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), in support of the
proposition that under some conditions the federal government may call
upon state governmental institutions to decide matters of federal policy.
But Testa recognized that, when doing so, Congress must respect the state
institution's own decisionmaking structure and method. That opinion limited its holding to circumstances under which the state court has "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate
this [federal] action." 330 U. S., at 394 (emphasis added). The Testa
Court then emphasized its meaning by citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S.
117 (1945), where the Court stated that "it would not be open to us" to insist on adjudication in a state court of a federal claim arising beyond the
jurisdiction of the state court. Id., 121. See Note, Utilization of State
Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Developments in
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"The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes state courts as it finds them." Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
489, 508 (1954). I believe the same principle must apply to
other organs of state government. It may be true that the
procedural provisions of the PURPA that prompt this dissent
may not effect dramatic changes in the laws and procedures
of some States. But I know of no other attempt by the federal government to supplant state prescribed procedures that
in part define the nature of their administrative agencies. If
Congress may do this, presumably it has the power to preempt state court rules of civil procedure and judicial review
in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This would be
the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by Professor
Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to obliterate the
states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is any danger, it
lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the prospect that
Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit,
until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." 5
I limit this dissent to the provisions of the PURP A identified above. Despite the appeal-and indeed wisdom-of
JusTICE O'CONNOR'S evocation of the principles of federalism, I believe precedents of this Court support the constituJudicial Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Testa upsets "the traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's
sovereign right to determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of
its own courts").
The Court also cites Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658
(1979), to support its holding. Ante, 18. The case stands for the unremarkable proposition that a district court, after adjudicating a contest
under federal law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing rights,
may order the losing State to abide by the court's decision. Nothing in our
Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion authorized the federal court to amend the
structure of a state political institution.
6
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978) .
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tionality of the substantive provisions of this Act on this facial attack. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); Testa v. Katt,
330 U. S. 386 (1947). Accordingly, to the extent the procedural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in part and
reverse in part.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell
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FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
ET AL., APPELLANTS v. MISSISSIPPI ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 91H317, 92 Stat. 3117 et seq., (PURPA), imposes unprecedented burdens on the States. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR ably
demonstrates, it intrusively requires them to make a place on
their administrative agenda for consideration and potential
adoption of federally proposed "standards." The statute
does not simply ask States to consider quasi-legislative matters that Congress believes they would do well to adopt. It
also prescribes administrative and judicial procedures that
States must follow in deciding whether to adopt the proposed
standards. At least to this extent, I think the PURPA violates the Tenth Amendment.
I
Most, if not all, of the States have administrative bodiesusually commissions-that regulate electric and gas public
utility companies. As these utilities normally are given monopoly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both substantively and procedurally by state law. Until now, with
limited exceptions, the federal government has not attempted to preempt this important state function, and certainly has not undertaken to prescribe the procedures by
which state regulatory bodies make their decisions. The
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PURPA, for the first time, breaks with this longstanding
deference to principles of federalism.
Now, regardless of established procedures before state administrative regulatory agencies, and of state law with respect to judicial review, the PURPA forces federal procedures on state regulatory institutions.
The PURPA
prescribes rules directing that "the Secretary [of Energy],
any affected electric utility, or any electric consumer of an affected electric utility may intervene and participate as a matter of right" in regulatory proceedings required by the
PURPA respecting electrical rates. 1 It directs that "[a]ny
person (including the Secretary) may bring an action to enforce" the obligations with respect to electrical rate consideration that the PURP A lays upon state regulatory commissions. 2 The statute provides that "[a]ny person (including
the Secretary) may obtain [judicial] review of any determination" made by a state regulatory commission regarding the
PURPA's electrical rate policies. 3 The foregoing require'16 U. S. C. § 2631(a) (Supp. IV 1980). "[A]ny electric utility or electric consumer" may enforce its intervention and participation rights in federal court. § 2633(b)(2). See also § 2633(b)(1).
The PURPA grants similar intervention and participation rights to the
Secretary with respect to state natural gas utility rate proceedings. See
15 U. S. C. § 3205 (Supp. IV 1980). These rights also are specified to be
enforceable in federal court. See § 3207(a)(2).
2
16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). A similar enforcement right
is granted in the case of natural gas rate proceedings. 15 U. S. C.
§ 3207(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
Under the PURPA's Title II, § 210, States must implement federal rules
relating to the interconnection of electrical utilities with qualifying
cogeneration and small power production facilities . 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3
(Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and (under
certain conditions) "[a]ny electrical utility, qualifying cogenerator, or qualifying small power producer" may bring judicial actions against state regulatory commissions to require the implementation of the federal rules prescribed by the PURPA. § 824a-3(h)(2)(A) and (B).
3
16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The PURPA also makes
available a right of judicial review in the same manner with respect to the
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ments by the PURP A intrude upon-1n effect preempt-core
areas of a State's administrative and judicial procedure.
II
In sustaining these provisions of the Act, the Court reasons that Congress can condition the utility regulatory activities of States on any terms it pleases since, under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to preemp!.__.,J f ~;~
completely all such activities. Ante, 21-22. Under ~ \...:....."threat of preemption" reasoning, Congress-one supposescould reduce the States to federal provinces. But as N ational League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426 U. S. 833, 841
(1976), and indeed as the structure of the Court's opinion today makes plain, ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause and
the Tenth Amendment embody distinct limitations on federal
power. That Congress has satisfied the one demonstrates
nothing as to whether Congress has satisfied the other. 4
interconnection of electrical utilities with cogeneration and small power
production facilities. § 824a-3(g)(l). No similar right is available in the
case of natural gas rate proceedings. See 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2) (Supp.
IV 1980).
As a separate matter, the PURPA specifies the rocedural re uirements
e
for the state regulatory agenciesA cons1 eratwn and determmation o
PURPA's federally proposed standards. See § 3203(c); 16 U. S. C.
§ 2621(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
'The Court cites Testa v. Katt , 330 U. S. 386 (1947), in support of the
proposition that under some conditions the Federal Government may call
upon state governmental institutions to decide matters of federal policy.
But Testa recognized that, when doing so, Congress must respect the state
institution's own decisionmaking structure and method. That opinion limited its holding to circumstances under which the state court has "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate
this [federal] action." Id ., at 394 (emphasis added). The Testa Court
then emphasized its meaning by citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117
(1945), where the Court stated that "it would not be open to us" to insist on
adjudication in a state court of a federal claim arising beyond the jurisdiction of the local court. Id. , at 121. See Note, Utilization of State Courts
to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Developments in Judicial
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"The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes state courts as it finds them." Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
489, 508 (1954). I believe the same principle must apply to
other organs of state government. It may be true that the
procedural provisions of the PURP A that prompt this dissent
may not effect dramatic changes in the laws and procedures
of some States. But I know of no other attempt by the Federal Government to supplant state prescribed procedures
that in part define the nature of their administrative agencies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power
to preempt state court rules of civil procedure and judicial review in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This
would be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by
Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to
obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is
any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the
prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty,
bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." 5
I limit this dissent to the provisions of the PURP A identified above. Despite the appeal-and indeed wisdom-of
JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S evocation of the principles of federalFederalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Testa upsets "the
traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's sovereign right to determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of its
own courts").
The Court also cites Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658
(1979), to support its holding. Ante, 18. The case stands for the unremarkable proposition that a district court, after adjudicating a contest
under federal law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing rights,
may order the losing State to abide by the court's decision. Nothing in our
Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion authorized the federal court to amend the
structure of a state political institution.
5
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978).
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ism, I believe precedents of this Court support the constitutionality of the substantive provisions of this Act on this facial attack. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); Testa v. Katt,
330 U. S. 386 (1947). Accordingly, to the extent the procedural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in part and
reverse in part.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Public Utilit
egulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 et seq., (PURPA), imposes unprecedented burdens on the States. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR ably
demonstrates, it intrusively requires them to make a place on
their administrative agenda for consideration and potential
adoption of federally proposed "standards." The statute
does not simply ask States to consider quasi-legislative matters that Congress believes they would do well to adopt. It
also prescribes administrative and judicial procedures that
States must follow in deciding whether to adopt the proposed
standards. At least to this extent, I think the PURPA violates the Tenth Amendment.
I
Most, if not all, of the States have administrative bodiesusually commissions-that regulate electric and gas public
utility companies. As these utilities normally are given monopoly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both substantively and procedurally by state law. Until now, with
limited exceptions, the federal government has not attempted to preempt this important state function, and certainly has not undertaken to prescribe the procedures by
which state regulatory bodies make their decisions. The
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PURPA, for the first time, breaks with this longstanding
deference to principles of federalism.
Now, regardless of established procedures before state administrative regulatory agencies, and of state law with respect to judicial review, the PURPA forces federal procedures on state regulatory institutions.
The PURPA
prescribes rules directing that "the Secretary [of Energy],
any affected electric utility, or any electric consumer of an affected electric utility may intervene and participate as a matter of right" in regulatory proceedings required by the
PURPA respecting electrical rates. 1 It directs that "[a]ny
person (including the Secretary) may bring an action to enforce" the obligations with respect to electrical rate consideration that the PURP A lays upon state regulatory commissions. 2 The statute provides that "[a]ny person (including
the Secretary) may obtain [judicial] review of any determination" made by a state regulatory commission regarding the
PURPA's electrical rate policies. 3 The foregoing require'16 U. S. C. § 2631(a) (Supp. IV 1980). "[A]ny electric utility or electric consumer" may enforce its intervention and participation rights in federal court. § 2633(b)(2). See also § 2633(b)(1).
The PURP A grants similar intervention and participation rights to the
Secretary with respect to state natural gas utility rate proceedings. See
15 U. S. C. § 3205 (Supp. IV 1980). These rights also are specified to be
enforceable in federal court. See § 3207(a)(2).
2
16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). A similar enforcement right
is granted in the case of natural gas rate proceedings. 15 U. S. C.
§ 3207(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
Under the PURPA's Title II, § 210, States must implement federal rules
relating to the interconnection of electrical utilities with qualifying
cogeneration and small power production facilities. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3
(Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and (under
certain conditions) "[a]ny electrical utility, qualifying cogenerator, or qualifying small power producer" may bring judicial actions against state regulatory commissions to require the implementation of the federal rules prescribed by the PURP A. § 824a-3(h)(2)(A) and (B).
' 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The PURPA also makes
available a right of judicial review in the same manner with respect to the
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ments by the PURP A intrude upon-in effect preempt-core
areas of a State's administrative and judicial procedure.
II
In sustaining these provisions of the Act, the Court reasons that Congress can condition the utility regulatory activities of States on any terms it pleases since, under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to preemp!.__.J ~;~
completely all such activities. Ante, 21-22. Under ~ \....:...."threat of preemption" reasoning, Congress-one supposescould reduce the States to federal provinces. But as N ational League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426 U. S. 833, 841
(1976), and indeed as the structure of the Court's opinion today makes plain, ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause and
the Tenth Amendment embody distinct limitations on federal
power. That Congress has satisfied the one demonstrates
nothing as to whether Congress has satisfied the other. 4

+

interconnection of electrical utilities with cogeneration and small power
production facilities. § 824a-3(g)(1). No similar right is available in the
case of natural gas rate proceedings. See 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2) (Supp.
IV 1980).
As a separate matter, the PURPA specifies the rocedural re uirements
for the state regulatory agenciesA cons1 eratwn and determmatwn o t e
PURPA's federally proposed standards. See § 3203(c); 16 U. S. C.
§ 2621(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
'The Court cites Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), in support of the
proposition that under some conditions the Federal Government may call
upon state governmental institutions to decide matters of federal policy.
But Testa recognized that, when doing so, Congress must respect the state
institution's own decisionmaking structure and method. That opinion limited its holding to circumstances under which the state court has "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate
this [federal] action." /d., at 394 (emphasis added). The Testa Court
then emphasized its meaning by citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117
(1945), where the Court stated that "it would not be open to us" to insist on
adjudication in a state court of a federal claim arising beyond the jurisdiction of the local court. Id., at 121. See Note, Utilization of State Courts
to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Developments in Judicial
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"The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes state courts as it finds them." Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
489, 508 (1954). I believe the same principle must apply to
other organs of state government. It may be true that the
procedural provisions of the PURP A that prompt this dissent
may not effect dramatic changes in the laws and procedures
of some States. But I know of no other attempt by the Federal Government to supplant state prescribed procedures
that in part define the nature of their administrative agencies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power
to preempt state court rules of civil procedure and judicial review in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This
would be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by
Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to
obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is
any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the
prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty,
bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." 5
I limit this dissent to the provisions of the PURP A identified above. Despite the appeal-and indeed wisdom-of
JuSTICE O'CONNOR's evocation of the principles of federalFederalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Testa upsets "the
traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's sovereign right to determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of its
own courts").
The Court also cites Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658
(1979), to support its holding. Ante, 18. The case stands for the unremarkable proposition that a district court, after adjudicating a contest
under federal law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing rights,
may order the losing State to abide by the court's decision. Nothing in our
Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion authorized the federal court to amend the
structure of a state political institution.
5
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978).
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ism, I believe precedents of this Court support the constitutionality of the substantive provisions of this Act on this facial attack. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); Testa v. Katt,
330 U. S. 386 (1947). Accordingly, to the extent the procedural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in part and
reverse in part.
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Public Utility egulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95--617, 92 Stat. 3117 et seq., (PURPA), imposes unprecedented burdens on the States. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR ably
demonstrates, it intrusively requires them to make a place on
their administrative agenda for consideration and potential
adoption of federally proposed "standards." The statute
does not simply ask States to consider quasi-legislative matters that Congress believes they would do well to adopt. It
also prescribes administrative and judicial procedures that
States must follow in deciding whether to adopt the proposed
standards. At least to this extent, I think the PURPA violates the Tenth Amendment.
I
Most, if not all, of the States have administrative bodiesusually commissions-that regulate electric and gas public
utility companies. As these utilities normally are given monopoly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both substantively and procedurally by state law. Until now, with
limited exceptions, the federal government has not attempted to preempt this important state function, and certainly has not undertaken to prescribe the procedures by
which state regulatory bodies make their decisions. The
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PURPA, for the first time, breaks with this longstanding
deference to principles of federalism.
Now, regardless of established procedures before state administrative regulatory agencies, and of state law with respect to judicial review, the PURPA forces federal procedures on state regulatory institutions.
The PURPA
prescribes rules directing that "the Secretary [of Energy],
any affected electric utility, or any electric consumer of an affected electric utility may intervene and participate as a matter of right" in regulatory proceedings required by the
PURPA respecting electrical rates. 1 It directs that "[a]ny
person (including the Secretary) may bring an action to enforce" the obligations with respect to electrical rate consideration that the PURPA lays upon state regulatory commissions. 2 The statute provides that "[a]ny person (including
the Secretary) may obtain [judicial] review of any determination" made by a state regulatory commission regarding the
PURPA's electrical rate policies. 3 The foregoing require'16 U. S. C. § 2631(a) (Supp. IV 1980). "[A]ny electric utility or electric consumer" may enforce its intervention and participation rights in federal court. § 2633(b)(2). See also § 2633(b)(1).
The PURP A grants similar intervention and participation rights to the
Secretary with respect to state natural gas utility rate proceedings. See
15 U. S. C. § 3205 (Supp. IV 1980). These rights also are specified to be
enforceable in federal court. See § 3207(a)(2).
2
16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). A similar enforcement right
is granted in the case of natural gas rate proceedings. 15 U. S. C.
§ 3207(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
Under the PURPA's Title II , § 210, States must implement federal rules
relating to the interconnection of electrical utilities with qualifying
cogeneration and small power production facilities. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3
(Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and (under
certain conditions) "[a]ny electrical utility, qualifying cogenerator, or qualifying small power producer" may bring judicial actions against state regulatory commissions to require the implementation of the federal rules prescribed by the PURPA. § 824a-3(h)(2)(A) and (B).
3
16 U.S. C. §2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The PURPA also makes
available a right of judicial review in the same manner with respect to the
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ments by the PURP A intrude upon-in effect preempt-core
areas of a State's administrative and judicial procedure.
II
In sustaining these provisions of the Act, the Court reasons that Congress can condition the utility regulatory activities of States on any terms it pleases since, under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to preemp!__.,J f ~;-:,
completely all such activities. Ante, 21-22. Under ~ '-...:..-"threat of preemption" reasoning, Congress-one supposescould reduce the States to federal provinces. But as N ational League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426 U. S. 833, 841
(1976), and indeed as the structure of the Court's opinion today makes plain, ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause and
the Tenth Amendment embody distinct limitations on federal
power. That Congress has satisfied the one demonstrates
nothing as to whether Congress has satisfied the other. 4
interconnection of electrical utilities with cogeneration and small power
production facilities. § 824a-3(g)(l). No similar right is available in the
case of natural gas rate proceedings. See 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2) (Supp.
IV 1980).
As a separate matter, the PURPA specifies the rocedural re uirements
e
for the state regulatory agencies~ cons1 eratwn and determination o
PURPA's federally proposed standards. See § 3203(c); 16 U. S. C.
§ 2621(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
'The Court cites Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), in support of the
proposition that under some conditions the Federal Government may call
upon state governmental institutions to decide matters of federal policy.
But Testa recognized that, when doing so, Congress must respect the state
institution's own decisionmaking structure and method. That opinion limited its holding to circumstances under which the state court has "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate
this [federal] action." Id., at 394 (emphasis added). The Testa Court
then emphasized its meaning by citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117
(1945), where the Court stated that "it would not be open to us" to insist on
adjudication in a state court of a federal claim arising beyond the jurisdiction of the local court. !d., at 121. See Note, Utilization of State Courts
to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Developments in Judicial
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"The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes state courts as it finds them." Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
489, 508 (1954). I believe the same principle must apply to
other organs of state government. It may be true that the
procedural provisions of the PURPA that prompt this dissent
may not effect dramatic changes in the laws and procedures
of some States. But I know of no other attempt by the Federal Government to supplant state prescribed procedures
that in part define the nature of their administrative agencies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power
to preempt state court rules of civil procedure and judicial review in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This
would be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by
Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to
obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is
any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the
prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty,
bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." 5
I limit this dissent to the provisions of the PURP A identified above. Despite the appeal-and indeed wisdom-of
JuSTICE O'CONNOR'S evocation of the principles of federalFederalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Testa upsets "the
traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's sovereign right to determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of its
own courts").
The Court also cites Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658
(1979), to support its holding. Ante, 18. The case stands for the unremarkable proposition that a district court, after adjudicating a contest
under federal law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing rights,
may order the losing State to abide by the court's decision. Nothing in our
Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion authorized the federal court to amend the
structure of a state political institution.
5
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978).
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ism, I believe precedents of this Court support the constitutionality of the substantive provisions of this Act on this facial attack. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); Testa v. Katt,
330 U. S. 386 (1947). Accordingly, to the extent the procedural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in part and
reverse in part.

'

.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: MAY 1 9 1982

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1749

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
ET AL., APPELLANTS v. MISSISSIPPI ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
[May - , 1982]

JusTICE POWELL, concurring and dissenting.
J
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 et seq., (PURPA), imposes unprecedented burdens on the States. As JusTICE O'CONNOR ably
demonstrates, it intrusively requires them to make a place on
their administrative agenda for consideration and potential
adoption of federally proposed "standards." The statute
does not simply ask States to consider quasi-legislative matters that Congress believes they would do well to adopt. It
also prescribes administrative and judicial procedures that
States must follow in deciding whether to adopt the proposed
standards. At least to this extent, I think the PURPA violates the Tenth Amendment.
I
Most, if not all, of the States have administrative bodiesusually commissions-that regulate electric and gas public
utility companies. As these utilities normally are given monopoly jurisdiction, they are extensively regulated both substantively and procedurally by state law. Until now, with
limited exceptions, the federal government has not attempted to preempt this important state function, and certainly has not undertaken to prescribe the procedures by
which state regulatory bodies make their decisions. The
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PURPA, for the first time, breaks with this longstanding
deference to principles of federalism.
Now, regardless of established procedures before state administrative regulatory agencies, and of state law with respect to judicial review, the PURPA forces federal procedures on state regulatory institutions.
The PURP A
prescribes rules directing that "the Secretary [of Energy],
any affected electric utility, or any electric consumer of an affected electric utility may intervene and participate as a matter of right" in regulatory proceedings required by the
PURPA respecting electrical rates. 1 It directs that "[a]ny
person (including the Secretary) may bring an action to enforce" the obligations with respect to electrical rate consideration that the PURPA lays upon state regulatory commissions. 2 The statute provides that "[a]ny person (including
the Secretary) may obtain [judicial] review of any determination" made by a state regulatory commission regarding the
PURPA's electrical rate policies. 3 The foregoing require'16 U. S. C. § 2631(a) (Supp. IV 1980). "[A]ny electric utility or electric consumer'' may enforce its intervention and participation rights in federal court. § 2633(b)(2). See also § 2633(b)(1).
The PURPA grants similar intervention and participation rights to the
Secretary with respect to state natural gas utility rate proceedings. See
15 U. S. C. § 3205 (Supp. IV 1980). These rights also are specified to be
enforceable in federal court. See § 3207(a)(2).
' 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). A similar enforcement right
is granted in the case of natural gas rate proceedings. 15 U. S. C.
§ 3207(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
Under the PURPA's Title II, § 210, States must implement federal rules
relating to the interconnection of electrical utilities with qualifying
cogeneration and small power production facilities. 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3
(Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and (under
certain conditions) "[a]ny electrical utility, qualifying cogenerator, or qualifying small power producer" may bring judicial actions against state regulatory commissions to require the implementation of the federal rules prescribed by the PURPA. § 824a-3(h)(2)(A) and (B).
3
16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The PURPA also makes
available a right of judicial review in the same manner with respect to the
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ments by the PURPA intrude upon-in effect preempt-core
areas of a State's administrative and judicial procedure.
II

In sustaining these provisions of the Act, the Court reasons that Congress can condition the utility regulatory activities of States on any terms it pleases since, under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to preempt
completely all such activities. Ante, 21-22. Under this
"threat of preemption" reasoning, Congress--one supposes-could reduce the States to federal provinces. But as N ational League of Cities v. Usery stated, 426 U. S. 833, 841
(1976), and indeed as the structure of the Court's opinion to- ·
day makes plain, ante, at 9 and 15, the Commerce Clause and
the Tenth Amendment embody distinct limitations on federal
power. That Congress has satisfied the one demonstrates
nothing as to whether Congress has satisfied the other. 4
interconnection of electrical utilities with cogeneration and small power
production facilities. § 824a-3(g)(1). No similar right is available in the
case of natural gas rate proceedings. See 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2) (Supp.
IV 1980).
As a separate matter, the PURPA specifies the procedural requirements
for the state regulatory agencies' consideration and determination of the
PURPA's federally proposed standards. See § 3203(c); 16 U. S. C.
§ 2621(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
' The Court cites Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947) , in support of the
proposition that under some conditions the Federal Government may call
upon state governmental institutions to decide matters of federal policy.
But Testa recognized that, when doing so, Congress must respect the state
institution's own decisionmaking structure and method. That opinion limited its holding to circumstances under which the state court has "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate
this [federal] action." Id., at 394 (emphasis added). The Testa Court
then emphasized its meaning by citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117
(1945), where the Court stated that "it would not be open to us" to insist on
adjudication in a state court of a federal claim arising beyond the jurisdiction of the local court. !d., at 121. See Note, Utilization of State Courts
to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Developments in Judicial
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"The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes state courts as it finds them." Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
489, 508 (1954). I believe the same principle must apply to
other organs of state government. It may be true that the
procedural provisions of the PURPA that prompt this dissent
may not effect dramatic changes in the laws and procedures
of some States. But I know of no other attempt by the Federal Government to supplant state prescribed procedures
that in part define the nature of their administrative agencies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power
to preempt state court rules of civil procedure and judicial review in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This
would be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by
Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to
obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is
any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the
prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty,
bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." 5
I limit this dissent to the provisions of the PURP A identified above. Despite the appeal-and indeed wisdom-of
JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S evocation of the principles of federalFederalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 971 (1947) (nothing in Testa upsets "the
traditional doctrine that Congress may not interfere with a state's sovereign right to determine and control the jurisdictional requirements of its
own courts").
The Court also cites Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658
(1979), to support its holding. Ante, 18. The case stands for the unremarkable proposition that a district court, after adjudicating a contest
under federal law between a State and Indian tribes over fishing rights,
may order the losing State to abide by the court's decision. Nothing in our
Fishing Vessel Assn. opinion authorized the federal court to amend the
structure of a state political institution.
5
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978).
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ism, I believe precedents of this Court support the constitutionality of the substantive provisions of this Act on this facial attack. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); Testa v. Katt,
330 U. S. 386 (1947). Accordingly, to the extent the procedural provisions may be separable, I would affirm in part
and reverse in part.

